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 This research project provides novel tools and applications of techniques to better 
understand and utilize Construction Manager-at-Risk (CMR) project delivery in the context of 
public university capital projects by evaluating CMR project delivery in comparison to Design-Bid-
Build (DBB) project delivery to understand and quantify the value of owner-driven scope growth in 
achieving critical success factors. Machine learning algorithms were used to support construction 
research and analysis, modeling cost and schedule growth using a sample of 37 CMR and 74 DBB 
projects, and accurately imputing missing data values in a sample of 67 CMR and 99 DBB projects. 
In-depth analysis of design and preconstruction services contracts illustrates the importance of 
synchronizing contractual language governing the duties, responsibilities, and obligations of 
collaboration and cooperation between the designer and general contractor. Analysis of project 
performance metrics demonstrated that traditional cost and schedule growth metrics may not 
accurately describe CMR projects in this market segment and a novel metric to evaluate design fee 
efficiency in developing scope changes was developed to assess the quality of project team 
integration. Results were validated by data envelopment which included a survey of public 
university capital projects staff, a content analysis of 44 CMR procurement documents not 
previously included in the research, and case studies of three database projects which appeared to 
have performed poorly but were considered as successful projects to their owners and end users. 
Finally, a method of quantifying the value for money from using CMR over DBB is proposed that 
accounts for collaborative behavior and improved relationships within the project team. Four best 
practices synthesized from the research project are proposed as techniques to allow public 
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1.0 Introduction  
 The annual value of higher education sector construction in the United States is roughly 
$250 billion, or 13% of total annual construction spending nationwide, as of August 2021 (US 
Census 2021). This market sector consists of close to 700 public institutions, ranging from two-
year community colleges, four-year baccalaureate universities, advanced graduate degree-
granting institutions, and independent professional doctorate-granting institutions in all 50 states, 
the District of Columbia, and several territories. Capital construction projects have traditionally 
been delivered using Design-Bid-Build (DBB) where the lowest bidder is awarded the contract 
for construction services in a competitive bidding scheme, however, in the 1990’s, many states 
began to authorize legislation allowing the use of Construction Manager-at-Risk (CMR) project 
delivery in an effort to improve project performance and reduce the volume of construction 
claims driving both project cost growth and extensive litigation (Konchar and Sanvido 1998). 
Public university projects typically have many layers of administrative overhead, end users, 
campus 3rd parties, external 3rd parties, and various groups of stakeholders with varying levels of 
influence over the funding and development of a project which can result in multiple revisions, 
scope changes, additions, adjustments, and approvals that cannot be effectively managed by the 
capital projects staff with traditional delivery methods. Fortunately, CMR project delivery is a 
legal delivery method for the construction of public buildings in all but ten states as of 2021 
(Figure 1.1) having almost doubled in six years (Gransberg et. al 2013). CMR is widely utilized 
by public institutions of higher education in an effort to deliver capital improvements in an 
effective, integrated approach that improves the typically contentious relationships between the 
owner, designer, and general contractor common to traditional low-bid construction projects. 
This project delivery method has had a significant amount scholarship generated over the last 
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30+ years as it has been steady adopted across the United States of America, however, research 
into the application of CMR in the public higher education sector has been limited to a handful 
of studies, of which this dissertation seeks to build upon and move forward the state of the 
practice in this important segment of the construction industry by studying a larger dataset of 
public university projects than has been previously attempted.  
 
Figure 1.1 CMR Legislation by State (as of 2021) 
 
1.1 Background Motivation 
 The genesis of this research project was a result of the author’s experience as a capital 
projects manager at the University of Oklahoma. CMR had been the project delivery method of 
choice for larger capital projects since the University completed their first CMR-delivered 
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project in 2003. CMR had been perceived to provide an effective way to deliver projects that 
were sufficiently complex to benefit from the early involvement of construction expertise 
provided by a general contractor selected primarily upon their qualifications. However, between 
2015 and 2017, the University had more than one CMR-delivered project which experienced 
unacceptable scope, cost, and schedule growth as well as an increased level of contention and 
conflict between the parties to the contract. A decision was made to take a step back from CMR 
and try using DBB delivery to see if there was an appreciable improvement in the ability to 
control the project scope. These difficulties seemed contradictory to the existing literature which 
had proven CMR’s capacity to increase schedule and cost certainty when compared to similar 
DBB-delivered projects. It seemed, at the time, that a wise course of action would be to conduct 
an in-depth analysis of historical projects completed under both delivery methods at the 
University. These projects were the seed from which this dissertation grew and eventually 
became a database of  173 projects gathered from more than 20 American public universities. 
 The initial focus was on building a framework to analyze two major project delivery 
methodologies employed in the execution of capital construction projects in public universities:  
Construction Manager-At-Risk (CMR) and Design-Bid-Build (DBB). There seem to be two 
conflicting schools of thought when comparing CMR to DBB among capital projects staff 
formed by their practical experiences managing projects. The first argues that CMR is usually 
not worth the additional initial cost for construction manager services provided during pre-
construction and that the benefit to see improved project team integration and a reduction in 
contentious behavior is negligible. A commonly asked question is why should you pay the 
contractor more when you still end up dealing with the same difficulties and headaches generally 
associated with DBB delivered, low-bid projects? CMR projects do typically cost more upfront 
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than DBB projects, they pay an additional fee to the general contractor for preconstruction 
services during the design phase, then a construction management fee is applied to the price of 
the work, and higher general conditions are typically paid throughout the life of the project. The 
second maintains that the additional up-front cost for preconstruction services in CMR is usually 
justified because 1) the owner gets to select the best qualified contractor and 2) it produces a 
better designed and constructed product, higher end user satisfaction, increased cost and schedule 
certainty, and 3) reduces contentious behavior between parties that could result in excessive 
claims and/or litigation. Most owners select their CMR general contractors using a combination 
of qualifications and price factors to identify the best qualified contractor for the job. 
Comparative research of CMR and DBB has been conducted in specific states, regions, and on 
the national scale for public infrastructure projects, and the vast majority seems to support claims 
of the second school of thought on CMR. This literature will be thoroughly investigated in the 
Literature Review section. However, there is little, if any, authoritative research in commercial 
building construction, or the specific subset of university capital projects, due to the difficulty of 
assembling a statistically significant population of project performance data. The existence of the 
first school of thought on CMR begs the question, when the literature seems to be 
overwhelmingly contradictory, why, and how, do capital projects staff come to these 
conclusions? Where are the knowledge gaps in the literature that need to be filled in? Is there 
something missing or improperly employed by capital projects staff at public universities when 
using CMR as a delivery method? Are there generalizations from existing research that do not 
apply to this industry segment? This research project intends to answer as many of these 




1.2 Research Objectives   
 There are five research objectives and hypotheses related to answering the research 
question posed comparing CMR to DBB project delivery in the context of public university 
capital projects construction. They were formulated from a synthesis of findings present in the 
existing literature and practical experience from managing CMR and DBB projects in this 
context for multiple years (Table 1.1) with the intended purpose of generating findings, 
conclusions, recommendations, and best practices that could be readily applied by capital 
projects staff. Tasks associated with these objectives and hypotheses can be found under the 
Research Methodology (Section 1.4). 
Table 1.1 Research Objectives and Hypotheses 
Objective 1 
Create a framework to evaluate public university capital construction projects delivered 
using Construction Manager-at-Risk and Design-Bid-Build project delivery methods. 
Hypothesis 1a 
Construction Manager-at-Risk project delivery provides greater value for money than 
Design-Bid-Build when applied to capital projects on public universities. 
Objective 2 Understand the relationship between project delivery method and project performance. 
Hypothesis 2 
Capital projects on public universities, when delivered using CMR, outperform 
comparable projects delivered using DBB, when measured with traditional project 
performance metrics. 
Objective 3 Understand the relationship between contractual language and project performance. 
Hypothesis 3 
CMR project delivery provides greater contractual flexibility to incorporate owner-
directed and late scope changes to capital projects on public universities. 
Hypothesis 3a 
Late scope changes that would require a second procurement under DBB would not 
under CMR. 
Objective 4 
Develop metrics to measure the efficiency by which scope changes are incorporated into 
ongoing projects. 
Hypothesis 4 
The integration of owner, designer, and general contractor staffs found in CMR project 
delivery allows scope changes to be incorporated more efficiently into ongoing projects 
than in projects delivered by DBB. 
Objective 5 
Develop strategies for owners to increase their ability to maximize potential integration 
benefits of CMR project delivery. 
Hypothesis 5 
The quality of contractual language synchronization between the designer and general 




1.3 Literature Review 
 The section is a consolidation of the literature reviews conducted for each paper written 
for this dissertation, reducing the overall length of the report, and providing a single location to 
reference. Likewise, citations have been consolidated from each paper into a single section at the 
end of this report.  
 
1.3.1 Previous Studies 
 The four most salient studies on this subject consist of a master’s thesis, a doctoral 
dissertation, and two studies published in ASCE journals. Neidert’s 2012 comparison of CMR 
and DBB delivery method performance of 19 CMR and 14 DBB projects showed that DBB 
projects took more time to deliver but cost less than CMR projects and that early contractor 
involvement in the design reduced change orders. This is the only study of its kind focused on 
this specific market segment. William’s 2003 study of 111 CM/GC and 104 DBB public 
construction projects in Oregon, of which 23 CMR and 58 DBB were education-related, found 
that CMR projects were more efficient than DBB projects and provided greater potential to 
mitigate risk, however DBB projects outperformed CMR projects on both cost and schedule 
growth. Rojas and Kell’s study of 297 CMR and DBB public secondary school construction 
projects completed in Oregon and Washington showed no statistical difference between delivery 
methods found that CMR projects were less efficient at controlling cost at buy out where 
subcontracts are awarded to trade partners. Carpenter and Bausmann’s 2016 study of projects 
from 137 public schools in the southeastern US showed the DBB outperformed CMR on all cost 















































































































Year Published 2020 2016 2016 2014 2012 2012 2010 2008 2003 1998 1996 1993 
PDMS Compared                         
DBB X X X X X X X X X X X X 
CMR X X X X X X X X X X X X 
DB  X X   X X   X     X X X 
IPD   X   X X           X   
Number of 
Projects 212 204 137 204 35 33 40 297 407 351 25 106 
Commercial 23% 10%   10%           45% 44%   
Housing/Lodging 13% 13%   13%           8% 12%   
Office 58% 20%   20%     100%     42% 8%   
Correctional   2%   2%                 
Educational   27% 100% 27% 25% 100%   100% 100%       
Manufacturing 5% 5%   5%           5%     
Sports & 
Recreation   5%   5%                 
Transportation   1%   1%             16%   
Health Care   16%   16% 50%           8%   
Utilities   0%   0%             12%   
Public Sector X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Private Sector X X   X X   X X   X   X 
  * These studies utilized some or all of the same projects for each analysis   
 
 There have been many other studies comparing CMR and DBB projects which included 
projects from other public sector construction segments (Oberlander and Zeitoun 1993; Pocock 
et al. 1996; Sanvido and Konchar 1998; Menches and Hanna 2006; Rojas and Kell 2008; 
Korkmaz et al. 2010; El Asmar et. al 2013). These studies have generally found CMR to 
outperform DBB according to traditional metrics of cost and schedule growth. Konchar and 
Sanvido’s 1998 seminal comparison of 351 US building projects, they found that over 50% of 
DBB projects experienced schedule growth of 4% compared to CMR where over 50% of 
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projects fell below 0% schedule growth and median cost growth for DBB projects was 4.83% 
compared to 3.37% for CMR. Sullivan, et. al. (2017) captured two decades of literature produced 
researching CMR, Design Build (DB), and DBB projects of which only 8 out of 31 papers 
analyzed CMR cost growth and only 3 analyzed CMR schedule growth.  
 
1.3.2 Project Delivery Methods   
 Project delivery methods are defined by the American Institute of Architects as “a 
formalized contractual approach which allows an owner to secure planning and design services 
and build a project, assuring effective management throughout” (AIA Minnesota (emphasis 
added)). TCRP Report 131 defines it as follows: “The project delivery method (or project 
delivery system) is the process by which a construction project is comprehensively designed and 
constructed for an owner. It refers to all the contractual relations, roles, and responsibilities of the 
entities involved in a project” (Touran et al. 2009). The Construction Industry Institutes 
maintains that there are only three project delivery methods (PDMs): Design-Bid-Build (DBB), 
Construction Manager-at-Risk (CMR), and Design-Build (DB) (CII 1997). There are multiple 
variations on each of these PDMs utilizing various combinations of procurement procedures, 
contract payment provisions, and scope development approaches (Mehany et. al 2018). PDMs 
can be understood as existing along a spectrum of risk and control shared between the owner and 
the contractor (Fig 1.2). Where the owner requires the greatest share of risk and control, DBB 
and its variants are more appropriate. Where the owner requires the least share of risk and 
control, DB and its variants are more appropriate. Where there is a moderate level of sharing 
between the owner and contractor, CMR is the more appropriate. Research has supported the 
benefits of employing alternative project delivery methods to improve project performance since 
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the late 1990’s (Konchar and Sanvido 1998, Ibbs et a. 2003, Oyetunji and Anderson 2006, 
Kuprenas and Nasr 2007, Sullivan et al. 2017, Gransberg and Gransberg 2019). The following 
section will describe the various attributes of each delivery method. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 The Project Delivery Spectrum 
(Courtesy Gransberg & Assoc., Inc.) 
1.3.2.1 Design-Bid-Build 
 The traditional method for delivering construction projects in the United States is referred 
to as Design-Bid-Build (DBB) accepted by public agencies at the municipal, state, and federal 
levels which utilizes a three-step process where the designer is selected to produce complete 
construction documents, the project is advertised for bids from general contractors, and the, 
typically, lowest bidder constructs the project (Hallowell and Toole 2009). This PDM is 
characterized by two lines of contractual privity 1) between the owner and the designer and 2) 
between the owner and the general contractor (Gransberg and Gransberg 2019) as illustrated in 
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Figure 1.3. DBB contracts are typically awarded as a lump sum or on a unit price basis that does 




Figure 1.3 Design-Bid-Build Contract Model  
(Courtesy Gransberg & Assoc., Inc.)  
 
 Some advantages of DBB are that the owner retains total control of the design, the 
designer provides strong representation for the owner acting in their traditional role as the 
owner’s representative, the construction documents are complete prior to the procurement, and 
may provide early cost certainty for project financing. A primary disadvantage of DBB is the 
adversarial relationship between the contracting parties where the designer looks to defend the 
construction documents against claims made by the general contractor who is incentivized to 
actively look for errors and omissions made by the designer to increase the cost of the project 
through change orders to defend against losses due to errors and omission. A key feature of DBB 
contracts is active case building by the designer and contractor over potential claims that, if 
ineffectively resolved, may be litigated in the courts. Unsophisticated owners may seek to play 
the designer and the general contractor off each other to attempt to cut project costs or get more 












has the most mistakes in their estimate which may result in post-award change orders and poor 
project management resulting in a higher overall project cost than anticipated. 
 
1.3.2.2 Design-Build 
 Design-Build (DB) project delivery combines design and construction responsibility in a 
single entity with a single line of privity between the owner and the Design-Builder, see Figure 
1.4. DB project delivery is considered the oldest formalized method of procuring design and 
construction services through a “master-builder”, in modern terms the “Design-Builder”.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Design-Build Contract Model  
(Courtesy Gransberg & Assoc., Inc.) 
 
 DB procurements may utilize a one or two-step competitive negotiation process. In a one-
step process, the owner issues a Request for Proposal (RFP) to potential proposers and 
determines the award using a best-value selection that considers the best combination of the 
proposed technical aspects and project cost which provide the most advantage to the owner 














qualifications and some sort of cost component. With the two-step process, the owner issues a 
Request for Qualifications (RFQ) which proposers respond to with a Statement of Qualifications 
(SOQ) that the owner then rank-orders to create a “short-list”, typically between 3 to 5 proposers 
make this list. The short-listed proposers are then issued an RFP to develop cost and technical 
proposals which are evaluated using a best-value selection process to award the project. A 
common feature of two-step DB procurement methods are honoraria or cash stipends, usually 
worth a portion of the actual cost of proposal development, that help defray the technical and 
cost proposals for proposers that are not awarded the project contract. This is a best practice that 
improves the quality of technical and cost proposals, whose costs are not insignificant to prepare.  
 The primary advantage of DB project delivery for most public owners is the ability to 
accelerate the project schedule which is incentivized by 1) a lump sum contract for both design 
and construction and 2) the shift in Spearin Doctrine liability for the plans and specifications 
onto the design-builder. In public works, the owner warrants the completeness of construction 
documents produced by the designer and is liable to pay for any errors and omissions therein that 
are discovered during the project (United States vs Spearin, 1918). This legal principle was 
established in federal court in a 1918 lawsuit between a utility contractor and the US government 
for the construction of a drydock in Brooklyn Naval Yard. The design-builder is liable to review 
and approve the plans and specifications whereas the owner only reviews the plans and specs for 
compliance with the RFP. Another advantage is that work packaging allows the construction to 
begin without 100% complete construction documents which assists in accelerating the project 
schedule. Additionally, the designer has a greater incentive to adhere to the construction budget 
and schedule as most design-build partnerships are led by the builder. DB has been shown to 
improve overall cost and schedule certainty, especially with large and/or complex projects that 
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may benefit from contractor innovations. A primary disadvantage is the major culture shift 
required from DBB project delivery for all parties. DB requires a greater level of trust, 
communication, and coordination to delivery on its benefits. Additionally, DB projects typically 
cost more than low-bid DBB delivered projects due to the qualifications-based and/or best-value 
selections. This is a tradeoff for increased quality and competence which may not be justified on 
smaller, simpler projects and/or for an accelerated construction schedule that would not be 
achievable with other delivery methods. A final disadvantage is the owner’s loss of control over 
the design that accompanies the shift of Spearin Doctrine liability which requires a greater level 
of trust between the contracting parties to be successful. This can be mitigated with bridging 
documents that specify the portions of the scope that the owner is not flexible on, but the greater 
the quantity of bridging used, the bigger the reduction in potential benefits due to the loss of 
potential design-builder innovations from prescriptive bridging documents. 
 
1.3.2.3 Construction Manager-at-Risk 
 Construction Manager-at-Risk (CMR), also referred to as Construction Manager/General 
Contractor (CM/GC) in the transportation sector among others, is an alternative delivery method 
used widely in public sector higher education construction projects in the United States of 
America. CMR project delivery can be considered a hybrid of DB and DBB delivery methods. In 
CMR project delivery “the public owner engages both a project designer and a qualified 
construction manager under a negotiated contract to provide both preconstruction services and 
construction” (AGC 2007). CMR contracts have the same lines of privity as DBB but include 
specific clauses mandating improved communication, coordination, and relationships between 
the designer and the general contractor to “achieve a high degree of collaboration among all 
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parties” (Shane and Gransberg 2010). The general contractor is typically procured under a 
qualifications-based selection (QBS) and awarded a lump sum professional services contract, 
referred to as preconstruction services, at some point in the design phase of the project (Rojas 
and Kell 2008), as shown in Figure 1.5. The preconstruction services procurement may include 
some sort of cost component, usually a lump-sum fee for services and a percentage-based fee for 
post-design construction services, according to the state laws in force and the owner’s particular 
policies. The general contractor (“construction manager”) assists the owner and designer with 
constructability reviews, producing estimates using real-time cost data, conducting market 
surveys, and consulting on means and methods as well as current construction technology 
(Gransberg and Gransberg 2019). Typical preconstruction services may include market surveys, 
constructability reviews, real-time cost estimates, schedule estimates, construction technology 
recommendations, and coordination of preferred means and methods with the design. The owner 
and general contractor negotiate the construction cost prior to the completion of the design using 
open-books accounting and mutually agreeing to a Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) that 
theoretically is not to be exceeded, however the GMP is often in practice neither entirely 
guaranteed nor maximum. The designer is able to rely upon the general contractor’s intimate 
knowledge of the local market as well as their preferred means and methods, reducing potential 
disputes over the plans and specifications (Choi et. al 2019). The designer’s and the general 
contractor’s contracts contain language in them that mandates communication and cooperation 
between both parties for the duration of the design and construction (Gransberg and Shane 
2010). The owner may directly benefit from the integrated approach to developing design, which 
can improve the relational dynamics of the project team (Touran 2006) and avoid the adversarial 
relationships experienced between the owner, designer, and general contractor found in DBB 
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(West et al. 2012). Much of the literature shows that CMR projects improve cost performance 
relative to comparable DBB delivered projects (Konchar and Sanvido 1998; Molenaar et al. 
1999; Francom et al. 2016).  
 
Figure 1.5 Construction Manager-at-Risk Contract Model  
(Courtesy Gransberg & Assoc., Inc.) 
 
The designer is also procured using a qualifications-based selection. The owner and 
general contractor typically negotiate a Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) for the construction 
scope during the design phase, sign a construction services contract, and issue a Notice to 
Proceed (NTP) when a GMP is agreed to. The preconstruction services contract can be 
terminated or converted into a construction services contract by amendment. At some point after 
the design is complete, a CMR contract may be converted from GMP to lump sum, at which 
point the construction administration is almost identical to DBB. An underappreciated benefit of 
preconstruction services is the ability to terminate the preconstruction services contract if the 


















construction documents can be completed by the designer and let using DBB as the delivery 
method, commonly referred to in the industry as a contractual “off ramp.”  
CMR shares many of the advantages and disadvantages of DBB and DB delivery. Like 
DBB, the owner retains control of the design through contractual privity with the designer but 
can capitalize on proposed innovations from the CM as they choose. Construction work may be 
acerated by working packaging, like DB, so that early work packages are designed and released 
for construction prior to completing later portions of the scope. CMR can spin off design work 
packages faster than DB, even though DB is considered the PDM of choice for schedule 
compression, as the CM can be selected at the same time or before the designer is selected. This 
is rarely taken advantage of as owners using CMR tend to wait until there is some base level of 
conceptual design complete to procure the CM. The contractual coordination between the CM 
and the designer during construction services allows the designer to improve material selections, 
design within the means and methods that the general contractor will employ and rely upon 
significantly more accurate market surveys and cost estimates using real time data only available 
to general contractors. CMR requires a similar culture shift within the contracting parties’ 
organizations to coordinate their efforts effectively and efficiently. This can be difficult to 
accomplish within highly bureaucratic government agencies lacking dedicated executive buy-in. 
Unsavvy owners can similarly attempt to play the designer and contractor off each other, as in 
DBB, which has a greater liability to ruin the advantages of CMR delivery. Finally, CMR 
projects typically cost more initially than comparable DBB projects due to the qualifications and 





1.3.3 Project Delivery Method Evaluation and Selection 
 Considerable literature has been developed over the last 30+ years on the topic of project 
delivery method evaluation and selection. A basic tenant of construction research is to assume 
that no two projects are identical, but a constellation of project characteristics can be derived that 
are generally applicable to all projects. Two hypothetical projects may have the identical plans, 
specifications, owner, and designer but they will inevitably have differences in work crews, 
construction management, staffing, weather, market conditions, etc. resulting differing outcomes 
of vary degrees. Furthermore, each project’s unique characteristics will lend themselves towards 
a preferred method of delivery that it fits best. As far back as 1982, it was theorized that selecting 
the appropriate delivery method could reduce overall construction costs (Contractual 1982). The 
proper delivery method best addresses the needs of the owner, builder, and the unique technical 
requirements and project characteristics (Alhazmi and McCaffer, 2000). Early attempts to model 
project delivery focused on meeting the owner’s specific needs for the project (Ireland 1985), 
built off or modified models incorporating multi-attribute techniques (Skitmore and Marden 
1988, Bennet and Grice 1990), focused on meeting owner/client and contractor needs (Mohsini, 
1993), and incorporated risk allocation and market considerations (Gordon 1994). Gordon (1994) 
posited that choosing the appropriate PDM for a project could “decrease project duration, 
provide flexibility for changes, reduce adversarial relationships, allow for contractor 
participation in design, [and] provide cost savings incentives to the contractor” and likened the 
process of PDM selection to a process of elimination wherein the owner discards inappropriate 
methods until a choice can be made between the remaining methods. These early models had 
their short comings and limitations, of which many were addressed by Alhazmi and McCaffer’s 
Project Procurement Selection Model (PSSM) (2000) that employed a mixed qualitative-
18 
 
quantitative, four-step process based upon an alternative value engineering technique (Parker 
1985) combined with an analytic hierarchy process (Saaty 1994) using proprietary software. This 
process first scored a set of 31 evaluation criteria based upon their appropriateness to a given set 
of PDMs without discarding any PDMs. The second step evaluated and scored each PDM for its 
benefits and drawbacks as perceived by the owner’s team at which point low scoring PDMs 
would be discarded from the analysis. The third step conducted a weighted evaluation by first 
completing paired comparisons assessing only two needs at a time then compiling the results into 
an evaluation matrix where weights are assigned to the evaluation criteria. The final step was 
conducted using proprietary software to provide the optimum PDM recommendation. The 
Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Report 131 remains an important contribution to 
evaluating PDMs in transportation projects (Tourani et al. 2009) categorizes PDM selection into 
three tiers: qualitative approach, weighted matrix method that combines qualitative and 
quantitative features, and a final highly quantitative risk-based cost estimating method. The 
decision-making process is intended to begin with the first tier and proceed thru subsequent tiers 
as necessary to select an appropriate PDM, where the first two tiers should be conducted with 
owner staff and the third is recommended to procure an outside expert consultant to conduct. 
Qualitative PDM selection approaches play an important role in matching projects to an 
agency appropriate PDM by facilitating discussions among the project team, building consensus, 
and exchanging ideas (Khwaja et al. 2018). Existing PDM decision tools are for the most part 
customized to the culture, objectives, and priorities of the organizations they were developed for, 
but all provide a good point of departure in developing a new decision model that is focused on 
the specific agency and market in need. 
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 Gordon’s 1994 study on PDM selection provided 6 examples of how alternative PDMs 
provide contractual solutions to improve project performance over the “zero-sum-game nature of 
fixed-price contracts” (Gordon 1994). Of these 6 examples, 4 directly address solutions to 
reducing the adversarial relationships typical in DBB and are as follows: 
 
1. Flexibility to approve changes without paying a premium. 
2. Creating opportunities for teamwork between the general contractor and designer. 
3. Allowing the general contractor to meaningfully participate in the design process. 
4. Incentivizing general contractors to save the owner money. 
 
CMR and DB both provide improved flexibility to approve changes to the project scope that 
can reduce the potential markup that is typically included in DBB change orders. The use of a 
negotiated Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) enables the owner and the general contractor to 
process changes to the scope with minimal administrative overhead for any changes that fall 
within the GMP amount. Additionally, the GMP can be increased through a simple contract 
amendment or can utilize contingencies established in the GMP contract. The integration of the 
designer and general contractor within a DB entity under a lump sum contract incentivizes 
collaboration between these parties to provide innovating solutions to project changes to 
minimize the impact to their shared profit margin. Both CMR and DB create considerable 
opportunities for collaborative teamwork through contractual requirements for the designer and 
general contractor to communicate and collaborate on developing the design which can establish 
good relationships in the project timeline that improve overall communication when the project 
shifts from design to construction. Incorporating the general contractor into the project team 
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during the design phase contributes to building positive teamwork and effective collaboration 
between the three parties to the contract (Irwin 2003, Minchin et al. 2007). The contractual 
model employed in DB project delivery decreases potential conflict between the general 
contractor and designer in that there is a single line of contractual privity with the owner and the 
DB assumes Spearin Doctrine liability for design errors and omissions, incentivizing close 
collaboration between both parties to mitigate them (Walewski et al. 2001, Harrison-Hughes 
2002, Halpin 2006). In both delivery methods, frivolous claims are disincentivized to the design-
builder and the CMR contractor as both are typically selected either on qualifications alone or a 
best-value selection that combines qualifications and a price factor (Touran et. al 2009). The 
author’s 2019 multi-project cross-case comparison study of 24 vertical and horizontal CMR 
project case studies identified 17 common advantages to CMR of which 4 were strong influences 
to improved collaboration, coordination, and communication (Gransberg and Gransberg 2019) 
are as follows: 
 
1. Select general contractor on qualifications  
2. Spirit of trust 
3. CMAR is owner’s advocate during design  
4. Flexibility during design/construction  
 
Being able to select the general contractor on qualifications is powerful tool that allows the 
owner, and sometimes the designer, to eliminate proposers with records of poor performance, 
contentious or combative styles of interaction, and provides a forum to meet each contractor 
project team in person after a shortlist is developed. Personal relationships are incredibly 
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important in CMR, and DB delivered projects, if the project team is serious about attaining 
project goals and objectives. Two of the lessons learned in this study were related to cooperation. 
The first was that the designer’s contract and the general contractor’s preconstruction services 
contract must be coordinated so that the designer’s obligations to cooperate with the general 
contractor on design development are equal to those in the preconstruction contract. The second 
was that the general contractor should be procured as early as possible in the project 
development and design phase to maximize the potential benefits of project team integration and 
collaboration in developing the design (Shane and Gransberg 2010, Gransberg and Gransberg 
2019). The owner can impact cooperative behavior in the project team, positively or negatively, 
by the way that risk is allocated (Zhang et al. 2016). CMR and DB both have advantages in risk 
allocation from participation of the general contractor in the risk allocation and management 
process (Touran et al. 2009). The ability to coordinate efforts within the project team allows risks 
to be allocated to the team member that is most capable at managing them or permits sharing of 
risks between project team members to reduce the overall exposure. In CMR, the general 
contractor may assist in developing prescriptive designs and specs that clearly spell out risk 
responsibility in greater detail. In DB, the design-builder takes on all errors and omissions risk 
which is a primary source of contention and claims in DBB delivered projects. Collaborative risk 
allocation is a practical way the alternate PDMs enable project team integration and build trust. 
 Project partnering seeks to provide project benefits from positive project team 
relationships by creating an environment of trust, interorganizational collaboration, and clear and 
safe communication (Sanders and Moore 1992). Project partnering is a common activity that is 
usually facilitated by consultants in a single or series of workshops that are a mix of social 
activities and collaborating goal setting. Often, partnering sessions are concluded with the 
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signing of a partnering compact that may or may not be binding.  Project partnering has become 
quite commonplace as an assistive tool for the culture shift required within an organization to 
maximize the potential benefits of alternative delivery. The Construction Industry Institute’s 
definition of project partnering includes the phrase that the “relationship is based on trust, 
dedication to common goals, and an understanding of each other’s individual expectations and 
values” (1991). 
 
Figure 1.6 Partnering Process (Abudayyeh 1994) 
 
 The primary purpose of partnering is to prevent conflicts before they occur by  
transforming relationships between contracting parties from traditionally adversarial ones into 
cooperative relationships that create an environment where all parties are acting as a single team 
(Abudayyeh 1994). This process is simple, as seen in Figure 1.6, and workshops may be repeated 
periodically throughout a project to reinforce commitments and encourage teamwork and  
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become more important when there is turnover in the project staff, which is typically on longer  
duration, larger scoped projects. The California Department of Transportation was an early 
adopter of project partnering in the early 1990’s and their experience was covered in 
Abudayyeh’s 1994 paper where the multiple benefits to the owner and the contractor were 
identified as seen in Table 1.3. Successfully partnered projects enable project team members to 
come to a common understanding of the project and are empowered to openly debate ideas, share 
information, challenge assumptions, and integrate viewpoints and knowledge (Barron 2000, 
Allen et al. 2005, Edmondson and Lei 2014, Manata et al. 2018). These potential partnering 
benefits are more readily achievable under an alternative project delivery method than a 
traditional one. 
Table 1.3 Caltrans Partnering Program Benefits (Abudayyeh 1994) 
 
 
 The integrated project team environment plays an oversized role in the effectiveness in 
project partnering (Uhl-Bien et al. 2007, Li et al. 2019). It is important to maintain an open 
environment where free communication is safe for all team members, allowing people to speak 
freely, ask questions, and collectively learn from each other’s mistakes (Edmonson and Lei 2014, 
Lloyd-Walker et al. 2014). Much of the literature comes from Australia and New Zealand who 
Owner Contractor
Potential claims reduction due to open communication Reduced costs related to potential claims and litigation
Reduced cost overruns and delays due to improved cost 
and schedule control
Improved productivity due to focus on the project rather 
than on case-building
Improved conflict resolution strategies due to open 
communication and unfiltered information
Improved cost and schedule control
Lower administration costs due to the elimination of the 
effort required in defensive case-building
Lower risk of cost overruns and delays 
Increased opportunity for innovation through open 
comminication that encourages proposal for new means 
and methods and constructability improvements
Increased opportunity for financial success through 




utilize a practice known as alliancing wherein the owner, designer, contractor, and applicable 3rd 
party stakeholders enter a joint contract where all parties share profit and loss (Lloyd-Walker et 
al. 2014). Under a project alliance agreement, the owner trades traditional contract prerogatives 
to bring project team organizations, like the designer and builder, into contractual parity so that 
all alliance parties will be incentivized to make “best-for-project” decisions to collaboratively 
achieve project objectives (Australian Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2015). 
Although this PDM does not exist in any similar form in the United States, there are many good 
points made that can be applied to American alternative PDMs, specifically regarding 
communication strategies and proactively encouraging “no-blame culture” practices where they 
can me practically applied within these existing PDM structures. Two problem solving models 
illustrated in Walker-Lloyd et al.’s paper that discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the 
Australian alliancing version of “no-blame culture” provide an excellent visual representation of 
the differences in traditional, adversarial constructs versus integrated alternative delivery models. 
Figure 1.7 shows the established (and problematic) mode of problem solving that revolves 
around placing and avoiding blame for problems. Figure 1.8 shows the alliancing model for 
problem solving that is substantially shorter and directly addresses problems in a collaborative 
manner. This sort of problem-solving culture requires project leadership to make a paradigmatic 
shift away from traditional, authoritative, command and control leadership modes and embrace 
flatter organizational models that capitalize on distributed leadership within the project team that 





Figure 1.7. Established Adversarial Problem-Solving Model (Llyod-Walker et al. 2014) 
 





1.3.4 PDM Selection for Public University Capital Projects 
 Public universities have varying levels of capital projects administration and support staff 
depending on several factors including the size of the university, financial capacity, etc. Some 
universities have independent business units dedicated to capital projects, the University of 
Oklahoma’ A&E Services division for example or may incorporate those functions within their 
facilities management organizations as Colorado State has their Planning, Design & Construction 
division within Facilities Management, or may even utilize a private construction management 
services consultant to provide the requisite expertise on their behalf. Larger universities have 
invested a significant of effort into developing highly competent capital projects staffs, 
employing a robust set of techniques, practices and procedures developed through practical 
experience gained delivering projects year after year. The University of Missouri System’s 
(UMS) Planning, Design & Construction division utilizes five different project delivery methods 
and has developed an online manual (University of Missouri 2021) that provides guidance to 
capital project staff in a concise, effective manner that is particularly instructive given the focus 
of this research project. The spirit of this manual can be encapsulated by the following quotation 
from the introduction to Chapter 5: Project Delivery Methods: 
“The University of Missouri intends to make the best and most cost-effective use 
of construction funding and to build high quality facilities respective to 
functionality and appearance.” 
This is a commonly expressed corporate goal among public university capital programs which 
intends to produce the greatest value in the resultant facilities for the funds available to procure 
the work. Value, for the owner, consists of objective (functionality) and subjective (appearance) 
components which are expressed as a function of an attainable level of quality for the available 
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funds. Optimizing the level of attainable quality for the available funding is one of the driving 
forces behind project delivery method selection, recognizing that every project will be unique 
and have delivery method that provides more opportunity to be able to achieve key success 
factors and end-user goals. The UMS manual identifies nine project selection factors and seven 
owner success factors that should be considered when selecting the delivery method for a project 
(Table 1.4) which are considered in the early stages of project development so that the unique 
considerations of the project are balanced against identified owner success factors to identify the 
best fit delivery method to achieve them. The UMS manual does a nice job of concisely 
characterizing the advantages and disadvantages of each method and provides a best use scenario 
to assist projects staff. An extract of these criteria for DBB and CMR can be found in Tables 1.5 
and 1.6, respectively. 
 
Table 1.4 Selection Criteria Project and Owner Success Factors (University of Missouri System) 
Project Factors Owner Success Factors 
Schedule requirements; or the cost of a linear 
schedule versus the cost to accelerate the schedule, 
or overlap the project phases 
Desire to control design content/quality; ability to 
define and verify the program and to take 
responsibility for the design 
Clarity of the project scope; is a longer planning 
phase needed 
Experience with particular delivery system 
Cash flow or funding cycles funding the project 
budget; when is cash available 
Internal resources to manage particular delivery 
system: ability to manage multiple contracts for a 
single project 
Need for early establishment of the contract for 
construction cost 
Desire to control contingency budgets and to what 
extent 
Potential for scope changes during construction 
phase 
Desire to eliminate responsibility disputes between 
contractors and designer 
Desire to encourage innovation and/or contractor 
input during design 
Tolerance for change orders and flexibility to allow 
changes during construction 
Special financing; developer-led project, etc. Desire to control the project risk and contingencies 
Unusual budget restraints   
Unusual quality or design control requirements   




Table 1.5 DBB Selection Criteria (University of Missouri System) 
BEST SUITED FOR: Projects that are budget sensitive but are not especially schedule sensitive and not subject 
to change. Owner can completely control the design. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Familiar delivery method Linear process means longer schedule duration than 
other methods 
Simpler process to manage Price not established until bids are received; may 
require redesign and rebid if bids exceed budget 
Fully defined project scope for both design and 
construction 
Quality of contractors and subcontractors not assured 
Both design team and contractor accountable to 
Owner 
Cost estimates change during design process 
Lowest price proposed and accepted; pricing, 
including contractor fee and overhead, developed 
competitively: “best price” 
Fosters adversarial relationships between all parties; 
increases probability of disputes 
Creates the most bidding opportunities for general 
contractors and subcontractors 
No design phase input from contractor on project 
planning, budget or estimates 
  
Not optimal for projects that are sequential, schedule 
or change sensitive. 
  
Change orders and claims may increase final project 
cost. 
*Consolidated from UM System Facilities Management Policy and Procedure Manual, Chapter 5 located at: 
https://www.umsystem.edu/ums/rules/fpm/5_professional_services  
Table 1.6 CMR Selection Criteria (University of Missouri System) 
BEST SUITED FOR: Large new or renovation projects that are schedule sensitive, difficult to define or subject to 
potential changes; also for projects requiring a high level of construction management due to multiple phases, 
technical complexity or multi-disciplinary coordination. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Selection of contractor based upon qualifications, 
experience and team 
Difficult for Owner to evaluate the GMP or determine 
whether the best price has been achieved for the work 
Contractor provides design phase assistance in 
budget and planning 
Costs more than traditional bid due to reduced 
competition in pricing of contractor overhead, fee and 
sub-contract costs 
Continuous budget control possible A/E fees higher due to additional packages 
Screening of subcontractors allows Owner and 
contractor quality screening 
Costs often increase due to “details” not in the GMP 
Faster schedule than traditional bid; fast track 
construction possible 
CM may expand budget to create future savings 
Ability to obtain GMP earlier in process; earlier than 
traditional bid, later than D/B 
  
Theoretically, more teamwork between design firm 
and contractor   
Provides more ability to handle change in design and 
scope   
Theoretically, reduced changes and claims once in 
construction   




1.3.5 Construction Administration 
 Construction administration is defined as “the handling of business relations between the 
parties to the contract” (Fisk and Reynolds 2010, emphasis added). “Handling” comes out of the 
contract clauses and “relations” comes from the people and organizations involved in the 
contract, ergo good relations can lead to a successful project. Promoting communication, 
collaboration, cooperation between the owner, designer, and builder are increasingly important 
as project increase in magnitude and complexity necessitating the implementation of alternative 
delivery methods that provide the contractual structures to allow these areas to be improved upon 
over the traditionally adversarial relations found in DBB contract models. 
1.3.6 Preconstruction Services 
 Many authors point to the constructability review as an effective tool to control both 
scope growth and scope creep (Anderson et al 2007; Kifokeris, and Xenidis 2017; Stamatiadis et 
al. 2017; Alsafouri, and Ayer 2019), and recent research on project delivery methods has found 
that Construction-Manager-at-Risk (CMR) delivery provides an effective contractual mechanism 
to ensure constructability through its preconstruction services contract (Alleman et al. 2017; 
Gransberg and Molenaar 2019). “When the designer has access to the construction contractor’s 
real-time pricing and the ability to review the constructability of the design before it is 
completed, there is no longer an excuse to exceed the published budget for the project” (West et 
al 2012). However, this quote presumes that the project scope will not change, and that cost 
growth is a negative performance metric. Previous research has also found that the negotiation of 
the construction cost during the preconstruction period of a CMR contract actually permits the 
owner to refine and enhance its expectations for the constructed scope of work in a manner that 
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adds value to the final project even if the final negotiated price is higher than the original 
budgeted amount (Molenaar et al. 2009).  
 
1.3.8 Measuring Project Performance 
 Project performance can be defined as techniques utilized to quantify “the measurable or 
tangible results of a project” (Jitpaiboon, et. al., 2019). The Project Management Institute (2016) 
states that cost management planning provides a “framework for efficient and coordinated cost 
management” through which cost controls are used as “a mechanism to monitor and control 
project costs”. Public owners have a fiduciary responsibility to the taxpayer to efficiently deliver 
projects, where a prevailing goal among owners is the desire to maximize cost savings with a 
goal of finishing projects under budget. The concept of cost certainty looks at this from an 
opposite direction, with a goal of identifying the expected final price of a project early in the 
process (Touran et. al 2011) to reduce the incidence of unintended change orders. Change orders 
can contribute to cost and schedule overruns (Shrestha and Zeleke 2018, Shrestha et. al 2019). 
The most common cost control metric measures the percentage of cost growth from the 
commencement of construction activities to the completion of construction activities. Konchar 
and Sanvido (1998), in their seminal study of project delivery methods, defined cost growth as 
shown in the following equation: 
 
Equation 1.1 Cost Growth (%) (Sanvido & Konchar 1998) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ (%) =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑋100 
 This metric does not measure cost changes from the initial cost estimate developed to 
finance the actual construction scope, which would reflect an agency’s relative ability to forecast 
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project costs with a relatively immature design. However, El Asmar et al.’s 2013 study of 
integrated project delivery performance defined cost growth in the following equation: 
 
Equation 1.2 Cost Growth (%) (El Asmar et al. 2013) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ(%) =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
(𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)
 𝑥 100 
 
 This metric accounts for early agency estimates, providing some insight into their 
accuracy as compared to the cost at contract award and cost at completion. Equation 1.2 is used 
in the study as a basis for quantifying the amount of additional project cost growth. This 
measurement is a useful project management tool, but it does not characterize the source of 
realized cost growth.  
 Sanvido and Konchar (1998) defined schedule growth the difference between Total Time 
and Total As-Planned Time divided by Total As-Planned Time (Equation 1.3) where Total As-
Planned is defined as “the period from the as-planned design start date to the as-planned 
construction end date,” which is interesting given that cost growth measured did not account for 
changes over the design phase. 
 
Equation 1.3 Schedule Growth (%) (Sanvido & Konchar 1998) 
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ (%) =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
 𝑥 100 
 
1.3.9 Scope Growth and Scope Creep 
 The literature points to poor scope definition as the underlying cause of cost growth in 
construction (CII 1986; Dysert 1997; Dumant et al. 1997; Gransberg et al. 2007) and that design 
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changes are the root of construction cost growth as much as 60% of the time (Bresnen et al. 
1991; Bubshait, et al.  1999; Craigie et al. 2016; Pinto et al. 2018). Scope growth, due to owner 
directed changes, is manifested by design cost growth (Kuprenas and Nasr 2003). On the other 
hand, scope creep is a function of “uncontrolled and unexpected changes in project requirements 
that extend the initial boundaries of the project [scope]” (Amoatey and Anson 2017). The term 
scope creep has several definitions (Amoatey and Anson 2017) but all of them characterize the 
phenomena as something that must be avoided if possible and controlled if not. Scope growth 
experienced during design and construction results in an increase in the design services contract 
amount through owner approved change orders or contract modifications; whereas the result of 
scope creep is a reduction in the designer’s profitability as they must complete more work 
without additional compensation (Knight and Fayek 2002). Research has shown that 
uncompensated scope creep can lead to poor quality design documents (Love and Li 2000; Carr 
and Beyor 2005), which contributes to construction cost growth due to errors and omissions. 
Hence, it is important to differentiate between scope growth and scope creep. As such, the paper 
will use the following definitions to distinguish the underlying difference: 
 
• Scope Growth: Rightfully recognized, compensable increases in the initial project scope 
during design or construction phases of a project, i.e., the result of a conscious decision to 
add new scope for which the designer is rightfully due a contractual change. Scope 
growth is generated by the owner as a recognition of end-user needs that have not been 




• Scope Creep: Recognized or unrecognized, uncompensable, uncontrolled increases in the 
project scope during design or construction phases of a project, i.e., product of change in 
quantities of work and incremental adjustments to the working design not covered in the 
designer’s contract. Scope creep is a type of incremental scope growth that can be 
generated by minor changes to design details, materials selection, means and methods, 
etc. that, in aggregate, contribute to unintended project scope growth.  
 
 In a thought-provoking essay entitled “In Defense of Scope Creep,” Helm (2012) posits 
that scope creep is merely “the pejorative name we give to the natural process by which clients 
discover what they really want.” Helm maintains that scope creep is not only inevitable but 
necessary to the “requirements gathering” process for defining the project’s actual scope of work 
as more detailed requirements is developed during the design process. Helm uses the term “scope 
creep” to cover all scope increases during the design process without regard to whether the 
change is recognized or not. “Scope growth” will be used as the term to define additional owner-
generated scope in this paper. It is important to note that scope change is not necessarily a 
negative phenomenon, as it provides a vehicle by which the owner refines its expectations for the 
final constructed project after the designer is engaged, adding value to the process rather than 
detracting from it. Thus, Helm argues that the project delivery process must be crafted to allow 
for the addition of inevitable owner-generated scope to attain successful project completion.  
 
1.3.10 Beneficial Scope Growth 
 Sobin et al.’s finding (2010) demonstrates that scope growth during project delivery can 
add value, even if it adds cost. It also illustrates the impact of negotiating the construction price 
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during design and preconstruction as opposed to fixing it prior to award of the contract, as 
happens in DBB and DB. Similar examples can be found elsewhere in the literature regarding the 
ability to adjust the final scope of work during preconstruction in CMR (Carlisle 2006; Touran 
2006, West et al 2012). This leads one to infer that the ability to add scope to a project after its 
award is a feature that can add value for money and that cost growth resulting from a conscious 
decision by the owner to add desirable scope should not be considered a negative event. 
Considering the position described by Helm (2012) regarding scope growth, the paper will 
explore the notion that CMR project delivery provides an opportunity for the owner to add scope 
as needed in a manner that is more efficient than DBB, and this aspect creates a previously 
unrecognized value to the owner. A major contribution of this research dissertation is 
quantitatively assessing the concept that project cost growth resulting from owner-directed scope 
enhancements and additions can be a positive indication of project performance. 
 
1.3.11 Change in Construction 
 Change in most construction projects is inevitable (Ibbs 1997, Hanna et. al 2002, Hanna 
et. al 2004, Alnuaimi et. al 2010, Syal and Bora 2016, Duah and Syal 2017, Kim et. al 2020). 
Owners have the right to make changes to their projects, before or after they have been awarded 
for construction, due to changes in their requirements as the work progresses “as long as they are 
willing to pay for them” (Günhan et. al 2007). Researchers have long sought to better understand 
and characterize the causation of cost and schedule growth in construction projects, 
differentiating the sources generating deviations to the project scope generally into design and 
construction (Jacobs and Richter 1978, Diekmann and Nelson 1987, Clark 1990, Burati et. al 
1992, Ibbs 1997, Hwang et. al 2009). Changes can be generally characterized as resulting from 
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alterations to the project scope, design errors and omissions, delays, differing site conditions, 
project suspensions, or acceleration (Ibbs 2007). Diekmann and Nelson’s 1987 investigation into 
the cause of claims in 22 federal projects (18 low-bid, 4 negotiated, total value of $104 million) 
found that design changes where the greatest cause of claims, where 72% of design changes 
resulting from either design errors or owner-initiated changes. Burati et. al’s 1992 study of mid-
1980’s industrial projects (9 each, total value of roughly $7.8 billion) produced similar findings 
with design deviations responsible for 78% of total deviations and 78% of total costs due to 
deviations, where an average of 9% of total deviations per project were owner-driven, and all but 
one project seeing owner-initiated deviations to the project scope ranging from 0.2% to 18.8% of 
total project deviations. Ibbs’ 1997 study characterized the results of three earlier studies (Jacobs 
and Richter 1978, Diekmann and Nelson 1987, Clark 1990) showing that of the primary causes 
of change in the studied sample of projects, 30% were due to design changes not related to errors 
and omissions, which can be interpreted as an attribution of owner-driven changes to the scope. 
His study (104 private-sector projects, total value roughly $8 billion, 37% DB, 46% DBB, 17% 
other) found that most changes identified were executed inefficiently, seeing a reduction in 
overall project productivity by 2.48% for every additional 10% of change added to a project and 
that the costs of labor directly associated with completing project changes increased 
proportionally with the magnitude of the cost of change (Ibbs 1997), ergo the greater the scope 
of the change, the more expensive the per unit cost of labor for the work. Additionally, this study 
produced productivity regression curves which found that design phase changes reduced 
productivity by 10% less than construction phase changes (-24.8% versus -34.4%), while not 
being specifically noted in the findings, was attributed to “turn-key” contractors (Design-Build) 
spending more on design to improve construction phase productivity. This productivity impact 
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relationship sheds light onto the efficacy of incorporating scope changes before physical work 
commences while affirming the additional costs associated with altering the scope at any point 
after project design has commenced. Hanna et. al’s 2004 study of the cumulative effect of 
change in DBB-delivered mechanical/electrical projects also found that the most common causes 
of change were design related “additions, design changes, and design errors” of which the first 
two categories are owner-directed. Günhan et. al’s 2007 study of five years’ worth of change 
orders (more than 6,500) issued by a major American school district employing construction 
management firms issued between 1999 and 2004 explored the relationship between the causes, 
management, and magnitude of change orders. They found that over the period of the study, the 
average contribution of owner-directed changes was worth at least 21% of the total cost of post-
award contract change orders; this could have been more as 26% of the total average changes 
were categorized as “other” due to ambiguities in causation. The school district studied initiated 
a policy change in 2002 to reduce the volume of owner-directed changes by requiring school 
administrators to identify and communicate their desires during preconstruction with the promise 
that construction phase change requests summarily rejected. This is a noted benefit of CMR 
project delivery which provides a vehicle for collaborative project scope development (Shane 
and Gransberg 2010). Hanna et. al, in their 2017 study quantifying the cumulative impact of 
change orders in 68 DBB projects demonstrated that 50% of changes were caused by scope 
additions, deletions, and design coordination, with 26% caused by design changes, 18% due to 
errors and omissions on the designer’s part, 4% due to schedule compression, and only 2% due 
to value engineering. This study noted that productivity losses due to changes could be better 
managed through improved owner-contractor relationships, however these circumstances “rarely 
occur in design-bid-build projects, such as collaboration, mutual trust, and efficient and 
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transparent communications between owners and contractors” (Hanna et. al 2017) which are 
common characteristics of CMR delivered projects. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 This dissertation is paper based, so specific research methodologies can be found within 
each chapter as is applicable. This section covers the general methodology employed throughout 
the life of this research project and guided the synthesis of information gleaned by various 
analyses and sources into findings and conclusions. The primary sources of information for this 
project consisted of: 
1. a comprehensive review of existing literature, 
2. a project database gathered from public universities in the United States, 
3. a collection of public university Requests for qualifications (RFQs) and Requests for 
Proposal (RFPs), 
4. a review of common CMR contracts for both design and construction services, 
5. informal interviews of individual representatives for owner, designer, and general 
contractor with recent experience in CMR projects delivered on the University of 
Oklahoma campus, and 
6. a survey of public university capital projects staff. 
 
The following research instruments were employed in this project: 
1. a qualitative analysis of lessons learned from existing case study research, 
2. a quantitative analysis of the public university construction projects database, 
3. a qualitative analysis of individual perceptions regarding CMR and DBB delivery, 
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4. content analysis of CMR contract documents, 
5. content analysis of RFQs and RFPs, 
6. a survey of public university capital projects staff, and 
7. case study analysis of sample projects. 
 
1.4.1 Research Approach  
 The research objectives (Table 1.1) were executed by completing the tasks set forth in 
this section. A framework was constructed to evaluate public university capital projects delivered 
using CMR and DBB by synthesizing results of the literature review and the results of the 
quantitative analysis of the projects database. Qualitative research tools were employed to fill 
perceived gaps and validate findings through data envelopment. The final deliverables are 1) 
project performance metrics for projects within the database, 2) a metric for measuring design 
fee efficiency, 3) recommendations for improving CMR contracts, and 4) recommendations and 
best practices for university capital projects staff. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1.9 and is 




Figure 1.9 Research Approach 
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Task 1.1 Evaluate Existing CMR and DBB Project Delivery Comparative Research 
 An extensive literature review was used as the primary research tool for Research Task 
1.1, providing a benchmark of the body of knowledge behind CMR project delivery, specifically 
applied to projects completed by public universities to understand where the state of the practice 
currently sits. There is a great deal of scholarship produced over several decades surrounding the 
theory and application of this alternative project delivery method due to its widespread adoption 
in the United States of America. Identifying seminal studies which established widely accepted 
best practices, evaluation metrics, documented practical applications, challenges, risks, and 
opportunities associated with CMR delivery provides an opportunity to find where gaps exist in 
the literature. These gaps are where this research project seeks to add new knowledge to the 




 A comprehensive literature review was conducted over the existing literature on CMR 
project delivery, in public and private as well as vertical and horizontal applications, which is 
covered within this chapter. To summarize, the literature repeatedly demonstrates that CMR 
delivered projects outperform comparable DBB delivered projects regarding cost and schedule 
growth. There was a very limited selection of papers focusing on CMR project delivery in the 
context of capital projects construction at public universities in the United States, which were 
generally in agreement with the other extant literature that CMR delivery can improve cost and 
schedule certainty, however studies in the related field of public school construction diverged 
with the consensus on the point of schedule and cost certainty showing that, in certain cases, 
CMR delivery took longer and/or experienced more cost growth than comparable DBB projects. 
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There was sufficient literature to guide the development of research methods, tools, and 
strategies utilized in subsequent research tasks.  
 
Task 1.2 – Evaluation Contractual Frameworks and Relationships in CMR Project Delivery 
 Research Task 1.2 was accomplished with a pilot study that tested initial assumptions to 
determine if a full study should be undertaken. This study consisted of 1) a content analysis of 
pairs of contracts, design services and preconstruction services, to evaluate clauses and language 
governing integration and collaboration between the designer of record and the general 
contractor during the design/preconstruction phase of the project and 2) a series of informal 
interviews of experienced representatives for owners, designers, and general contractors that had 
worked on university projects locally to ask candid questions about their thoughts and 
perceptions on the practical application of CMR. Findings were synthesized from both tasks that 
were used to guide the development of the main study.  
 
Content Analysis of CMR Contracts 
 Contract documents were collected from several public universities and examples of 
common standard form contracts were obtained for analysis. Contract document types included 
1) agreements for design services, 2) agreements for preconstruction services, 3) agreements for 
construction services, and 4) change orders and contract modifications. Standard form contracts 
samples from the American Institute of Architects (AIA) were included in the analysis due to 
their ubiquity. Two rounds of content analysis were conducted: 1) on a set of contracts for a $30 
million academic building and 2) on three sets of contracts (AIA, University of Oklahoma (OU), 
State of Colorado). Analysis of OU contracts consisted of a word count and analysis of “shall + 
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verb” statements and count of the words “Architect” and “Construction Manager” providing an 
insight into the power dynamics and generation of the contractual relationship between these 
parties. The second analysis of three sets of contract documents was focused on identifying the 
contractual language regulating the relationship between the project designer and the general 
contractor to identify gaps and continuities between each set of contracts regarding the duties of 
each party to the other with an emphasis on identifying examples, or the lack, of synchronization 
between the two. Results of the content analysis are laid out in Chapter 4, to summarize there is a 
significant gap between the duties of the designer and the duties of the general contractor in the 
AIA standard form contracts that strongly favors the designer. Examples of well synchronized 
contracts were produced. Outputs of this analysis assisted in the development of a questionnaire 
used in informal interviews. 
 
Informal Interviews 
 Informal interviews were conducted with representatives for an owner, a designer, and a 
general contractor which had all recently participated in various CMR-delivered projects on the 
University of Oklahoma campus. These interviews provided insights into perceptions of what 
each party considered to be important to a successful project which were 1) the importance of 
expectations management of the owner/client (common responsibility), 2) setting the tone for the 
project early (owner responsibility), and 3) responsibilities of the architect (critique). Results of 
the analysis illuminated the critical roles the owner and architect play in enabling a successful 
CMR and highlighted the cultural shift necessary for these parties to undergo when transitioning 






Task 2.1 – Develop CMR/DBB Project Database 
 Research Task 2.1 had two parts: project data collection and project performance 
analysis. Data collection was the longest task to complete in this study, taking roughly a year and 
a half to collect sufficient public university construction project data to analyze and draw 
conclusive findings from. Project data was received in varying levels of completeness and many 
times in different formats than requested. Additional data was collected by internet search and 
was more incomplete than data provided voluntarily by capital projects staff at several public 
universities that were both forward thinking and kind enough to support this research project. 
This task was conducted concurrently with simulation modeling in Task 2.2, which had to be 
completed to allow missing values to be properly imputed and then conduct a project 
performance analysis of the database projects. 
 
Project Data Collection 
 Project data was collected from public universities between 2018 and 2019 by two 
methods: 1) voluntarily provided by capital projects staff at the request of the researcher and 2) 
through internet web search of publicly available data. Project data for 74 CMR and 104 DBB 
projects, valued at roughly $3 billion, was consolidated into an excel database and missing data 
points were imputed using the Random Forests algorithm. This dataset was reduced to a matched 
“shadow projects” database of 86 projects was analyzed. A second interim dataset of 37 CMR 
and 74 DBB public projects completed by the public universities as well as state and federal 
agencies were obtained to provide a statistically significant sample of projects to assist in model 
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development. These federal projects were removed from the database once sufficient public 
university capital projects were obtained. Data collection was conducted primarily electronically 
over email except for projects provided by two public universities in Colorado. The primary 
investigator visited the University of Colorado – Boulder and Colorado State University who 
graciously provided access to their project records and explanations of how some projects 
included in the database which appeared to have had serious problems had been highly 
successful in reality. These discussions were the catalyst that led to the development of a novel 
method of measuring the performance of CMR delivered projects by quantifying the efficiency 
of design dollars expended for owner-directed scope changes. Data collected via internet search 
suffered from high rates of data missingness which necessitated the following research task. 
Projects were categorized based up their delivery method, project type, and project subtype.  
 
Task 2.2 Develop Project Simulation Model 
 Development of an analytical model was necessary to test the utility of the project 
database, guide the development of an evaluation construct, and provide a tool to impute missing 
values in the dataset. This process provided a useful tool to characterize the project data in 
preparation for project performance analysis. 
 
Simulations Modeling 
 A statistical model was constructed using machine learning algorithms programmed with 
Python that employed multiple regression analysis as an early goal to predict project final cost by 
modeling cost and schedule growth of CMR and DBB projects. This model used an early version 
of the projects database that had been supplemented by a sample of federal building projects, for 
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a total of 37 CMR and 74 DBB projects. The model compared cost and schedule growth as a 
function of the initial budget and schedule estimates developed for the project. Statistical 
analysis was conducted in Python using Jupyter Notebook to characterize the dataset. Results of 
the analysis both supported and contradicted the literature. Results supported the literature by 
showing that CMR project delivery provided better schedule certainty (r2 = 0.767) than DBB (r2 
= 0.242). The analysis showed that Initial Cost and Final Cost variables were significant at α = 
0.05 for both DBB and CMR and Preconstruction variables were significant to both Initial and 
Final Cost variables in CMR at α = 0.15. However, cost variables were poorly correlated to 
schedule variables were poorly correlated for both delivery methods. Results partially 
contradicted assertations from the literature that CMR provides greater cost certainty than DBB 
but there was no appreciable difference between the two datasets (DBB r2=0.952; CMR 
r2=0.945) and that the cost for preconstruction services had a limited impact on predicting the 
final project cost for CMR projects. However, due to limitations inherent in the dataset (project 
type, use of “Best Value DBB” by the Navy, etc.), these findings were categorized as emerging 
trends and were used to focus the analysis in conducted in Task 3.1 on cost performance. This 
model provided a valuable opportunity to characterize project data extracted from public DBB 
and CMR projects providing a baseline from which the subsequent analysis could be evaluated 
by. The full details on the development and outcomes from the simulation model can be found in 
Chapter 5.  
 
Missing Values Imputation 
 The Random Forests data imputation algorithm was employed to eliminate missingness 
in the database. Data for many projects in the database was either not publicly available over the 
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internet or was missing from historical project files at participant universities, necessitating the 
development of a robust technique to impute missing values. Although this is a novel technique 
in construction research, it is well-established in other fields of scientific research. Missing 
values were successfully imputed using this algorithm allowing subsequent analysis of project 
performance and the development of novel metrics. Details of this procedure are illustrated in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Project Performance Analysis 
 A sample of 86 projects was selected from the project database using a well-established 
construction research technique, known as “shadow projects”, which is used to reduce 
dissimilarities between projects being analyzed. There was a total of 43 CMR projects in the 
database that had totally complete datapoints whereas there were over 70 DBB projects with 
complete datapoints, so DBB projects were matched to the CMR project they were most similar 
to according to these descending criteria: 
1. Initial Estimate Value 
2. Project Type (New Construction or Renovation) 
3. Project Subtype (Academic, Administrative, Athletic, Utilities, Health Sciences, Housing, 
Paving) 
The CMR projects with their DBB “shadow projects” resulted in a sample dataset of 86 projects 
where 19 CMR and 20 DBB were new construction and 24 CMR and 23 DBB were renovations. 
A further breakdown of these values and measurements of central tendency can be found in 
Chapter 6. An initial analysis was conducted to identify trends in the updated project database by 
calculating the following cost performance metrics for each project: 
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1. Cost growth from early construction estimate to project completion 
2. Cost growth from construction contract award to project completion 
3. Cost growth from the design contract award to project completion 
When compared, DBB projects outperformed CMR projects in the dataset with CMR projects 
experiencing between 3.7% to 13% (median to mean) more cost growth from early estimates, 
1.9% to 4.2% (median to mean) more cost growth from construction contract award, and 
between -1% to 4.1% (mean to median) cost growth in design fees. The results were a true 
surprise as they seemed to contradict the literature which posits that CMR projects outperform 
DBB projects using these traditional metrics. It had been assumed that by eliminating the interim 
federal projects from the database used in Task 5 would reduce the amount of cost variability in 
the CMR projects in the sample, as would be expected according to the literature, yet the 
opposite occurred, seemingly disproving the second hypothesis. A summary of the initial 
analysis can be seen in Table 1.7.  
 
Table 1.7 Initial Results of “Shadow Projects” Sample 
VAL = CMR - DBB 






Variance 3.8% 2.4% 67.2% 
Standard Dev. 5.9% 10.5% 69.6% 
Mean 13.0% 4.2% -1.0% 
Median 3.7% 1.9% 4.1% 
Total Value   $                       1,543,749,884.55  
 
 A second analysis was carried out on the sample data to identify outliers, using an outlier 
threshold calculation (Tukey 1977) where the threshold value is either Q3 plus 1.5 times the 
interquartile range or Q1 minus 1.5 times the interquartile range. This resulted in the 
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identification of eight outlier values for CMR and four for DBB. Cost growth metric 
characterization was recalculated, and the results can be seen in Table 1.8. There were modest 
adjustments downward in the difference between CMR and DBB, the greatest being the 
difference in variance for growth from early estimates (from 3.8% to -2.3%), however there was 
a rather pronounced positive shift in the difference in mean values for design cost growth with 
CMR seeing 8.5% more mean cost growth than DBB.  
 
Table 1.8 Results after Outliers Removed 
VAL = CMR - DBB 
 Trad. Cost Growth Metrics  
Early Contract Design 
Variance -2.3% 1.0% 2.8% 
Standard Dev. -5.3% 6.7% 9.0% 
Mean 12.6% 1.2% 8.5% 
Median 3.5% 1.7% 3.8% 
Total Value   $                        1,543,749,884.55  
  
 These results demanded a reevaluation of key assumptions held regarding CMR project 
delivery, specifically if CMR delivery doesn’t typically outperform DBB in public university 
projects, then why does it continue to be a widespread, respected delivery method? What is the 
perceived value of CMR to owners that leads them to choose it over DBB, even though it would 
most likely experience greater scope growth? The design fee cost growth shift led to the 
realization that traditional project performance metrics do not account for the value an owner 
might place on being able to incorporate scope into an existing project. Owners typically only 
pay a designer a change order for additional fee if the owner is the cause of the change. If the 
designer has made a mistake in the plans, it is considered an error or omission which they cannot 
expect to be compensated for discovering and fixing. Therefore, the greater positive cost growth 
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for design fees in CMR (15% to 21%) means that owners are more likely to add scope to a CMR 
delivered project after it has been awarded than a comparable DBB project (11.2% to 12.5%).  
 Traditional performance metrics cannot account for this, so a novel metric was developed 
to measure the relative efficiency design fee dollars expended by the owner for owner-driven 
scope additions to construction dollars of scope in those scope additions. This metric is 
expressed as a ratio of construction dollars to design fee dollars (C$:D$) and may be used to 
measure the relative efficiency of design fees expended at any point in a project. The eureka 
moment of this research project occurred when the design fee and construction scope dollars 
associated with owner-directed scope additions were isolated and used in calculating the 
efficiency ratio. It was discovered, for the projects in the sample population, that design fee 
dollars expended for owner-directed scope additions were roughly twice as efficient in CMR 
projects as they were in DBB projects. CMR projects saw between $8.43 to $14.87 of 
construction scope for every design dollar whereas DBB projects saw $4.42 to $8.48 of 
construction scope for comparable design fee dollars, providing evidence that CMR delivered 
projects allow owners to incorporate new scope into an existing project in a more efficient 
manner, providing a previously unrecognized benefit of CMR that needs to be investigated. 
These findings were validated in subsequent research tasks that included a survey of public 
university capital projects staff, a content analysis of external RFQs and RFPs, and an additional 
literature review focused on change and change management in CMR delivered projects. 
 
Phase 3: Validation and Application 
 This research study was validated through “data envelopment” by approaching the 
findings and conclusions with different sources, tools, and techniques. Tools used to accomplish 
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this envelopment included 1) an online survey of public university capital projects staff, 2) a 
content analysis of Requests for Qualifications (RFQs) and Requests for Proposals (RFPs) from 
institutions not represented in the study’s database of construction projects, and 3) an exploration 
of projects from the database that appear to have been poorly administered according to 
traditional metrics but demonstrated a high ratio of owner-driven construction scope change 
dollars to design fee change dollars (as covered in Chapter 6). These tools provided an effective 
way to validate research hypotheses. 
 
Tasks 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3: Construct Validation, Internal Validation, and Best Practices 
 Construction validation was conducted by using the tools developed over the course of 
the research project to evaluated CMR projects with poor traditional project performance metrics 
to determine if 1) the project was over budget or over schedule due to owner-driven scope 
change by assessing the cost growth of design fees and 2) if the project team was able to 
efficiently incorporate that scope into the project to the benefit of the owner by calculating the 
design efficiency of post-award change. There was significant overlap between validation tasks, 
as is evident in Chapter 7. Three projects were identified by poor traditional performance 
metrics: the 5 Partners Place building at the University of Oklahoma (43.9% schedule growth, 
29.9% design fee growth), the Biotechnology E-Wing at the University of Colorado Boulder 
(39% post-award cost growth, 159.2% schedule growth, 11.1% design fee growth) and the 
Multipurpose Stadium at Colorado State University (12.6% post-award cost growth, 91.3% 
schedule growth, 9% design fee growth). Design efficiency ratios were calculated for each 
project (OU - $13.32, CUB - $32.82, CSU - $21.18) which showed that all three projects 
provided the means to incorporate post-award change theoretically more efficiently than 
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comparable DBB projects, using values calculated in Chapter 5. These results provided an 
indication that these projects may have been completed successfully, which led directly to the 
internal validation task accomplished by a detailed investigation of each project.  
 Research was then conducted into the history of each project to investigate the various 
constraints and goals associated with each project, to understand contractual relationships, 
project financing, project team integration, and the sources of the realized cost and schedule 
growth. This research was developed into case studies of example projects exploring the relevant 
history of each project with a focus on 1) validating research hypotheses and 2) synthesizing best 
practices. These examples are found in full detail in Chapter 7. 
 
Task 3.2 External Validation: 
 External validation consisted of three subtasks with included 1) an additional focused 
literature review of change management in CMR, 2) a content analysis of RFQs and RFPs not 
previously included in research data, and 3) a survey of capital projects personnel at a 
combination of public universities that had provided and not provided project data to the 
research.  
 
Additional Literature Review on Change Management in CMR 
 An additional literature review focused on changes and change management in CMR 
delivered projects was conducted as a technique to assist in validating findings from the data 
analysis, content analyses of contract documents, and informal interviews. The literature 
provided the results of several studies on the causation and effects of change in construction 
projects delivered using both traditional and alternative delivery methods, including a five-year 
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study over 6,500 change orders approved on CMR delivered construction projects undertaken by 
a major American school district with an average annual volume of $550 million. This study 
provided an excellent insight into the behavior of the owner’s representatives and their internal 
clients’ methods of fully developing the scope of a project, which directly contributed to cost and 
volume of change orders executed, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 3. The school district instituted 
a policy near the midway of the study that required end users to make requests for additional 
scope during the preconstruction or be rejected automatically if construction had become, which 
capitalizes on the ability to collaboratively develop project scope, an established CMR benefit, 
supporting Hypothesis 3. Additional studies focused on productivity losses associated with 
change orders in DBB-delivered projects found that productivity impacts could be significantly 
reduced through collaboration, mutual trust, and improved communications between the project 
parties which are all established characteristics of the CMR project delivery model, supporting 
Hypotheses 4. The full results of this review are laid out in Chapter 7. 
 
Content Analysis of RFQs and RFPs 
 RFQs and RFPs for CMR projects were collected by publicly available internet search, 
resulting in the collection of 44 individual procurement documents. Content analysis produced a 
count, by document, of the number of incidences that an RFQ/RFP addressed a selection of 95 
criteria common to these types of documents. Results of this analysis provided an insight into 1) 
characteristics of general contractors that are perceived as indicators of competence and 2) 
common patterns in the methodologies of public university owners in procuring general 
contractors for CMR delivered projects. These results ultimately served to validate findings that 





  A 13-question survey was composed and sent to over 220 public university capital 
projects staff, receiving 27 responses of which 23 were fully responsive, which met the target 
response rate of 10%. There was fortuitous near 50-50 split in respondents between executives 
and project management and support staff that allowed a more sophisticated analysis of the data. 
Questions were formulated to test each research hypothesis and results supported Hypotheses 1, 
3-5 and disproved Hypothesis 3a. The survey provided support that 1) CMR provides greater 
contractual flexibility to incorporate late scope than DBB, 2) that project team integration and 
relationships are improved in CMR, 3) that CMR provides a better delivery method to deliver 
complex projects, and 4) that the ability to support the incorporation of owner-driven scope into 
the project is recognized as a benefit of CMR.  
 
1.5 Dissertation Organization 
 This dissertation is organized in journal paper format with the papers organized logically 
from the genesis to completion of this multi-disciplinary research project. The dissertation body 
consists of four parts: 
Part 1: Introduction (Chapters 1 and 2): 
 This part consists of the introductory chapter and a benchmark of the state of the 
 practice provided by a comparative analysis commercial and infrastructure 
 projects delivered using CMR. This paper was published in 2020 in the Journal of 
 Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction.  
Part 2: Pilot Study (Chapters 3 and 4): 
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 This part consists of the pilot study conducted using qualitative (textual 
 analysis of contract documents and informal interviews) and quantitative 
 (linear and multiple regression simulation modeling) methods. These 
 papers were submitted to the Journal of Engineering Management. 
Part 3: Quantifying the Value of Owner-Directed Scope Growth in CMR (Chapter 
 5) This part consists of a study that 1) evaluates the level of contractual 
 synchronization between the designer and general contractor’s 
 professional services agreements, 2) assembly and initial analysis of a 
 statistically significant database of public university capital projects using 
 the Random Forests machine learning algorithm for data imputation, 3) an 
 analysis of a sample of CMR projects with comparable DBB “shadow 
 projects” drawn from the main database, and 4) development of a novel 
 metric to evaluate design fee efficiency in post-award changes that 
 accounts for owner-directed scope growth. This paper will be presented at 
 the ASCE Joint Construction  Institute and Construction Research 
 Congress Conference in Alexandria, VA on March 9-12, 2022, and will be 
 subsequently published in was submitted to the Journal of Legal Affairs 
 and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction. 
Part 4: Validation (Chapter 6):   
 This part consists of internal, external, and construct validation, providing a 
 novel method of calculated value for money realized in a CMR-delivered project 
 that has benefited from the efficient incorporation of owner-driven scope growth 
 and a synthesis of best practices. 
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2.0 Comparative Analysis of Public Commercial and Infrastructure Projects Delivered 
Using Construction Manager-at-Risk 
Gransberg, N.J. and Gransberg, D.D., “Public Project Construction Manager-at-Risk Contracts: 
Lessons Learned from a Comparison of Commercial and Infrastructure Projects,” Journal of 
Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction, 2020, 12(1): 04519039. 
 
2.1 Paper Synopsis 
 The primary benefits of Construction Manager-at-Risk (CMR) project delivery are 
associated with increasing the ultimate constructability of a project by bringing the construction 
contractor to the project during the design phase. This paper reports the results of a content 
analysis of 24 published CMR case studies worth $5.4 billion in both the commercial and public 
infrastructure sectors and derives four lessons learned. The major finding is that the owner must 
synchronize the clauses of the design contract with those of the preconstruction to promote the 
level of collaboration necessary to realize enhanced constructability. It also finds that engaging 
the CMR contractor as early as practical and clearly defining the deliverables it will produce 
during preconstruction as well as limiting the cost component of best value selections to only 
CMR fees facilitates project success. The paper’s major contribution is in the comparison of both 
commercial and infrastructure CMR projects, finding common lessons learned. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
 The Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) defines Construction Manager-
at-Risk (CMR) project delivery (also called Construction Manager/General Contractor) as a 
project delivery system where “the public owner engages both a project designer and a qualified 
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construction manager under a negotiated contract to provide both preconstruction services and 
construction” (AGC 2007). The same source describes the CMR’s responsibilities as: 
“provid[ing] consulting and estimating services during the design phase of the project and 
act[ing] as the general contractor during construction, holding the trade contracts and providing 
the management and construction services during the construction phase.” CMR removes the 
contractual separation of design and construction by bringing the contractor onto the project at a 
point where it can provide substantive input to the final design in a manner that enhances 
constructability and increases both cost and schedule certainty (Alleman et al. 2017). The result 
is a shift in the contractual paradigm found in traditional design-bid-build (DBB) construction 
contracting. Opportunities for improving cost and schedule certainty by procuring 
preconstruction services from the general contractor during project design can be an attractive 
option to public owners operating within fixed budgets. 
 This study reviewed the literature on CMR contracting, including 24 CMR case study 
projects, representing a greater number and variety of projects found in the 2010 research by 
Shane and Gransberg. That study surveyed 11 CMR projects executed by 6 department of 
transportation (DOTs) and 3 non-highway owners (Shane and Gransberg 2010) as well as the 
results of National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis 402: 
Construction Manager-at-Risk Delivery for Highway Programs (2010). The 24 case study 
projects represent both public building and infrastructure projects from 11 US states and 1 
Canadian Province procured by city, county, state, province, and federal government public 
agencies. The projects range from $3.3 million to $1.3 billion with a combined contract value of 
$5.4 billion. The objective of the paper is to synthesize the broad set of experiences represented 
in both the literature and the case study projects into a set of lessons learned regarding the 
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contractual application of CMR project delivery in the public sector, which represents its 
contribution to the body of knowledge in this area. 
 
2.2.1 Multi-Project Cross-Case Comparison Protocol Generation 
 Each of the case studies reviewed during content analysis followed the protocol proposed 
by Yin (2008), which maintains “case studies are empirical inquiries that investigate 
contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context.” Case study research methods are attractive 
because they permit the researcher to drill down into the details of the CMR project performance 
and seek answers for the “how” and “why” questions from case study project participants within 
the context of the specific agency’s procurement policies and restrictions. Hence, the method 
furnishes a mechanism to capture contractual lessons learned from a variety of public agencies 
where the “how” and “why” are the primary variables of interest (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
 While CMR project delivery has long been used in public building construction, it is a 
recent development in public infrastructure projects, requiring the researchers to augment Yin’s 
approach with a protocol proposed for “inductive” case studies by Barratt et al. (2011). 
“Inductive case studies are conducted to extend, develop and build theory because existing 
theory is incomplete… the generated theory is directly derived from the researcher’s data to fill a 
gap in the literature” (Barratt et al. 2011 italics added). Boutellier et al. (2011) posit that multi-
project case study analysis demands that the final protocol determine how to consolidate existing 
case studies, which case study data elements will be extracted, the additional information to be 
collected to ensure that all case study projects in the study population are at the same level, and 
the manner in which the resultant case study data will be analyzed. The case study protocol 
followed rigorous qualitative research design and analysis methodologies proposed by 
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Eisenhardt, (1989, 1991); refined by Miles and Huberman, (1994); and formalized by Yin, 
(2008). The protocol included a research synopsis of project objectives, field procedures that 
detail the logistical aspects of the investigation (such as permission to access projects for data 
collection), and a format for documenting and analyzing the individual case studies (Eisenhardt 
1989, 1991; Yin 2008; Boutellier et al. 2011). A plan was also developed for cross-case 
comparisons to determine similarities and differences between cases (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles and 
Huberman 1994). Qualitative research tools were utilized to aid in the coding and analysis of the 
case study output (Bazeley and Richards 2000). The final protocol became a tool that permitted 
the researchers to manage data and ideas as well as query the data to report results across 
multiple cases, collected at different times. 
 
2.2.2 CMR Advantage/Disadvantage Content Analysis 
 Table 2.1 is the result of the literature content analysis of cited advantages and 
disadvantages. Additionally, each data point was classified regarding the aspect of project 
delivery to which it pertained. The “Type” column in Table 2.1 contains that information. The 
“Times Cited” column shows the number of instances where a given advantage or disadvantage 
was observed in an article. For example, “CMR design input” was the most highly cited 
advantage and was observed in 27 of the 32 papers reviewed. The percentage column is the 
percentage of articles where a given advantage or disadvantage was observed as a percentage of 





Table 2.1 Summary of advantages and disadvantages found in the literature 
Type Advantages Times Cited Type Disadvantages* Times Cited 
D CMR design input 27 100% D 




Early knowledge of 
costs 
20 74% D Still have two contracts to manage 16 70% 
D 
Owner control of 
design 
20 74% D 




Ability to bid early 
work packages 
16 59% D 
Potential CMR design liability via 
review comments 
15 65% 
S Ability to fast-track 15 56% C 
Actual cost not known until GMP 
is set 
14 61% 
R Risk transfer 15 56% A 




GMP creates cost 
control incentive 
14 52% A 




Select GC on 
qualifications 
11 41% C Contingencies difficult to allocate 10 43% 
A Spirit of trust 11 41% S 






10 37% A Must pick CMR early in process 5 22% 
D 
Focus on quality and 
value 
8 30% D 




CMR is owner’s 
advocate during design 
8 30% C 
CMR underestimates cost of 
preconstruction services 
2 9% 




7 26%     




7 26%     




5 19%     
    
A 
Less radical change 
from DBB than DB 
4 15%     
    
* 4 articles did not list any disadvantages. 
Type: A = Administrative-related; C = Cost-related; D = Design-related; S = Schedule-related; R = Risk-
related 
Definitions: Sub = subcontractor, GC = general contractor, GMP = guaranteed maximum price 
 
 Table 2.2 is a summary of the number of types of advantages and disadvantages 
contained in the NCHRP synthesis’ list. It shows that Administrative-related, Cost-related, and 
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Design-related are the three most often cited types. This leads one to infer that the lessons 
learned within these three categorical types will have the broadest application. Therefore, the 
case study interview results were focused on gleaning potential lessons learned from these three 
categorical types as a means to separate anecdotal lessons applying to a single agency or project 
type from ones that were potentially valuable to most CMR projects, regardless of the specific 
agency and/or project characteristics. 
Table 2.2 CMR advantage/disadvantage types 
Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Administrative (A) 6 3 
Cost (C) 4 4 
Design (D) 4 5 
Risk (R) 1 0 
Schedule (S) 2 1 
 
2.2.3 Benchmark CMR State-Of-The-Practice  
 CMR is considered an integrated approach to the delivery of public construction projects. 
In most cases, public owners chose CMR to better control schedule and budget (referred to as 
cost and schedule certainty) and to assure the quality of the constructed project via enhanced 
constructability achieved through early contractor design involvement (Gransberg 2013). The 
public project delivery team comprises the owner, the designer, who might be an in-house 
engineer, and the at-risk construction manager. CMR procurement involves first executing a 
contract for preconstruction services at some point during the project’s design phase. Once price 
negotiations are concluded, a construction contract is awarded. 
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 One of the most oft cited advantages of CMR is the ability to influence design decisions 
early by utilizing contractor-provided preconstruction services (Alder 2007, Anderson and 
Damnjanovic 2008, Kwak and Bushey 2000, Martinez et al. 2007). Contractor input to the 
design is generally referred to by the term constructability (Shane and Gransberg, 2010) which, 
according to Anderson and Fisher (1997), “can be defined as the optimum use of construction 
knowledge and experience in planning, design, procurement, and field operations to achieve 
overall project objectives.” Furthermore, Dunston, et. al. (2002) states that constructability 
reviews “are the key mechanism for insuring that plans and specifications fulfill these quality 
objectives” and that “the early infusion of construction knowledge into the project development 
process … results in the greatest impact and the least disruption in terms of cost” although 
“[i]ncorporating constructability ideas may sometimes call for changes which will add time to 
the design schedule.” These design schedule impacts occur early enough in the design phase to 
reduce schedule growth caused from errors and omissions, increasing schedule certainty by 
expanding the level of scope definition provided in the design. Lopez del Puerto et. al. (2016) 
defined cost certainty by contrasting it against cost savings as “changing the overarching 
preconstruction decision criterion from ‘minimize cost’ to ‘maximize cost certainty’” and 
demonstrated an inverse relationship exists between cost growth and the percentage of project 
funds allocated towards preconstruction services. 
 There are several variations on how these contractual obligations are developed (two 
separate contracts, modifying the preconstruction contract to include construction, etc.), but 
regardless of the jurisdictional idiosyncrasies, the result is the same. The public project delivery 
team comprises the owner, the designer (which may be an in-house engineer), and the at-risk 
construction manager selected by the owner to provide preconstruction services. During 
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preconstruction, the construction manager (also referred to as the CM or CMR) assists with 
scope development, constructability reviews, and updated cost estimates and engages with the 
owner in negotiation over the construction cost of the project. If agreement is reached, the CMR 
is awarded a general contract to complete the construction at the agreed price. If agreement on 
price is not reached, the public owner closes the preconstruction contract, takes the design to 
final construction documents, and advertises the construction project using DBB procurement 
procedures. 
 CMR delivery requires the contractor and the designer to maintain a high degree of 
collaboration (Shane and Gransberg 2011) and creates a mechanism for the owner to negotiate 
the allocation of risk with the contractor through its pricing mechanism. The project’s 
construction contract amount is typically agreed when the design has reached a point where the 
contractor can minimize contingencies for potential scope increases. “The aim of this project 
delivery method is to engage at-risk construction expertise early in the design process to enhance 
constructability, manage risk, and facilitate concurrent execution of design and construction 
without the owner giving up control over the details of design, as it would in a design-build 
project” (Gransberg and Molenaar 2019). Hasanzad et al. (2018) looked at the impact of 
alternative delivery methods including CMR and concluded they "reduce the frequency and 
severity of disputes." This validates earlier assertions in the literature (Beard et al. 2001) that 
when a contractor's past performance impacts its competitive position for future contracts with 






2.2.3 CMR Procurement Process  
 According to Schierholz et al. (2012), one advantage of CMR is being able to “select the 
contractor on a basis of its qualifications, past performance, and record of success rather than 
getting the contractor that submitted the lowest bid, perhaps by mistake.” National Cooperative 
Highway Research Program Synthesis (NCHRP) 390 found that “the ‘soft’ factors related to 
managerial competence and past performance are more important to the prequalification process 
than the ‘hard’ aspects related to bonding and financial status” (Gransberg and Riemer 2009). As 
a result, CMR contractors are either selected on a basis of qualifications alone, termed 
qualifications-based selection (QBS), using a request for qualifications (RFQ) process or on a 
best-value basis using a request for proposals (RFP) procedure. The major difference is the RFQ 
process does not include pricing information as a part of the contract award decision, whereas, 
the RFP process does (Scott et al. 2006). Again, variations on the composition of the CMR best-
value selection process abound (Alleman et al. 2017). 
 The American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC) and the American Institute of 
Architects (AIA) both advocate qualifications-based selection (QBS) for awarding design 
contracts (AIA 2015).  ACEC (2004) maintains that “when multiple prices are on the table, the 
owner is not in control; the price is. When price is on the table it trumps other considerations, 
even quality and innovation.” Thus, the issue in best-value awards becomes assigning an 
appropriate relative weight to the price factors with respect to non-price selection plan evaluation 
factors. QBS is the dominant procurement practice in the commercial building sector (Trauner 
2007; Carlisle 2006); whereas best value is more frequently used in public infrastructure CMR 




2.2.4 Defining Lessons Learned 
 The term “lessons learned” is commonly used in the literature on project management; 
however, it has several accepted definitions.  According to the American Institute of Architects 
(AIA), lessons learned is “the deliberate act of building knowledge during the accomplishment of 
projects, under the watchful eye of the project manager” (AIA 2018). The primary benefits of 
generating lessons learned are the ease of implementing the process as part of an ongoing project 
and can provide dynamic learning for professionals by capturing knowledge gained from recent, 
direct experience. The AIA considers utilizing lessons learned as an effective tool to incorporate 
professional development with billable activity (AIA 2018).  The Project Management Institute 
(PMI) similarly defines lessons learned as “the learning gained from the process of performing 
the project” categorized into three levels: 1) Lessons Learned Process, 2) Evaluation of Lessons 
Learned Repository, and 3) Metrics (PMI 2004).  The first level process consists of five steps: 1) 
identify valuable comments and recommendations, 2) document and share findings, 3) analyze 
and organize for the application of results, 4) store in a repository, and 5) retrieve for use on 
current projects (Rowe and Sikes 2006).   
 Given the above discussion, the study used the following definition for purposes of this 
paper: 
Lessons learned are knowledge gained from the insights of project participants through 
the deliberate documentation and analysis of positive and negative aspects of ongoing 
and completed projects providing useful recommendations to improve the prosecution of 





2.3 Research Methodology 
 The study’s methodology is based on a formal content analysis of previously published 
CMR case studies from eight previous research projects on the topic. Table 2.3 summarizes the 
salient aspects of the case study research. The projects were drawn from 20 public agencies in 11 
states and one Canadian province. The agencies included federal, state, and municipal entities. 
The value of the projects ranged from $3.3 million to $1.3 billion. The criteria for inclusion in 
the sample population are as follows: 
• The project was delivered under published public procurement procedures. 
• The details of the previous case study interview process were available.  
• Project interview data included project participant perceptions of project performance.  
• Project interview data included lessons learned. 
• The agency had completed more than five projects using CMR or at least two CMR with 
at least three using Design Build (DB).  
The last factor was added to eliminate nonrepresentative, anecdotal experiences and ensure that 
the agency had a maturing alternative project delivery process where lessons learned were 
captured and fed back into the agency procurement process. The procurement paradigm shift 
from DBB to alternative delivery methods has been well-documented as demanding a business 
culture shift for public agencies (Shierholz et al. 2012). The DB requirement was added due to 
the recent advent of CMR contracting in state DOTs. The DOTs in the population had at least 
two completed CMR projects plus previous experience in DB contracting. By excluding agencies 
with only one CMR project, the final pool of cases reflects those changes made as a result of 
initial experience. In other words, the experience with the first CMR project tested the agency’s 
procurement assumptions regarding the delivery method, and adjustments to the process would 
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subsequently be made to reflect lessons learned regarding the agency’s CMR procurement 
process. Finally, where an agency’s experience included only two CMR projects, only the second 













1 Alaska DOT Fairbanks Intl Airport Expansion $99.0 Building RFQ 
2 Arizona DOT State Route 89 Chino Valley $21.0 Road and Bridge RFQ 
3 Arizona DOT Loop 303 Waddell Road $128.0 Road and Bridge RFQ 
4 
Arizona/ City of 
Glendale 




Phoenix Sky Harbor Transit 
Guideway 
$650.0 






Ironwood-Gantzel Road (US 60)  
Improvements 
$63.7 Road, Bridge RFQ 












9 Florida DOT State Route 699. $21.0 Road and Bridge RFQ 








Kansas/ USA Corps 
of Engr 
Tuttle Creek Dam Modification $175.0 Geotechnical RFP 




13 Michigan DOT 
Michigan Route 222 Slope 
Stabilization 




Gaylord Journalism Building $14.0 Building RFQ 








Portland Mall Project 
$143.8 
 




Ontario/ Ministry of 
Transportation 
Highway 3 Grand River Bridge $20.0 Bridge RFP 
19 
Tennessee/ 
Memphis Airport  
Whole Base Relocation $245.0 Runway, Building RFP 
20 
Texas/ Texas Tech 
University 
Lanier Law School Center $13.7 Building RFQ 
21 Utah DOT 
I-80 State St to 1300 East 
Reconstruction 
$130.0 Road, Bridge RFP 













# Building (as the major amount of 
work) 
8 #RFQ 12 






 NCHRP Synthesis 402: Construction Manager-at-Risk Delivery for Highway Projects 
(2010) developed a list of common 17 advantages and 13 disadvantages cited in the peer-
reviewed literature. Since lessons learned are directly related to attempts to benefit from potential 
advantages and avoid potential disadvantages, the Synthesis 402 list was used as the basis for 
analyzing the content of literature published since the synthesis was competed in 2009. A total of 
32 journal articles on the topic of CMR in both building and infrastructure projects were 
reviewed, and their content was synthesized into the aforementioned advantage/disadvantage 
sets.  
 
2.4.1 Case Study Interview Lessons Learned Content Analysis 
 Reporting the entire body of experiential knowledge gained by case study project 
participants went beyond the scope of this study, and additionally, much of that information is 
specific to a given agency or type of project. There were also conflicting lessons among the case 
studies. For example, two of the public building projects (cases 4 and 14) interviewees indicated 
that the design should be advanced to roughly 35% or more before selecting CMR contractor; 
whereas 12 other cases indicated that they did not bring the CMR contractor on board soon 
enough to maximize its effectiveness.  Table 4 is a summary of the lessons learned observed in 
more than 50% of the case study projects. It must be noted that the lesson regarding best value 
cost information only applies to projects using a best value RFP selection process. Hence, the 7 




Table 2.4 Summary of CMR Lessons Learned 
Lesson Learned 

















16 6/10 4/12 
CMR reviews of design 
deliverable should be 
clearly defined in both the 
design and preconstruction 
services contracts. 
4,7,8,12,14,16,19,20 8 3/5 4/4 
Restrict best value cost 
information to CMR fees to 
maintain open books 
accounting 
7,11,15,16,21,22, 23 7 0/7 0/7 




12 7/5 2/10 
 
2.4.2 Case Study Examples of Each Lesson Learned 
 This section will briefly provide the salient information for one example of each of the 
lessons learned shown in Table 2.4. Its intent is not to repeat the case study in its entirety. The 
reader is referred to the literature where the details of all the cases shown in Table 2.3 are 
available. Rather, the next section is intended to put each lesson in a representative project 
context, demonstrating how the issues arose and were resolved. 
 
2.4.2.1 Lesson Learned #1: Coordinate Preconstruction and Design Contracts 
 As shown in Table 2.4, the first lesson learned was found in 16 of the 24 cases. A typical 
example for this lesson comes from Tennessee where the Memphis Shelby County International 
Airport Authority was tasked with constructing new facilities to permit the relocation of the 
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Tennessee Air Guard unit stationed at the airport to be moved so that Fedex could occupy the 
existing ramps (Gransberg and Shane 2010). The $245 million project consisted of five phases, 
three of which were CMR, three large span aircraft hangars, each delivered using CMR. The 
agency had completed more than 10 previous CMR projects and awarded the first design 
contract using its standard architect/engineer (AE) form for design services. The CMR was 
selected when the design had been advanced to approximately 30%. After commencing 
preconstruction services for the first hangar project, difficulties arose between the designer and 
the contractor with the designer resisting making any changes to its design as a result of 
constructability suggestions provided by the contractor. An investigation ensued and found that 
“the consultant initially viewed the CMR reviews as unwelcome and unnecessary interference by 
an unqualified entity” (Shane and Gransberg 2010). Additionally, the consultant revealed that it 
had not allocated any time in its fee for dealing with the additional reviews by the CMR, even 
though the owner had awarded the design contract stating that CMR was the project delivery 
method but providing no details as to what changes from a DBB AE contract would entail. The 
collaboration issue was resolved, and to ensure it did not arise in the future, the airport modified 
the design contract for the next phase of the project to put 10% of the design fee at risk for the 
final quality of the construction documents (5% for design quality and 5% for construction issues 
due to design quality problems) as well as codified design milestones, budget review points, a 
requirement to coordinate the design work with the construction work packages, and mandated 
joint coordination with third parties. This change created a different environment in which the 
consultant saw the CMR reviews as another layer of design quality control, and the cooperation 
required for successful completion of the CMR project occurred (Shane and Gransberg 2010). 
The airport felt that the value of the changes to its CMR design contract lay in creating an 
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incentive for both the designer and the CMR to mutually contribute to the design quality 
management program. 
 The Table 2.1 benefit addressed in this example is maximizing the value of early 
contractor design involvement to make the project more constructible. In the same vein, Gribbon 
et al. (2003) found that on a CMR project reported in the literature that the “City of Portland 
reported that the contractor’s early involvement with design review, value engineering, and risk 
analysis prior to design completion contributed to significant cost and schedule savings.” One of 
the Utah DOT interviewees states it in these words: 
“The CMGC [Construction Manager/General Contractor] process gives the contractor 
more time to understand and improve the design and to learn new construction methods 
not used before. Constructability is continuously reviewed in the design phase, so the 
design is optimized for construction and project costs are reduced. The contractor is able 
to inform the team of what construction methods would simplify construction and reduce 
cost and schedule.” (Alder 2007). 
Given the above, the lessons learned from the cases shown in Table 2.4 can be articulated as 
follows: 
 
To gain the most benefit from the early involvement of the construction contractor in a 
CMR project, the design contract and the preconstruction services contract should be 
synchronized to include key design deliverable review milestones, budget review points, 
coordination of the design work packages with the construction work packages, and joint 




2.4.2.2 Lesson Learned #2: Clearly Define CMR Design Deliverable 
 The second lesson learned was found in 8 of the 24 cases and a typical example comes 
from the University of Oklahoma’s Gaylord Journalism Building project and is really a corollary 
to the first one regarding the extent to which an agency can expect the CMR to identify design 
errors and omissions during its constructability reviews of intermediate design deliverables. The 
Gaylord Journalism Building at the University of Oklahoma was delivered by an agency with 
seven previous CMR projects. The agency’s policy was to award the architectural design 
contract and advance the design through schematic design before selecting the CMR contract 
using a QBS award. The preconstruction services contract required the contractor to provide 
estimates of cost and schedule, constructability reviews of the construction documents at each 
stage of design, and several other services. 
 The project progressed without incident, until the CMR bid out the mechanical 
subcontract package. During bidding, each of the bidders indicated that the plans showed four 
zones for the HVAC system but only three air handling units (AHU). The CMR instructed them 
to bid what was on the construction documents, e.g., three AHUs. After the subcontract was 
awarded, the CMR informed the owner of the omission of the fourth AHU in the design. The 
owner’s initial response was to state that since the CMR’s preconstruction staff had reviewed the 
mechanical drawings at least three times before the package was advertised for bidding, that the 
omission was the CMR’s responsibility, and the missing AHU would need to be provided at no 
cost to the project. The CMR took the position that a constructability review, as defined in the 
preconstruction, was not a technical engineering review of the plans and specifications. 
Additionally, the missing AHU had not been detected by the architect, its mechanical engineer, 
nor the owner’s review staff; furthermore, as the preconstruction staff were not licensed design 
professionals, they were not qualified to perform a technical review and had to rely on the 
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licensed design professionals on the architect’s and owner’s staff to ensure that the documents 
they used to produce estimates and constructability studies were technical sufficient. Finally, the 
Spearin Doctrine in construction contract law maintains that the owner furnishes an implied 
warranty of the quality of the construction documents prepared under its supervision and the use 
of CMR delivery in no way abrogates that doctrine (Loulakis et al. 2015). 
 The dispute was taken to mediation and eventually settled in accordance with the CMR 
contractor’s interpretation of the preconstruction contract. The case study interviewee 
representing the owner expressed continued frustration and concluded that the value of 
preconstruction services was diminished if it could not depend on the contractor’s reviewers to 
point out design errors and omissions. The contractor’s interviewee pointed out that while they 
are expected to do a thorough technical review, they do find and report potential design errors 
and omissions if they see them, they cannot be held responsible for any of the designer's errors or 
omissions that they miss. In fact, the preconstruction staff had pointed out several which were 
corrected during the design process. This and similar issues in the other case study projects leads 
one to infer the following lesson learned: 
 
The expectations and limitations of the CMR’s preconstruction review of design 
deliverable should be clearly articulated in both the design and the preconstruction 
services contract. Additionally, the design contract should explicitly state that the CMR 
review comments are not to be construed as directive nor indicative of an assumption of 




2.4.2.3 Lesson Learned #3: Restrict Best Value Cost Evaluation to CMR Fees 
 The third lesson learned was found in 7 of the 24 cases. The example comes from the 
Utah Department of Transportation’s Mountain View Corridor project and is the only one 
devoted to the cost category of advantages and disadvantages. Since 2004, UDOT has completed 
34 CMR (it uses the term CMGC) projects, more than any other DOT in the nation. Thus, its 
experience provides an excellent example for public infrastructure CMR projects. UDOT 
awarded its first five CMR projects using QBS and received criticism from the construction 
industry that the selection process amounted to a subjective “beauty contest” (Park 2012). 
Additionally, the agency’s inexperience with negotiating construction pricing versus merely 
receiving competitive unit prices led it to change the process to a best value award and require 
competing contractors to submit several unit prices for key pay items as part of their proposals. 
Weights were assigned to both the price and the non-price evaluation factors, which allowed the 
calculation of the best value and identify the winning contractor. Over time, UDOT found that 
the value of the pricing was significantly less than the value added by the non-price contractor 
qualification and project approach factors. Figure 1 (Park and Gransberg 2018) shows the change 




Figure 2.1. Change in price versus nonprice evaluation weight over time. (Reprinted from Park 
and Gransberg 2018, with permission from the Transportation Research Board.) 
 
 More importantly, the inclusion of unit prices in the proposal essentially eliminates the 
ability to develop the negotiated construction cost using open-books accounting procedures, an 
advantage cited in 10 of the articles shown in Table 2.1. This is because the contractor’s fixed 
costs and profit are buried in the competitive unit pricing and no longer visible. Alleman et al. 
(2017) also found that requiring unit prices also “moves the preconstruction focus away from 
innovation to ensuring the final design does not violate the pre-award pricing assumptions… 
[and] fixes the project risk profile rather than furnishing an opportunity to discuss project risk 
and determine the best way to allocate and/or share the risks.” The solution arrived at in the 
Mountain View Corridor case study was to ask the competing contractors to submit only their 
preconstruction services fee in the proposal and assign no weight to it in the evaluation and 
award process. Doing so, makes the contractor’s profit and overheads open for negotiation in a 
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highly transparent fashion, allowing UDOT to capture the benefit of open-books accounting 
during construction cost negotiations. 
 A similar approach that has seen limited use but holds the same potential is to ask for 
competing CMRs to submit two lump sum fees. The first is for preconstruction and the second is 
the fee for managing the actual construction project. The construction management fee would 
include overheads, general conditions, and profit. The rationale articulated for a Rhode Island 
DOT CMR project not included in the case study population cited the following factors: 
• In DBB, competing contractors will generally bid the prevailing labor rates, cost of 
materials from the nearest sources, roughly the same equipment costs, and subcontractors 
from the same local pool of trades. Thus, most of the competitive pricing action is 
contained in the contractor’s indirect costs and profit margin. 
• Based on experience from DBB change order negotiations, the most difficult aspects of 
the contractor’s price to determine are (1) coming to reasonable costs for home office 
overhead, (2) general conditions, and (3) profit. 
• If these items are submitted as part of the procurement process as a lump sum, the benefit 
of competitive pricing is received by the agency, and subsequent negotiations can be 
completely open book and if necessary, the owner can audit cost items like payrolls, 
subcontractor, and supplier invoices, etc. (Gransberg 2016) 
 The lesson learned here is not whether to use a purely qualifications-based selection. 
Table 2.1 shows the case studies to be split 50-50 regarding the procurement model used and all 
projects were considered to be successfully completed. The lesson shows owners to avoid 
structuring the procurement in such a fashion that reduces or eliminates the ability to accrue the 
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benefits associated with being able to negotiate the construction cost using open-books 
accounting with the CMR. This lesson learned has two parts and can be described as follows: 
 
Restrict any pricing information required during the procurement process to items that 
do not preclude the ability to negotiate using a highly transparent process; do not let the 
weight assigned to price factors in a best value award overwhelm the benefits of being 
able to select the best qualified contractor. 
 
2.4.2.4 Lesson Learned #4: Select CMR as Early as Practical 
 The final lesson learned was observed in 12 of the 24 cases and examples from the US 
Army Corps of Engineers’ Tuttle Creek Dam Modification and the Sellwood Bridge 
Replacement project are worthy of discussion. The Tuttle Creek Dam Modification project came 
about because of the discovery that the foundations of the dam located upstream of Manhattan, 
Kansas were being undermined by groundwater flow, threatening a catastrophic failure and 
flooding (Hoffman et al. 2008). This project is unique because the agency did not outsource the 
design services, but rather performed those using its internal design assets. The project is the 
largest in situ ground modification ever performed on an active dam in the world. It became 
obvious at the start of the project that the key success factor was related more to constructability 
than a theoretical design solution. Thus, the agency chose to advertise a CMR contract (termed 
Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) by the agency) to gain the necessary expertise at a very 
early point in the design process with the key qualification being past experience on high-risk 
dam ground modification projects. 
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 The project was also unique in that, as it progressed, it became apparent that the owner 
and the contractor were going to have to implement a solution that had never been tested in the 
field. To manage the performance risk, the CMR was paid to conduct full-scale performance 
testing of design alternatives. The result was a final design that was constructed two years earlier 
than planned at a savings of nearly $75 million. The owner’s interviewee stated that if they had 
waited to bring the contractor into the design process at the 30%+ point, the design effort 
expended to that point would have probably been lost as the final design solution was nothing 
like the initial design concept. 
 The Sellwood Bridge Replacement project is an example of the other side of this lesson. 
Multnomah County Oregon originally planned to deliver this urban bridge replacement project 
using DBB, but as the design advanced, the estimated cost exceeded the available funding 
(Multnomah 2010). The owner decided to change to CMR delivery to capture the ability to get 
real-time pricing from a contractor as well as expert project work sequencing and scheduling 
assistance. After selecting the CMR, the first review and estimate revealed that the current 
engineer’s estimate was also missing costs for temporary marine structures necessary to 
construct the project. During preconstruction, the contractor proposed an alternative technical 
concept to resolve the budget overage and improve the project’s schedule. In essence, the 
proposal was a change from the original concept of removing and rebuilding one lane of the two-
lane bridge at a time, using the open lane for traffic (McLain et al. 2014). The contractor 
recommended that the existing bridge be jacked laterally about 40 feet, allowing the contractor to 
build both new lanes simultaneously and greatly improving the traffic flow across the Willamette 
River during construction. The result was a one-year schedule reduction and nearly $11 million 
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in cost savings, not to mention the huge reduction in congestion that was provided to the 
traveling public during construction. 
 Early contractor design involvement cannot start until the contractor is brought onto the 
project team. The earlier that construction expertise is procured, the more opportunity there is to 
benefit from constructability input. It also minimizes the amount of lost design effort when a 
constructability recommendation is accepted and implemented that changes the current design 
approach. As can be seen by the two case study examples, the lesson learned here is: 
 




 This paper’s primary contribution is to assemble a reasonably large body of detailed case 
studies on CMR projects in both public building and infrastructure projects and evaluate the 
content of the detailed interview of CMR project participants conducted for previous research 
projects. The paper demonstrated that not only are there a well-defined set of advantages and 
disadvantages but that there also are a reasonably large set of lessons learned captured and 
published by public agencies using CMR. The paper identified the four most common lessons 
learned and illustrated by examples drawn from five of the twenty-four case studies in the 
population. While the results can be generally applied, they may be limited in their application to 




 The four lessons learned from the major conclusions are supported by the information in 
this paper. Two other conclusions can also be drawn. First, CMR projects can be successfully 
delivered using either a QBS or best value process, demonstrated by the even split between the 
two approaches in the case study projects included in this research. When using best value, the 
agency should not assign so much weight to the price evaluation criteria that it overwhelms the 
ability to select the best qualified contractor.  
 Secondly, early contractor design involvement results in a paradigm shift from DBB 
delivery’s “design-centricity” to CMR delivery’s “construction-centricity.” Logically, the owner 
would not need to pay for the design if it did not intend to build the project. Therefore, making 
design decisions in the context of their impact on constructability is both reasonable and realistic. 
The Memphis airport and Oklahoma Journalism building projects demonstrated the need to 
change the DBB procurement culture when using CMR by synchronizing the design and 
preconstruction contracts and spelling out the role of preconstruction reviews during the design 
process. The case studies discussed from Utah, Kansas, and Oregon demonstrated the potential 
benefits of negotiating construction costs by sharing the risks with the contractor by “optimizing 
the design for construction” (Alder 2007) rather than attempting to shed the construction risk to 
the low bidder on a design that has been optimized for cost alone. 
 In summary, the results of this study demonstrate that owners choosing CMR project 
delivery must be careful to create a project procurement and delivery process that does not 
unintentionally eliminate the potential benefits they are seeking from the delivery method. The 
public owner’s business culture must shift from an antagonistic, hard-bid mentality found on 
public DBB projects and embrace early contractor involvement in the design process as the key 




 The authors would like to acknowledge the members of the nineteen agencies listed in 
Table 2.3 that provided the interviews for the original case studies. Without their insight and 
contribution of time, the lessons they learned the hard way in the field might have been lost. 
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3.0 Quantifying Perceived Value of Preconstruction Phase Construction Manager 
Involvement: A Pilot Study 
Gransberg, N. (2019). “Quantifying Perceived Value of Preconstruction Phase Construction 
Manager Involvement” Submitted to the Journal of Engineering Management.  
 
3.1 Paper Synopsis 
 This pilot study was conducted to investigate initial assumptions that contractual 
language found in Construction Manager-at-Risk (CMR) preconstruction services and design 
services contracts impacts collaborative relationships between the designer and construction 
manager. Results of this study showed that contract language in University of Oklahoma CMR 
contracts was biased in favor of the designer by 1) placing the construction manager in a 
subordinate position and 2) making them more responsible for collaboration than the designer. 
These findings were validated with informal interviews of an owner’s representative, an 
architect, and a construction manager who were all experienced and had recently completed 
CMR delivered projects on the University of Oklahoma campus. Interviews resulted in 
identifying three emergent themes: 1) the shared responsibility between the owner, designer, and 
construction manager to manage expectations of end users and 3rd party stakeholders, 2) the 
owner’s responsibility to set the tone for project team integration, and 3) responsibilities of the 
architect to improve construction document quality and to be more cognizant of the impact of 







 The feature that differentiates CMR from all other project delivery methods is the 
preconstruction services contract, creates a mechanism to gain early contractor involvement in 
the design project (Allemann et al. 2017). In fact, the perceived value of contractor design input 
is cited in most peer reviewed studies of CMR project performance (Bresnen and Haslam 1991; 
Alder 2007; Rojas and Kell 2008; Molenaar et al. 2009; Schierholz et al. 2012; Gransberg 2013; 
Kim et al. 2020). In the words of one typical study, “contractor design input is the most 
commonly recorded benefit in literature [on CMR delivery] … because it enhances 
constructability and innovation and creates potential for cost savings through effective design 
solutions” (West et al. 2012). Thus, the perceived value of the preconstruction phase of a CMR 
contract is well-documented in the literature. However, only one of the previously cited studies 
evaluated CMR educational projects and none were focused on CMR project performance in the 
university capital delivery program context. Therefore, the purpose of this pilot study is to test 
the perception found in the literature that preconstruction services add a unique value in CMR 
that is not found in DBB. The pilot will focus specifically on the higher education context and 
quantify its perceived benefits, if any.  
 The motivation for this preliminary analysis springs from the author’s personal 
experience working as capital projects manager for the University of Oklahoma (OU), The 
author’s personal experience delivering both CMR and DBB leads one to question whether the 
value-added during preconstruction services justifies the added expense of the preconstruction 
services fee (Rojas and Kell 2009) by leveraging the construction contractor’s experience during 
the design phase. Past research has shown that the result is a more constructible project with 
fewer design change orders during construction and reduced cost and schedule growth (Alder 
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2007; Alleman et al. 2017). However, this theory has not been tested in the higher education 
capital project delivery context. Additionally, preliminary analysis of data collected from CMR 
and DBB projects in this sector indicates that the assertion of enhanced cost certainty may not be 
applicable in higher education. Therefore, it is important more fully understand the contractual 
dynamics at play in CMR projects delivered by OU as a starting point to the greater research 
plan. Since the author has intimate working knowledge of the contracts used by OU as well as, 
the parties to OU CMR projects, this provides a level of insight not available from other sources.  
 
3.3 Research Methodology: Contract Documents 
 The pilot study uses two primary research instruments. The first is a content analysis of 
the CMR and DBB contracts used by OU. The second consists of informal interviews with 
architects, contractors, and OU project management personnel to further explain and validate the 
results of the content analysis. Content analysis is a systematic, replicable technique for 
condensing text into content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Krippendorff 1980; 
Weber 1990). This method can be used with either qualitative or quantitative data and in an 
inductive or deductive way (Elo and Kyngäs 2008). Categories are derived from the data in 
inductive content analysis whereas a theory or model moves from the general to the specific in 
deductive content analysis (Grove et al. 2013). In the pilot study, inductive content analysis is 
used to assemble the coding structure and deductive content analysis is used to identify trends in 
the data output and formulate conclusions. 
 The primary research questions explored through this textual analysis are as follows: 
• What are the similarities and differences between the responsibilities of the Architect and 
the Construction Manager (CM) found in CMR and DBB contracts used by OU? 
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• How do they influence stakeholder behavior in the preconstruction phase of a project? 
  
 Critically comparing the textual content of architectural and construction management 
contracts permits the analyst to gain an increased understanding of the importance and 
application of common terms and phrases used in contract documents. These terms and phrases 
allow for connections and inferences to be drawn that illuminate the Owner’s expectations for 
the respective duties of the Architect and the CM during project design which an objective 
mechanism to better understand the gaps between actual contract requirements and inferred 
stakeholder expectations. 
 
3.3.1 Text Selection Criteria and Sampling  
 Two contracts were selected from an engineering academic facility project on the OU 
Norman campus. The first contract is for architectural design services and, the second, for 
preconstruction phase construction management services, permitting a comparison of contractual 
obligations of the two major players in the preconstruction/design process. The architectural 
services contract was executed in November of 2015 and the preconstruction services contract in 
March of 2017. These texts were chosen from the Architectural and Engineering Services’ digital 
project database stored on local servers on the University of Oklahoma’s south research campus. 
This database contains contracts, contract modifications, applications for payment, project 
correspondence, approved permits, and miscellaneous project related data dating back to 2009. 
The text selection was based upon the availability of digital copies that could be converted from 
digital scans into searchable documents using optical character recognition (OCR) software on 
hand. These texts were written for the same project to reduce potential contextual variables 
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arising from differing scopes of the work. Additionally, procuring contractual documents from a 
recent or on-going project allows for follow-on analysis to be conducted with personnel engaged 
in the work covered by these contracts. Finally, the documents needed to be illustrative of typical 
Architect and CM duties as they pertain to the delivery of institutional capital projects as part of 
this overarching inquiry into understanding the perceptions of stakeholders in CMR contracting.  
 These texts are a good choice to explore the relationship between Architects and CMs 
while engaged in preconstruction design activities as they satisfy all the selection criteria. The 
CM has provided preconstruction services on multiple projects for the University over the last 
five years that have, in turn, been designed by various local and national architectural firms. The 
project covered under this contract is a $30,000,000 new three-story, engineering academic 
building. Both sets of contracts have sections devoted specifically to the preconstruction 
activities required of each of the contracted parties that are similar and unique in scope. This 
specific project was chosen out of over one hundred other projects because of its similarity to 
another recently completed project on campus that utilized the same project delivery method and 
is of a similar scope and contract value so that further comparisons conducted between these 
projects may be illuminating when guided by the results of this investigation. 
 Sampling of the text focused on selecting sections of each contract that covered pre-
construction activities. Within the Architect’s contract, sampled sections included (1) 
Preliminary Consultation and Schematic Design Phase Responsibilities, (2) Design Phase 
Responsibilities, (3) Construction Documents Phase Responsibilities, (3) The Project 
Construction Manager, (4) Duties, Obligations and Responsibilities Prior to Construction, (5) 
Optional Duties, Obligations and Responsibilities During Design and Construction Phases, and 
(6) Duties, Obligations and Responsibilities of the Owner. Within the CM’s contract, sampled 
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sections included (1) The Services, (2) Owner’s Duties, and (3) Construction Manager’s 
Representations. The Architect’s contract had significantly more text sampled from it than the 
CM’s as it was the complete contract for design services whereas the CM’s contract was an 
initial contract that covered only preconstruction service and was followed up by a contract for 
full construction services. 
 
3.4 Results: Contract Documents 
3.4.1 Analysis of Sampled Texts 
 The contracts were first read in their entirety, without making any annotations or 
selections, then a second time to identify common terms and phrases. Scans of each document 
were converted into searchable word documents using OCR conversion software. A list of 136 
terms and phrases was tabulated, and counts were taken for each document to detect instances of 
repetition and correlation between the documents, of which there were 66 shared terms and 
phrases. Of these shared terms and phrases, the top ten were (1) construction, (2) shall, (3) 
project, (4) cost/costs, (5) design, (6) phase, (7) requirements, (8) approval, (9) construction 
documents and (10) estimate. 
 Of the ten most common terms, the word “shall” was chosen for the first round of 
analysis. In contractual language the term “shall” implies an obligation of duty from the parties 
in contract. Thus, it provides an objective means to begin elucidating the express requirements of 
the CM and Architect. A count was taken of all the “shall + verb” statements in both samples of 
the text resulting in list of 52 unique obligatory statements. Of these statements, 11 were found to 
be shared between both contracts with the top four being (1) shall prepare, (2) shall provide, (3) 
shall include, and (4) shall review. The text associated with these “shall + verb” statements 
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defined the Architect and CM’s relationship, in that the Architect is to provide design 
documentation, project requirements and estimates and the CM is to primarily provide estimates 
and schedules based on the Architect’s deliverables. This clearly defined their contractually 
perceived roles during the design phase of a project but did not shed any light onto the dynamics 
of the relationship between CM and Architect, leading one to posit that the two contracts were 
not synchronized to create the necessary collaboration required to achieve value for the money 
spent on the preconstruction services fee. Synchronization of the design and preconstruction 
services contracts is repeatedly emphasized in the literature as an essential component for 
realizing potential benefits from CMR delivery (Shane and Gransberg 2010; Schierholtz et al. 
2012; West et al. 2012). That finding demands that a deeper look be taken into the explicit 
contractual requirements of the architect and the CM in the OU contracts. 
 
3.4.1.1 Analysis of “Architect” and “Construction Manager” 
 Another word count was taken of both text samples to identify where each party had 
specific duties to the other party by counting the terms “Architect” and “Construction Manager” 
in the other party’s contract sample. The term “Architect” occurred 33 times in the CM’s 
contract sample and the term “Construction Manager” occurred 56 times in the Architect’s 
contract sample. Six excerpts were taken from the CM contract sample and 15 from the 
Architect’s contract sample that spoke directly to the interaction of the Architect and the CM. Of 
the 15 excerpts taken from the Architect sample, all but three roughly approximated with the six 
CM excerpts. The most direct excerpts requiring consultation between parties are as follows 
from the Architect contract sample: 
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Section 2. The Architect shall consult in detail with the Owner and the 
Construction Manager, and shall carefully analyze any information furnished by 
the Owner and/or the Construction Manager, concerning requirements of the 
Project, including but not limited to, any design, construction, scheduling, 
budgetary or operational requirements. 
Section 8.a. The Architect shall cooperate with the Construction Manager with 
respect to any duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the Construction 
Manager including those set forth in the Agreement for At Risk Construction 
Management Services executed by and between the Owner and the Construction 
Manager. The Architect’s duty of cooperation shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, the duty of providing information to the Construction Manager 
concerning the Project; the duty of providing requested Project documents to the 
Construction Manager including those documents identified in Paragraph 14 
herein below; the duty of meeting and consulting with the Construction Manager 
concerning any matter relating to the Project; and the duty of working with the 
Construction Manager with respect to any inspection, testing, or analyses of any 
work performed on the Project; 
  
 The language of these excerpts from the Architect contract are interesting in that they 
require consultation with the CM and “shall carefully analyze any information furnished by the 
Owner and/or Construction Manager...” which falls under an open-ended umbrella of general 
categories. Furthermore, the Architect is required to cooperate with the CM with respect to the 
CM’s duties covered in the Agreement for At-Risk Construction Management Services, a 
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contract to which the Architect is not signatory.  Missing from the CM’s contract is any language 
of cooperation. The CM is required to consult with the Owner and the Architect, but the word 
“cooperate” is entirely absent.  This speaks directly to the power relationship between the 
Architect and the CM, one of superior to subordinate, where the Architect is the superior party.  
The subordinate party’s requirement to cooperate is implied and the superior party, which 
wouldn’t otherwise be mandated to cooperate has extra conditions placed upon them to work 
with the subordinate.  Support for this assertion is found the following quote from the Architect 
contract where it is designated as the Owner’s Representative, its decisions and directions 
carrying the weight and authority of the Owner themselves: 
7.b. The Architect shall represent the Owner during construction. Instructions 
and other appropriate communications from the Owner to the Construction 
Manager shall be communicated through the Architect unless the Owner directs 
otherwise. The Architect shall act on behalf of the Owner only to the extent 
provided in this Agreement; 
 
 There is no similar language to this section within the purview of the CM’s contract.  
Furthermore, the CM is required contractually to submit applications for payment to the 
Architect for certification of work completed before they are sent on to the Owner for payment.  
This informs a better understanding of the contractual dynamic established by the Owner from 
the beginning of the project that is very similar to the traditional project delivery method of DBB 
where the Owner contracts with the Architect to produce complete plans and then bids them out 
to the lowest bidder. 
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 The excerpt from CM’s contract that is most similar to the Architect’s sample from 
Section 2 is as follows: 
Section 1.b.  The Construction Manager, with the Architect, shall jointly 
schedule and attend regular meetings with the Owner and Architect. The 
Construction Manager shall consult with the Owner and Architect regarding site 
use and improvements, and the selection of materials, building systems and 
equipment. The Construction Manager shall provide recommendations on 
construction technology and feasibility; the availability of materials and labor; 
and other market conditions necessary to insure that the Project’s design stays 
within the budget for construction; time requirements for procurement, 
installation and construction completion; and factors related to construction cost, 
including estimates of alternative designs or materials, preliminary budgets and 
possible economies; 
 
 The language found in the above excerpt is strikingly similar to that found in design 
consultants’ subcontracts to the prime Architect.  The CM is required to bring its experience and 
knowledge of current means and methods of construction to assist with keeping the design within 
the budget and schedule for construction by reviewing the Architect’s design documents and 
preliminary estimates then providing updated construction schedules and cost estimates to 
inform improvements to the design. Of interest in this matter is that the language of both 
contracts requires only consideration of the CM’s recommendations by the Architect, and that 
the Architect is empowered to reject any and all CM recommendations as it sees fit.  Depending 
on the attitudes and relationship of the contracted parties, this may become problematic for the 
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Owner. In this instance, the Architect was brought under contract roughly 18 months prior to the 
CM to begin developing the conceptual design of the project. The primary relationship forged in 
the context of this project is between the Owner is with the Architect, which translates to 18 
months of decision-making without constructability input from the CM. This is an apparent weak 
point in the contractual arrangement for this project that could detrimentally impact the 
effectiveness of the CM’s involvement in completing the design as the onus is apparently upon 
them to establish a positive rapport with the Architect where they are viewed as a project partner 
not a potential adversary. 
 
3.4.2 Discussion of Trends – Contract Analysis 
 Analysis of excerpts from contracts for design and preconstruction services provided 
insight into the contractually arranged relationships between the Architect and the Construction 
Manager. Analysis of “shall + verb” statements clearly established the boundaries of the 
respective parties’ mutually supportive responsibilities yet did not shed much light into the 
dynamics of their relationship. A second analysis conducted, counting instances of the terms 
“Architect” and “Construction Manager” in their counterpart’s contracts, revealed the power 
structure inherent to these contractual relationships. Prescribed roles for both parties place the 
Architect above the CM as the representative of the Owner both explicitly in the contract and 
through the various subordinating roles required of the CM, which range from submission of pay 
applications to inspections of the work to conformance with the design documents as they are 
issued. These roles are the same between the Architect and the General Contractor in traditional 
DBB project delivery methods, in which the Owner places the parties in an adversarial 
arrangement (Pinto-Nunez et al. 2018).  The literature cites the reduction these potentially 
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adversarial relationships between the designer and builder by enforcing mutual cooperation 
during the design phase has a key benefit to CMR delivery (Carlisle 2006; Allemann et al. 2017; 
Hasanzadeh et al. 2018).  
 The time gap between the execution of the OU Architect’s contract and the CM’s 
contract reveals an unrecognized disconnect in the establishment of rapport between the CM that 
may discourage effective collaboration during preconstruction. Relationships are built 
organically over time through shared experiences of the parties to the CMR contract (Carlisle 
2006). The timing of the design contract award versus the award of the CMR contract creates a 
situation where the relationship between the Owner and Architect has matured to a point where 
the effectiveness of that tripartite relationship between the Owner-Architect-CM contemplated in 
CMR delivery can no longer be leveraged for the benefit of the project.  
 To summarize this abbreviated attempt to become fluent with the dynamics of the OU 
design and CM contracts in CMR, two issues were identified that require further investigation. 
First, the time-gap between the start of design and when the CM is brought to the project would 
appear to limit the value of early contractor involvement has been found to add in previous 
research (Carlisle 2006; Allemann et al. 2017; Hasanzadeh et al. 2018) simply because many of 
the fundamental design decisions are made by the Architect and Owner and to change them 
based on constructability input from the contractor would not only create the need to redesign, 
but also a delay in the project schedule. 
 The second issue involves the contractual structure in place when the CM is brought to 
the project, which appears to preserve the adversarial relationships found in DBB projects. The 
OU contracts clearly place the CM in a subordinate relationship to the Architect. Successful 
CMR delivery is predicated on an enhanced level of collaboration with a tripartite decision-
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making process where the CM furnishes priced alternatives to the Owner and Architect before 
fundamental design decisions are made (Hoffman et al. 2008; Park and Gransberg 2018) so that 
the Owner determine if the value added by a higher priced alternative justifies its cost. 
 To answer these two questions requires that participants in actual OU CMR projects be 
interviewed to determine if the effectiveness of preconstruction services provided by a CM is 
indeed limited in practice or if the procurement climate at OU is such that contractual structure 
limitations are actually surmounted by internal collaboration amongst the individuals that deliver 
the project. 
 
3.5 Research Methodology: Interviews 
 Interviews were conducted with representatives from each of the three contracting parties 
over the period of a one week. Three interviewees were chosen primarily for their experience 
participating as project managers in the execution of recently delivered CMR projects. Their 
industry experience ranged from 16 to 40 years, all had participated in CMR delivered projects 
within the last two years and had experienced both positive and negative outcomes. Additionally, 
none of the interviewees had worked with each other on recent projects. Two interviews were 
conducted over the phone and the third was conducted in person, with the interviews taking 
between 25 and 42 minutes. All three interviewees were professional acquaintances of the 
researcher who have worked with him, in some capacity, over the last four years and were 
willing and available to be interviewed as part of this pilot study. All interviewees were informed 
that their interviews would be digitally recorded then transcribed by the researcher, removing 
any identification of their name, employer, or projects to preserve their anonymity, at which 
point the digital recordings would be destroyed.  Each interviewee consented prior to the 
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commencement of the interview. Each interviewee was asked a series of questions about their 
roles and responsibilities within their organizations as well as specific questions from the same 
interview protocol, asking them to describe their understanding of their own responsibilities and 
the responsibilities of the other two contracting parties to draw insights into the potential sources 
of misunderstanding within the contract. The protocol and transcripts of the interviews are found 
in Appendix A. 
 A selection of responses to the questions asking the interviewees to describe the 
responsibilities of the Architect and the Owner. These questions provided several insights into 
the dynamics of the contracting project team that are usually given less attention than that of the 
Construction Manager as CMR projects tend to be construction-centric (as opposed to design-
centric in traditional methods). The roles of the Owner and Architect are critical to the success of 
the project, and they provide different sets of skills and leadership to the team. A summary of 
responses to questions asked relating to the various topics that form basis of the two issues found 
in the contract textual analysis are contained in Table 3.1, full transcripts can be found in 











Table 3.1: Synopsis of Interview Responses. 
Topic Owner Response Architect Response CM Response 
Developing the 
final scope of 
work 
The owner values the 
CM’s input to the scope 
development process by 
providing 
constructability and 
budget checks on the 
architect’s 
recommendations. 
The architect is 
responsible for 
developing the project 
program and telling the 
owner what it needs to 
meet its requirements. 
The owner must 
communicate its vision 
for the project and open 
discussion with the 
architect and the CM 
about technical, budget, 






The owner should 
reserve the right to 
prioritize options. 
The owner sets the tone 
for the level of 
collaboration it desires. 




to the owner. 
Establishing 
design criteria 
The owner needs to 
understand the cost and 
schedule implications 
associated with design 
criteria before making 
the final decision.  
In most cases, the owner 
wants the architect to lead 
the design criteria 
process. 
The architect should 
design to a minimum 
standard and allow the 
owner to chose to 
increase it after knowing 
the cost and schedule 
implications. 
Timing of the 
CM contract 
award. 
Having a conceptual 
design complete before 
awarding the CM 
contract provides a better 
basis for selecting the 
most qualified CM. 
On highly technical 
projects, the CM’s input 
is valuable as early as 
possible. That is not the 
case on routine projects, 
where CM input tends to 
create budget controversy 
rather than frank dialog 
about schedule and 
constructability. 
When the CM is 
engaged after significant 
design has been 
completed, it creates 
distrust between the 
owner and the CM when 






The owner must have the 
information necessary to 
communicate the 
limitations inherent to a 
project’s program to the 
end users. 
The architect’s program 
sets the standard for 
project scope 
expectations and usually 
involves minimal input 
from the owner and none 
from the CM. 
When project scope 
expectations are fixed 
without the CM’s 
constructability and 
budget analysis, an 
adversarial relationship 
develops and distrust of 
the CM’s motivations 
becomes an issue. 
OU contract 
structures 
There is no need to 
change the DBB design 
contract for use in CMR 
because the architects 
know what the 
differences are. 
By definition, the 
architect is best suited to 
lead the project in its 
entirety and as such the 
contracts should reflect 
that hierarchy. 
The current contracts 
place the CM at a 
disadvantage and do not 
encourage the level of 
collaboration possible in 
CMR to achieve 




3.6 Results: Interviews 
3.3.5 Analysis of Interview Output 
 Analysis of common themes within the interview texts can be synthesized into three 
categories: 1) expectations management, which was expressed as a responsibility for all parties, 
2) setting the tone, expressed primarily as the responsibility of the Owner and 3) responsibilities 
of the Architect. 
 
3.6.1.1 Theme 1: Expectations Management 
 Expectations management was expressed by each interviewee as a critical function for 
each member of the project team that needed to be established during preconstruction. The 
Owner expressed this as being one of their primary responsibilities:  
 
“Managing [end-user expectations] and making sure that they don’t think they’re 
going to get more than they are, so that they’re not disappointed later.  But then 
also, seeing what the needs are for the university and what’s really critical to 
have a successful program. “ 
 
 Both the Architect and CM expressed the same opinion, in so many words, as being 
crucial to project success. A failure to manage expectations for the Owner and end-user can 
cause significant delays and cost growth in a project when changes are introduced late in a 
project. The CM gave an example of an Owner requesting to add a hot tub on a second floor of a 
hypothetical project four months prior to completion and being shocked at the cost to add it to 




“And they’re like, “Well, you know, the Architect told me it would be like half of 
that.”” 
  
 His relation of this example illustrates a causal failure to manage expectations 
wherein the Owner, failing to manage the expectations of their end-user, sought out the 
Architect to explore a late change. The Architect, looking to please the owner, obliged with, 
what would otherwise be an unacceptable late change to the scope, resulting in the conflict 
between the CM and the Owner, when the CM had to provide the financial reality check. 
The Owner had this to say about his experience with Architects being too eager to please the 
Owner’s whims when they are unreasonable:   
 
“The CM’s going to fight with his subcontractor about what he’s getting, what 
he’s doing. The owner’s going to fight with the CM about not getting what we’re 
paying for and the Architect is going to, hopefully protect the Owner, but they end 
up fighting with the CM, too. Rarely does the Architect fight with the owner, too 
often Architects don’t end up paying for their mistakes.” 
 
 Consideration should be taken by each party as how to best represent the interests of 






3.6.1.2 Theme 2: Setting the Tone 
 Setting the tone was a commonly expressed as a primary responsibility of the Owner by 
all interviewees. Additionally, responses indicated that the Owner’s level of active involvement 
seems to directly influence the success of the project. The general opinion illuminated the 
potential value that could be gained by the Owner by their participation in establishing a clear 
scope of the work associated with a solid budget at the beginning of the project so that when 
issues arose later on, there would be a clearly established way to address them without 
substantially impacting the project schedule and budget. The Architect had this to say about 
Owner involvement:  
 
“If they are actively involved form the git-go and can contribute and kind of build 
that collaborative atmosphere, I think that any project, no matter if it’s 
compressed in time or challenged in money or whatever issue may be challenging 
that project, that project will be a success.  I think that if the Owner is engaged, 
especially as it comes to the preconstruction side, can understand cost issues, 
can understand scheduling issues, the ramifications of decisions, the project 
will succeed. End of story.” 
 
 The CM expressed a similar desire for the Owner to provide clear guidance on their 
expectations for the project during preconstruction:  
 
“The best thing that an Owner can do is to talk about what their vision of the 
project is with the Construction Manager and the Architect in the room…” 
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 His primary complaint was the Owner preferring to converse with the Architect alone 
when relating their vision for the project. His observation was compelling, the need for the CM 
to be privy to conversations regarding the project is crucial when the CM will end up being 
responsible for the decisions made as a result.  
 The Owner’s response to the question about his role was affirmative and informative 
regarding the need to set the tone of the project: 
 
“[C]aretaker comes to mind. Protector of our resources. Guide through the 
design process to protect the integrity of our campus.  Architectural integrity as 
well as the functionality of all the systems that go into it.” 
 
 The Owner’s ability to communicate their vision and set the tone for the project, up 
front, is a critical role that they alone can play. This establishment of goals and norms 
provides the framework within which the Architect and CM can produce a successful project 
that satisfies the needs of the Owner and end-user. 
 
3.6.1.3 Theme 3: Responsibilities of the Architect 
 Views of responsibilities of the Architect were much more diffused than those expressed 
for the Owner and Construction Manager. The Owner’s primary requirement of the Architect 
was the provision of complete, accurate plans that would provide clear guidance to the 
subcontractors in the execution of the project. The Owner had observed degradation in the 
quality control of design documents over the last several years and most notably in those 




“One of the things that’s happened with CM[R] is that there’s been a lack of 
quality control once you get to construction documents, just to answer your 
precon[onstruction] question. It is a problem, since the Architect is working with 
a CM, working through details and ways to do things. I don’t think they button up 
their CD’s [construction documents] as tightly as they used to, but that’s not the 
only reason, it’s not taught as well as it once was taught.” 
 
 A function of CMR procured projects is the production of construction documents by the 
Architect in collaboration with the CM to improve the constructability of plans, select 
appropriate construction technology, and provide current pricing to inform the selection of 
materials and methods. Both the Owner and the CM related instances from their experience 
where incomplete or a delay in providing plans had a negative impact upon the project. The 
Architect’s response to the question about their responsibilities provided an interesting if oblique 
support for the Owner and CM’s critique. 
 
“As my experience has been, it’s varied. I think it has a lot to do with who is 
really leading the project...  It gets a little grey ….and a little nebulous in terms of 
the responsibilities, based upon the experience and the capabilities of the 
contractor, in my opinion.” 
  
 This response is reasonable when considering the shifting of focus from design-centric to 
construction-centric that has occurred with the growing acceptance of negotiated bid 
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procurement methods. Over the last century, the Architect’s role has changed considerably from 
the concept of the “Master Builder” that prevailed until the 20th Century, where the Architect 
was designer, contractor, and owner’s representative, through the hard bid era following the 
Second World War to the current situation. In a sense, negotiated bid procurements are very 
much a return to the old way of procuring projects which combines all of the disciplines of the 
project team during the design. It is understandable then that there seems to be a general 
acknowledgement that the Architect’s responsibilities appear nebulous within a collaborative 
paradigm. The CM’s response to the question of Architect responsibilities is also illustrative:  
   
“My big thing from them is that they’re communicating with the Owner and being 
realistic of what they’re going to deliver.” 
 
 This seems to be a common opinion from CMs regarding the products provided by 
the Architect for construction and is one of the reasons why CMs are involved in 
preconstruction, to provide a greater level of realism to the design as it affects the materials 
and methods employed to execute the project. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 Interviews conducted with experienced representatives of the Owner, Architect, and 
Construction Manager provided valuable insights into the perceived responsibilities of each 
party as they relate to the CMR procured project. Three main conclusions can be drawn 
from the analysis of these texts. First, expectations management is crucial function of all 
parties within the project team. The preconstruction phase should be utilized to establish the 
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project baseline expectations regarding the scope of the work, the hard ceiling on the project 
budget, and outline the process to deal with changes to the scope in a collaborative manner 
to prevent unacceptable scope and schedule growth. Second, the Owner’s responsibility to 
set the tone for the project is directly correlated to the ability to successfully navigate the 
inevitable challenges of the project. Owners should make active involvement in their 
projects a clear priority with a focus on establishing and maintaining expectations, vision, 
and norms throughout the project in a highly consistent manner. Consistency is fundamental 
to preserving the integrity of the project scope and the viability of the financing associated 
with the program. Finally, the responsibilities of the Architect need to be clearly 
communicated by the Owner during the selection process to prevent confusion between the 
contracting parties of the project team. The varied responses of each interviewee 
demonstrated that the lack of clarity for this crucial member of the project team has the 
potential to create significant challenges for CMR projects. Expectations for the Architect’s 
responsibilities should be more clearly communicated by the Owner during the designer 
selection process with preference given to design firms that can clearly demonstrate solid 
past performance in negotiated bid projects. A potential metric for measuring designer 
performance in a negotiated bid scenario could be a cursory count of the Requests for 
Information from the CM as compared to the overall cost growth experienced by the budget. 
Additionally, Architecture firms may benefit from adopting the practice of politely, but 
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4.1 Synopsis 
 This study developed a statistical simulations model utilizing linear and multiple 
regression machine learning in Python software to model and evaluate the performance of CMR 
and DBB project data with the goal of predicting final project costs and durations. Cost and 
schedule data consisted of 101 capital projects from the University of Oklahoma, Texas Tech 
University, US Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC), Oklahoma Central Services, and other 
public owners utilizing CMR and/or DBB delivery methods. The analysis found that 1) CMR 
projects tended to have lower variability between estimated and actual project schedule, 2) there 
was no significant difference in cost performance between DBB and CMR projects, and 3) that 
the cost of preconstruction services has relatively little impact in the final cost of a project.  
 
4.2 Research Methodology 
 The following section describes the scope of the predictive analysis, data sets, 
assumptions, parameters, and decision variables employed. Data was organized into Excel 
worksheets which were uploaded into Jupyter Notebook for analysis utilizing a series of Python 
libraries. First, the combined dataset was characterized and split into two subsets, based on 
project delivery method, which were also characterized. Outliers were identified and removed 
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from each subset and statistical analyses were conducted. Simple linear regressions were 
conducted to check model assumptions for linearity and independence of variables. Multiple 
regression models were employed as the final step using machine learning algorithms to train 
and test the model’s ability to predict project final cost.  
 A brief literature review relating to comparative analysis of public capital construction 
projects delivered under DBB and CMR contracts has been included as well. 
 
4.2.1 Scope of the Analysis 
 The purpose of the analysis was to compare public projects delivered under CMR and 
DBB contracts by analyzing cost and schedule growth as a function of initial budget estimates 
and contracted project durations, respectively, and determine the relationship between cost and 
schedule growth and project delivery method. Additionally, the value of preconstruction services 
procured in CMR projects was calculated as a percentage of the early budget estimate to 
determine if there was a relationship between the amount invested in preconstruction and cost 
and/or schedule growth associated with the projects analyzed. The goal of the model was to see 
if final cost could be reliably predicted using values for an initial cost and expected schedule 
growth. 
 
4.2.2 Data Sets & Parameters 
Data sets utilized were drawn from the University of Oklahoma, the US Naval Facilities 
Command (NAVFAC), Oklahoma Department of Central Services, Texas Tech University, and 
several individual projects conducted by state and municipal public owners. Data included in the 
database for CMR projects is as follows: 
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1. Project Name 
2. Early Budget Estimate (in $) 
3. Actual Completed Cost (in $) 
4. Preconstruction Amount (in $) (CMR projects only) 
5. Original Contract Duration (in days) 
6. Actual Contract Duration (in days) 
Data included in the database for DBB projects is as follows: 
1. Project Name 
2. Early Budget Estimate (in $) 
3. Actual Completed Cost (in $) 
4. Original Contract Duration (in days) 
5. Actual Contract Duration (in days) 
 Projects missing any of the data points were eliminated from the data set. NAVFAC 
project durations were converted from months to days using an average working days per month 
of 21.5 multiplied by the number of months listed to provide a working day duration. 
 
4.2.3 Performance Metrics 
 Cost growth was calculated using the following formulation: 
Eq. 4.1 Cost Growth from Award 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ =




 Schedule growth was calculated using the following formulation: 
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Eq. 4.2 Schedule Growth from Award 
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ =




 Preconstruction (dollar value) percentage of project was calculated using the following 
formulation: 
Eq. 4.3 Preconstruction % of Project 





4.2.4 Statistical Assumptions 
 Normality was assumed based upon the sample size of the data being greater than 30 
projects by contract type:  37 CMR projects and 74 DBB projects. Cost and Duration variables 
were assumed to be independent. 
 
4.2.5 Delivery Method Behavioral Assumptions 
 DBB project delivery tends to produce an adversarial climate between project 
stakeholders that places the designer and general contractor at odds with each other and the 
owner. Design contracts designate the designer of record as the owner’s representative for the 
project, delegating them decisional authority for matters of design, responding to contractor 
generated requests for information, issuing of instructions on means and methods of 
construction, validating pay requests, and authorizing changes to the scope of work. The designer 
of record is the gate keeper of the project scope for the owner and is incentivized to ‘play 
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defense’ responding to questions that identify gaps or missing information that was left out of the 
construction documents during design. The designer has a vested interest to be perceived as 
defending the owner’s interest primarily expressed by reducing cost growth against contractor 
claims and maintaining their professional reputation of reliability in producing complete plans 
and specifications. Conversely, the general contractor has an incentive to discover missing data 
and gaps in the plans and specifications that will be required for the project to be successfully 
completed. Discovering these gaps during the advertising period can allow general contractors to 
submit lower bids than their competitors, with the knowledge that they can make back the 
difference in their bid by applying for change orders after project awarded. Some savvy general 
contractors in the low bid market have been quite successful at winning jobs and making their 
target profits by utilizing this technique. 
Many public construction contracts, both DBB and CMR, include liquidate damages 
clauses triggered typically by missing completion milestones in the contracted schedule. The 
general contractor agrees to pay damages at a fixed dollar value for each day’s delay usually past 
the contract completion date. The University of Oklahoma ties liquidated damages to the 
substantial completion date, which occurs when all of the major scope is complete, the end user 
can begin to move furniture and equipment into the facility, but there are still minor tasks for the 
general contractor to complete to obtain final completion.  In some cases, the liquidated damages 
amount is reduced by half for delays past final completion (typically 15 to 30 days following 
certification of substantial completion). Contractors are understandably averse to paying 
liquidated damages and will increase their bids to cover the value of liquidated damages they 
may be expected to pay if there are unauthorized project delays. This internal allowance is 
converted into additional profit or used to cover shortfalls if the general contractor obtains 
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substantial completion on time. Additionally, change order requests typically include a request 
for additional time to be added to the contract to cover the schedule impacts of authorized 
changes. An increase in variability between the initial budgets and schedules and the finals can 
be readily assumed based upon these modes of behavior generated by incentives and 
disincentives created by an owner’s DBB contract. 
CMR contracts are designed to reduce the adversarial relationship between the designer 
and general contractor through early contractor involvement. Lopez del Puerto, et. al’s 2016 
analysis of 1,200 public CMR projects demonstrated that increasing the owner’s investment in 
preconstruction design services, up to a point somewhere between 11-15% of the total project, 
improved cost certainty in CMR procured projects. Gransberg and Gransberg (2019) posited that 
the earlier the general contractor is involved in the design process, the greater the effect they 
have upon improving cost and schedule certainty. Owner do not always follow best practices, 
failing to maximize the potential benefits of CMR delivery which may result in increased 
variability in cost and schedule performance on their projects. It was expected, based upon the 
literature, that there should be less variability experienced between the initial and final budgets 
and schedules in CMR projects when compared to DBB projects. 
 
4.2.6 Linear Regression Analysis 
 Statistical analysis of the data was conducted in Python utilizing Jupyter Notebook and 
employed eight libraries (pandas, pylab, matploylib.pyplot, numpy, seaborn,xlrd, scipy.stats, 
statsmodels.api). Project data was imported from excel with initial outlier detection employing 
box plots for the four defined data types per contract (Initial Cost, Final Cost, Initial Duration, 
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Final Duration) for both CMR and DBB projects and characterized statistically and with 
boxplots which identified the presence of outliers in the data set (Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 Initial Box Plots of Project Data Points 
 
 Subsequently, box plots were prepared comparing distributions of the same data type for 
DBB and CMR projects.  
 




Figure 4.3 Initial Box Plots of Project Duration Variables 
 
 Analysis of DBB and CMR projects was conducted, isolating the 74 DBB projects and 
the 36 CMR projects from the database. Outlier detection was conducted by calculating the Z-
Scores for the Initial Costs of each project and discarding any with a score greater than the 
threshold of 3. Three outliers were removed in total:  DBB-40 DREDGING, z = 3.01; DBB-57 
BERTHING WHARF, z = 5.22; n-34 MULTIMODAL AIRPORT, z = 5.79. Statistical analysis 
of data variables was then recalculated (Tables 4.1 & 4.2) and boxplots replotted (Figures 4.5 & 
4.5). 
Table 4.1 DBB Projects Sample Dataset Statistics 
 






                  
72.00  
                  
72.00  
       
72.00  
       
72.00  
Mean 
    
5,623,135.00  
    
6,481,098.00  
     
439.32  
     
584.08  
Standard Deviation 
    
6,145,258.00  
    
7,826,317.00  
     
194.71  
     
278.35  
Minimum 
       
194,820.00  
       
194,820.00  
     
165.00  
       
68.00  
1st Quartile 
    
1,586,500.00  
    
1,780,178.00  
     
330.00  
     
393.50  
2nd Quartile 
    
3,495,934.00  
    
3,686,485.00  
     
404.00  
     
539.00  
3rd Quartile 
    
7,713,402.00  
    
8,785,644.00  
     
502.75  















Table 4.2 CMR Projects Sample Dataset Statistics 
 






                       
36.00  
                       
36.00  
               
36.00  
       
36.00  
       
36.00  
Mean 
       
36,501,527.78  
       
32,991,975.39  
       
92,411.81  
     
472.17  
     
435.17  
Standard Deviation 
       
58,065,050.82  
       
50,926,619.50  
     
125,159.27  
     
266.28  
     
212.66  
Minimum 
             
550,000.00  
             
635,339.00  
         
5,000.00  
     
154.00  
     
131.00  
1st Quartile 
          
6,281,250.00  
          
5,309,278.25  
       
12,750.00  
     
261.00  
     
261.00  
2nd Quartile 
       
11,000,000.00  
       
11,000,000.00  
       
43,500.00  
     
364.50  
     
406.00  
3rd Quartile 
       
33,250,000.00  
       
32,501,594.00  
       
85,069.50  
     
609.00  
     
625.75  
Maximum 
     
250,000,000.00  
     
241,000,000.00  














Figure 4.5 DBB Variables after Outlier Removal 
 
4.2.6.1 Project Costs Analysis 
 Simple linear regression was calculated to check model assumptions of linearity and 
variable independence. Cost variables were plotted with Initial Cost on the x-axis and Final Cost 
on the y-axis on a scatter plot (Figure 4.6) followed by curve fitting (Figures 4.7) and a 
composite joint plot for the regression (Figures 4.8). Regression results using Final Cost as the 




Figure 4.6 DBB and CMR Project Costs Scatter Plots 
  
Figure 4.7 DBB and CMR Projects Curve Fittings 
  














4.2.6.2 Residual Error – Project Costs 
The normal distribution was then checked for residual errors, the predicted value was 
calculated for Final Cost, and the residual calculated by subtracting the predicted value from the 
Final Cost and plotted for both DBB and CMR projects (Figure 4.9). 
 
Figure 4.9 Residual Error Distribution Plots for DBB and CMR Cost 
 
4.2.6.3 Project Durations Analysis 
 Schedule variables were plotted with Initial Duration on the x-axis and Final Duration on 
the y-axis on a scatter plot (Figure 4.10) followed by curve fitting (Figure 4.11) and a composite 
joint plot for the regression (Figure 4.12). Regression results using Final Duration as the 





Figure 4.10 DBB and CMR Project Duration Scatter Plots 
  
Figure 4.11 DBB and CMR Project Duration Curve Fittings 
   
Figure 4.12 DBB & CMR Project Duration Composite Joint Regression Plots 
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Table 4.5 DBB Final Duration Regression Results 
 





4.2.6.4 Residual Error – Project Durations 
The normal distribution was then checked for residual errors, the predicted value was 
calculated for Final Cost, and the residual calculated by subtracting the predicted value from the 
Final Cost and plotted for both DBB and CMR projects (Figure 4.13). 
 
  




4.2.6.5 Variable Correlation 
The final step of the linear regression analysis for the DBB and CMR projects employed 
correlation tables, a heatmaps, and pair plots to identify the strength of relationship between 
variables.  












Initial Cost  0.000 0.024 0.469 0.657 
Final Cost 0.024 0.000 0.419 0.619 
Initial Duration 0.469 0.419 0.000 0.508 
Final Duration 0.657 0.619 0.508 0.000 
 
 






Table 4.8 Correlation of Variables p-Values (CMR) 












Initial Cost 0.000 0.028 0.099 0.179 0.397 
Final Cost  0.028 0.000 0.109 0.200 0.370 
Precon Cost 0.099 0.109 0.000 0.170 0.371 
Initial Duration 0.179 0.200 0.170 0.000 0.124 
Final Duration 0.397 0.370 0.371 0.124 0.000 
 
 





4.2.6.6 Correlation Analysis 
 Correlation of variables analysis used α = 0.15 to test for statistical significance. Strong, 
statistically significant (α = 0.05) relationships between variable pairs were limited to one sets of 
variables in both models: Initial Cost to Final Cost in DBB (p-value = 0.024) and in CMR (p-
value = 0.028). In the CMR dataset, Precon Cost to Initial Cost was significant at α = 0.1 (p-
value = 0.099), Precon Cost to Final Cost significant at α = 0.15 (p-value = 0.109), and Precon 
Cost to Initial Duration was not significant at α = 0.15 (p-value = 0.17). Initial Duration to Final 
Duration were the only significantly correlated variables at α = 0.15 (p-value = 0.124). The 
remaining DBB variable correlations did not meet a threshold of α = 0.15, with p-values between 
0.419 to 0.657. 
 
4.2.7 Multiple Regression Model Analysis 
 Multiple regression simulations were developed and run for DBB and CMR projects 
using several Scikit-Learn library tools imported into the Jupyter Notebook console (Table 4.9) 
using the same protocols to attempt to predict project Final Cost using Initial Cost, Initial 
Duration, and Final Duration to determine if 1) the model was valid and 2) was able to predict 
Final Cost within an acceptable level of statistical confidence. The model variables were then 












 The dataset values were filtered and separated, setting the final cost as the dependent 
variable with initial cost, initial duration, and final duration as independent variables. Data was 
split into test and train sets which were run through multiple regressions: Training Set – 
Independent Variables (XDBB_train/XCMR_train), Test Set – Independent Variables, 
(XDBB_test/XCMR_test), Training Set – Dependent Variables (yDBB_train/yCMR_train), and 
Test Set – Dependent Variables (yDBB_test/yCMR_test). The model was first trained and then 
tested with the independent variables sets, the trained again with the dependent variables test set 
(yDBB_test/yCMR_test). The independent variables test sets were used to predict the Final Cost 
in the trained regression model. The DBB model (Model 1) predicted the Final Costs for 18 
projects with an r2 value of 0.949 and the CMR model (Model 2) predicted the Final costs for 9 
projects with an r2 value of 0.928. Mean values calculated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 were entered as 
individual values into the model to check the accuracy of the prediction against mean final costs. 
The DBB model’s predicted final cost was returned within 1% of the mean value and the CMR 
model’s predicted final cost was returned within 10% of the mean value. The model code was 
copied, and the Final Duration variables were removed to determine the accuracy of predicting 
final costs with only initial variables. The DBB model (Model 3) returned predictions with an r2 
value of 0.947 and the CMR model (Model 4) returned predictions with an r2 value of 0.914. 
Mean values were entered into the model again with the DBB model’s predicted final cost was 
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0.90% less than the mean value and the CMR model’s predicted final cost was 9.82% greater 
than the mean final cost. The CMR model code was copied again to test predictions by including 
preconstruction cost in the independent variables (Initial Cost, Precon Cost, and Initial Duration) 
to predict final cost. This model (Model 5) returned predictions with an r2 value of 0.90995. 
Mean values were entered into the model and the predicted final cost was 9.82% greater than the 
mean value. The CMR model code was copied one final time to remove duration from the 
dependent variables to determine the change in accuracy predicting final cost with the 
preconstruction and initial costs alone. The model (Model 6) returned predictions with an r2 
value of 0.911, a slight improvement from the previous model. 
 
Table 4.10 DBB Results of Multiple Regression Simulation 
DBB Mean Values Model 1 Model 3 
Initial Cost $5,623,135  Independent Independent 
Final Cost $6,481,098  Dependent Dependent 
Initial Duration (days) 439 Independent Independent 
Final Duration (days) 584 Independent - 
r-Squared Value 0.949 0.947 
Predicted Final Cost $6,531,674  $6,539,265  
Error (Mean - Pred) ($50,576) ($58,167) 
% Error -0.78% -0.90% 
 
Table 4.11 CMR Results of Multiple Regression Simulation 
CMR Mean Values Model 2 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Initial Cost $36,501,528  Independent Independent Independent Independent 
Final Cost $32,991,975  Dependent Dependent Dependent Dependent 
Precon Cost $92,412   -  - Independent Independent 
Initial Duration (days) 472 Independent  - Independent  - 
Final Duration (days) 435 Independent Independent  -  - 
r-Squared Value 0.928 0.914 0.90995 0.911 
Predicted Final Cost $29,906,713  $29,751,536  $29,397,249  $29,454,467  
Error (Mean - Pred) $3,085,262  $3,240,439  $3,594,726  $3,537,508  





 The cost data included in this analysis provided several interesting insights into the 
similarities and differences between DBB and CMR delivery. There were twice as many DBB 
projects as CMR projects (72 vs 36) in the sample and mean values were an order of magnitude 
less than CMR’s (millions versus tens of millions). Mean initial duration values for both project 
datasets were surprisingly close (DBB 439 days vs CMR 472 days) but final durations were not 
with DBB mean final duration of 584 days being 34% greater than the mean final duration of 
435 days for CMR. Additionally, mean values for cost and duration trended upward for DBB 
(+15.3% cost growth, +33% schedule growth) and downward for CMR (-9.6% cost growth, -
7.8% schedule growth). These trends indicate that a portion of the higher upfront cost associated 
with CMR delivered projects may be recaptured in overall cost savings by project completion 
along with the potential for schedule acceleration whereas the lower upfront cost of DBB may 
not provide overall lower construction costs or durations. 
 Linear regression analysis provides several insights into the comparative behavior of 
DBB and CMR delivered projects. Cost growth variability between DBB and CMR projects 
were similar and could be reliably predicted at or near a 95% confidence level (DBB r2=0.952; 
CMR r2=0.945). Initial and final cost variables were highly correlated for both delivery methods 
at α = 0.05 (DBB p = 0.024; CMR p = 0.028). Preconstruction Cost was correlated to initial and 
final cost variables in CMR α = 0.1 to Initial Cost (ρ-value = 0.099) and at α = 0.15 to Final Cost 
ρ-value = 0.109). This is of particular interest as the preconstruction services fee is typically the 
first hard number provided to an owner that can give an indication as to the total cost of the 
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project. These results show that owners should be able to accurately forecast the final costs for 
their projects regardless of the delivery method employed.  
 Schedule growth, however, was highly variable in both delivery methods with DBB 
producing the highest levels of variability (r2 = 0.242) compared to CMR which was much more 
predictable (r2 = 0.767) even if not at a statistically significant confidence level. As a side note, 
the Federal Highway Administration requires cost and schedule risk analyses to be completed for 
projects receiving federal funds with an estimated total cost greater than $500 million at a 70% 
confidence level (FHWA 2017). Duration variables were for DBB were not significantly 
correlated α = 0.15 (p-value = 0.508) as compared to CMR durations which were correlated 
significantly at α = 0.15 (p = 0.124) which lends support to literature claims that CMR project 
delivery may improve project schedule certainty, however, the reliability of this improvement 
may not be consistently experienced.  
 Correlation between cost and duration variables provided an insight in comparing both 
project delivery methods. Although neither dataset relationship between Initial Cost and Final 
Duration was significant at α = 0.15, these results can be useful indicators of how a project’s 
initial budget can impact the total duration needed to complete it and the relative value of 
improving cost certainty at award to improve overall schedule certainty. These values indicate 
that for DBB projects, increasing the initial budget of a project may not provide any positive 
impact on the overall project schedule and that projects which are relatively insensitive to 
schedule delays may be better candidates for this delivery method. For CMR projects, these 
values indicate that increasing the initial budget of a may have a positive impact on overall 
schedule certainty, even though this positive impact is not guaranteed.  
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 Results of the multiple regression simulation model supported these findings and 
provided additional insights into the relationship between preconstruction services and project 
final cost. The DBB model was able to provide accurate estimates of final costs with and without 
including the final duration of the project, as was expected due to the lack of significant 
correlation between cost and duration variables from the initial analysis. The CMR model was 
less accurate in predicting final cost than the DBB model, but each configuration of the variables 
was able to return predictions at greater than 90% confidence. The inclusion of preconstruction 
cost as a dependent variable slightly reduced the accuracy of the model predictions but dropping 
the duration variable from the regression slightly improved results (from r2 value 0.90995 to 
0.911). This drop in accuracy is consistent with common pricing practices associated with 
preconstruction services where general contractors offer a lump sum amount that rarely comes 
close to offsetting the real hourly cost of the professional services they provide because they 
view preconstruction services as an investment in being able to negotiate the price of 
construction and preconstruction services fees are typically less than 0.5% of total cost 
(Gransberg and Carlisle 2008). The model demonstrates that while cost of preconstruction 






 Final cost can be predicted with at least 90% confidence for both DBB and CMR projects 
provided the values for the initial cost and duration of the project, and the cost of preconstruction 
services for CMR projects. Contrary to assertations in existing literature, CMR does not appear 
to outperform DBB in controlling project cost growth, but it does provide a greater level of 
schedule certainty. Lower correlation between cost and schedule duration values in DBB than 
CMR provides an indicator that CMR may provide greater control over the final schedule. The 
contradiction regarding cost performance raises an important question: if CMR doesn’t provide a 
better vehicle to reduce schedule growth over DBB, then what value do public university owners 
recognize in CMR, that is not recognized in the literature, causes it to continue to be a preferred 
delivery method?  
 
4.4.1 Limitations 
 Limitations to this study are primarily associated with the source and quality of project 
data used in the model. Results of this study were drawn from project databases assembled by 
the main author and three other researchers’ prior work. During the analysis of the data, 
assumptions were made about the similarity of contracting methods utilized among the multiple 
public agencies represented in the data, which included the Naval Facilities Command that 
utilizes both traditional low-bid DBB and an alternative version that includes some best value 
selection criteria that evaluate the qualifications of the bidders. There were twice as many DBB 
projects as CMR projects in the sample which may have been a source of the higher confidence 
levels in prediction results for both analyses. As a result, the authors consider these results to be 
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emerging trends that would benefit from 1) cleaning and improving the project data in the model 





5.0 Quantifying the Value of Owner-Directed Project Scope Growth in Construction 
Manager-at-Risk Delivered Public University Capital Projects 
Gransberg, N.J. and Maraqa, S., “Leveraging the Value of Project Scope Growth through 
Construction Manager-at-Risk Delivery of Public University Capital Improvement Projects,” 
Journal of Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution in Engineering and Construction, 2022, 14(1): 
04521042. To be presented at the American Society of Civil Engineers’ Construction Institute 
and Construction Research Council Joint Conference, Arlington, VA, March 9th-12th, 2022. 
 
5.1 Synopsis 
 When capital improvement project final costs exceed the costs of initial estimates, the 
overrun is assumed to be an indication of poor performance. However, when the project owner 
adds scope at any point after the initial estimate, the value of the project is enhanced, even 
though the numbers are interpreted in a negative light. This paper explores the idea that 
construction manager-at-risk (CMR) delivery provides a level of contractual flexibility that is not 
available in traditional design-bid-build (DBB) contracts, and as such, lends itself to projects 
where additional funding may become available after contract award and facilitate its efficient 
use in a manner not available in DBB delivered projects. The paper reviews the cost performance 
of 166 CMR and DBB projects completed by 23 American public universities valued at over 
$3B, collected from 2018 to 2019. The study that found cost growth on university CMR projects 
was greater than similar DBB projects, contradicting the conclusions of most of the literature on 
CMR. It reports the analysis of a second sample of 86 projects, which individually compared 
DBB projects matched to similar CMR projects finding that CMR project design fee efficiency 
was double that in DBB. The first contribution is providing an objective metric to differentiate 
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between owner-driven scope cost growth and cost growth due to other reasons, and secondly, 
posits that the contractual flexibility inherent to CMR project delivery adds value for money by 
allowing a university to expeditiously obligate new sources of funding, such as donations. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
 This study compares the relative cost performance of Construction Manager-at-Risk 
(CMR) and Design-Bid-Build (DBB) projects completed in the public sector higher education 
construction market, with a specific focus on design fee efficiency. As public owners, 
universities’ capital improvement program funding sources typically include a percentage of 
non-tax funding that comes from charitable donations made by private entities. Because these 
funds are voluntary, it is difficult to forecast when they will become available and may fund 
anywhere from minor remodels to construction of new major facilities. As a result, the ability to 
add scope to an existing contract in an efficient manner to utilize new funding becomes an 
important aspect of a university capital improvement program.  
 
5.2.1 Research Objectives 
 This paper explores the following research questions related to project cost certainty: 
1. Does utilizing CMR change (increase or decrease) project cost certainty when compared to DBB? 
2. Is there a difference in design fee efficiency between CMR and DBB projects? 
3. If there is a difference in design fee efficiency, what is the probable cause of this difference? 
 
5.3 Research Methodology: Contract Collaboration Clause Synchronization Analysis  
 CMR contracts have the feature of mandating an improved level of collaboration between 
the designer and the general contractor through each party’s contracts with the owner, which 
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maintain the same lines of contractual privity as found in DBB contracts. This feature is absent 
in DBB contracts and present in Design Build (DB). However, collaboration is enforced by the 
subcontracts internal to the DB entity. It has been theorized that contracts which are 
synchronized with respect to expectations for collaboration, improve the likelihood that the 
owner will receive the intended expected benefits of CMR project delivery (Gransberg and 
Gransberg 2019The legal foundation for contractually required collaboration is the doctrine of 
“Good Faith and Fair Dealing,” which essentially forms “a general assumption of the law of 
contracts, that people will act in good faith and deal fairly without breaking their word, using 
shifty means to avoid obligations or denying what the other party obviously understood” (Hill 
and Hill 2007). Lahdenperä (2012) found that “express good faith” contract clauses that seek to 
regulate the relationships between the parties are effective in providing a framework upon which 
the interpersonal relationships that create actual collaboration can be realized. 
To test this assertion in the public higher education CMR context, CMR contracts used 
by the University of Oklahoma and the State of Colorado Department of Education were 
evaluated. To provide a more global assessment, American Institute of Architect’s (AIA) 2019 
standard form contracts for CMR, was also included.  
 
5.3.1 AIA Standard Form Contracts 
 Many public universities base their CMR contracts on the AIA standard form contracts 
for CMR delivered projects (AIA B133-2019 and AIA A133-2019). These contracts incorporate 
multiple clauses throughout the agreements establishing the form of collaboration expected 
between the designer and general contractor. There are many similarities between these CMR 
contracts and the AIA’s standard form contracts for DBB delivered projects from a cursory 
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review, which may indicate that AIA CMR contracts utilized DBB contracts as the base from 
which they were written. For example, in paragraph, §2.2 Relationship of the Parties of the 
general contractor’s agreement establishes the owner’s expectations for the general contractor to 
cooperate with the designer and reads as follows: 
 
“The Construction Manager accepts the relationship of trust and confidence established 
by this Agreement and covenants with the Owner to cooperate with the Architect and 
exercise the Construction Manager’s skill and judgement in furthering the interests of the 
Owner to furnish efficient construction administration, management services, and 
supervision, to furnish at all times an adequate, supply of workers and materials; and to 
perform the Work in an expeditious and economical manner consistent with the Owner's 
interests. The Owner agrees to furnish or approve, in a timely manner, information 
required by the Construction Manager and to make payments to the Construction 
Manager in accordance with the requirements of the Contract Documents.”    
 
 The architect’s agreement also contains a paragraph in Article 2 §2.3 that references the 
Construction Manager’s contract and includes an exculpatory clause reliving the designer of 
responsibility for the general contractor’s actions. It reads as follows:  
 
“The Architect shall provide its services in conjunction with the services of a 
Construction Manager as described in the agreement identified in Section 1.1.5. The 
Architect shall not be responsible for actions taken by the Construction Manager.”  
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 The clause in the general contractor’s agreement consists of seven lines of text whereas 
the clause in the designer’s agreement consists of two lines of text. The phrase “covenants with 
the Owner to cooperate with” is only present in the general contractor’s contract. The word 
“cooperate” is only present once in the designer’s contract (§6.4) and speaks to the owner’s duty 
to cooperate with the designer. The exculpatory language present in the designer’s agreement is 
absent in the general contractor’s agreement in Article 2. The architect’s contract (AIA B133-
2019) mentions the Construction Manager 131 times and the general contractor’s contract (AIA 
A133-2019) mentions the Architect 84 times. A count of common phrases showed an incidence 
of 41 times in the designer’s agreement and 36 times in the general contractor’s agreement for a 
combined total of 77 incidences. Of the 23 phrases analyzed, 11 occur more often for the general 
contractor than the architect and 11 occur more often for the architect. The three most common 
sets of phrases were “shall provide/furnish” (10 times; 3 A/E & 7 GC), “shall prepare/collect” 
(10 times; 4 A/E & 6 GC), and “shall advise/recommend/consult with” (9 times; 2 A/E & 7 GC). 
The phrase “to cooperate with/cooperation” appears once and only in the general contractor’s 
agreement. These phrases are present roughly twice as often in the general contractor’s 
agreement than in the architect’s which may be interpreted as placing the onus for building 
project team collaboration on the general contractor, which appears to be validated by a 
specifically titled paragraph outlining the relationship of the parties, only present in the general 
contractor’s agreement. The phrases “reasonably prompt/promptly/promptness” occur seven 
times, 6 times in the designer’s agreement and once in the general contractors, which may be 
interpreted as a recognition that the designer’s production of construction documents and 
responses to requests for information have an impact on the project construction schedule. In 
aggregate, this textual analysis appears to embrace the traditional concepts of roles for the 
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designer and general contractor, with collaboration being viewed as primarily the general 
contractor’s responsibility.  
 
5.3.2 University of Oklahoma Contracts 
 The University of Oklahoma (OU) has utilized CMR project delivery since the early 
2000’s, being an early implementor soon after legislation was passed to allow its use in projects 
(61 OK Stat § 61-202.1). OU utilizes a heavily modified version of the AIA standard form CMR 
contract that makes multiple improvements regarding expectations for collaboration. The two 
contracts analyzed came from an academic building project constructed in 2016. The architect’s 
agreement has a three-paragraph article titled “The Project Construction Manager” that consists 
of 18 lines of text and 241 words. Paragraph 8. (a) reads as follows: 
 
“The Architect shall cooperate with the Construction Manager with respect to any duties, 
obligations, and responsibilities of the Construction Manager including those set forth in 
the Agreement for At Risk Construction Management Services executed by and between 
the Owner and the Construction Manager. The Architect’s duty of cooperation shall 
include, but shall not be limited to, the duty of providing information to the Construction 
Manager including those documents identified in Paragraph 14 hereinbelow; the duty of 
meeting and consulting with the Construction Manager concerning any matter relating to 
the Project; and the duty of working with the Construction Manager with respect to any 




 The following paragraph goes on to establish that the duties of the designer do not alter 
any of the general contractor’s responsibilities.  The final sentence is compelling in its effective 
description of the roles and relationship between the designer and general contractor: 
 
“It is expressly acknowledged and agreed that the duties of the Architect to the Owner 
are independent of, and are not diminished by, any duties of the Construction Manager to 
the Owner.” 
  
 The general contractor’s agreement has a similar four-paragraph article titled “The 
Project Architect” that consists of 24 lines of text and 306 words. Paragraph 9. (a) is like the 
architect’s Paragraph 8. (a) and contains the same language, with direction to cooperate with the 
designer, be familiar with their agreement. The difference between this and Article 8. of the 
designer’s agreement are two sentences in the second and third paragraphs that direct the general 
contractor to review and study all documents prepared by the designer and comply with them to 
protect the owner’s interests. These two additional sentences read as follows:  
 
“The Construction Manager shall carefully review and be familiar with the Agreement 
for Architectural Services between Owner and Architect. … b) The Construction 
Manager shall review and study any and all analyses, reports, and other similar 
documents prepared by the Architect and furnished to the Construction Manager, and the 
Construction Manager shall incorporate and comply with any recommendations or 
proposals contained therein if necessary to protect the interest of the Owner and if 




 Paragraph 9. (c) has the same language as Paragraph 8. (b) in the architect’s agreement. 
The architect’s contract (University of Oklahoma 2015) mentions the Construction Manager 79 
times and the general contractor’s contract (University of Oklahoma 2016) mentions the 
Architect 115 times. A count of common phrases showed an incidence of 43 times in the 
designer’s agreement and 76 times in the general contractor’s agreement for a combined total of 
119 incidences. Of the 23 phrases analyzed, 14 occur more often for the general contractor than 
the architect and five occur more often for the architect. The three most common sets of phrases 
were “shall advise/recommend/consult with” (17 times; 3 A/E & 14 GC), “shall provide/furnish” 
(15 times; 3 A/E & 12 GC), and “shall prepare/collect” (4 times; 7 A/E & 6 GC). The phrase “to 
cooperate with/cooperation” appears five times, three times in the architect’s agreement and 
twice in the general contractor’s agreement. The two most common phrases occur roughly four 
times as often and the third phrase less than twice as many times as often in the general 
contractor’s agreement, indicating that most of the responsibility in developing the collaborative 
relationship between the architect and general contractor is on the general contractor.  The 
presence of highly synchronized articles dedicated to each party’s duties to collaborate are 
present in each agreement is an improvement over the AIA standard form contracts.  
 
5.2.3 State of Colorado Contracts 
 The University of Colorado and Colorado State University utilize standard form contracts 
for CMR, referred to as Construction Manager/General Contractor (CM/GC) provided by the 
State Architect’s Office (State of Colorado 2019, State of Colorado 2021) operating under the 
legislative statutes governing Integrated Project Delivery (CO Rev Stat § 24-93-101) and do not 
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appear to be based on the AIA standard form contracts. The history behind the development of 
these contracts was not readily available, however they appear to have been written from the 
ground up for this delivery method. Each contract has similar paragraphs setting the owner’s 
expectations for collaboration between the designer and general contractor, much like the articles 
present in the University of Oklahoma’s contracts. These paragraphs are located at the beginning 
of Article 1. Performance of Work and share the same paragraph number, 1.1.2.  The architect’s 
Paragraph 1.1.2 consists of 16 lines of text and 198 words. The general contractor’s Paragraph 
1.1.2 consists of 19 lines of text and 223 words. The architect’s paragraph reads as follows: 
 
“In the performance of the professional services, the Architect/Engineer acknowledges 
that time is critical for Project delivery and that portions of the work shall have their 
design completed as separate Bid Packages and ready for construction before other 
portions of the work are fully designed.  It is further recognized that this accelerated 
approach to construction utilizing the services of an Architect/Engineer and a 
Construction Manager/General Contractor is a unique concept and that its feasibility 
requires maximum cooperation between all parties.  It is also recognized that the services 
to be rendered by the Construction Manager and the interrelationships and coordinative 
aspects thereof are not traditional.  The Architect/Engineer has, however, reviewed the 
Construction Manager Contract and accepts the terms thereof as expressing a workable 
concept.  In furtherance thereof, in the event there appears to be a duplication, overlap, 
or conflict of responsibility or duties between the Architect/Engineer and the 
Construction Manager, or an absence of designation, the question shall be submitted to 
the Principal Representative for determination.  The Architect/Engineer shall abide by 
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the decision of the Principal Representative provided it does not require the performance 
of services beyond what was reasonably contemplated and accepted by the 
Architect/Engineer as its responsibility.” 
 
 The general contractor’s paragraph adds a single sentence at the end regarding claims for 
increases to the project scope: 
 
“If the Construction Manager claims any increase in the Work arises by virtue of such a 
decision.” 
  
 The architect’s contract (State of Colorado 2019) mentions the Construction Manager 
151 times and the general contractor’s contract (State of Colorado 2021) mentions the Architect 
73 times. A count of common phrases showed an incidence of 89 times in the designer’s 
agreement and 50 times in the general contractor’s agreement for a combined total of 139 
incidences. Of the 23 phrases analyzed, 13 occur more often for the architect than the general 
contractor and five occur more often for the general contractor. The three most common sets of 
phrases were “shall review” (23 times; 15 A/E & 8 GC), “shall prove/furnish/furnished” (16 
times; 9 A/E, 7 CM), and “shall advise/recommend/consult with” (15 times; 9 A/E & 6 GC). The 
phrase “to cooperate with/cooperation” appears eight times, four times equally in each 
agreement. The two most common phrases occur slightly more than or close to twice as many 
times as often in the architect’s agreement than in the general contractors, which is the opposite 
of both the AIA and OU agreements. This indicates that the State of Colorado more evenly 
expects both parties to hold responsibility for developing project team collaboration, with 
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slightly more responsibility on the architect’s part. This attitude expressed through the language 
of these agreements is an excellent example of synchronization that should be replicated and 
employed by other public owners to enable CMR projects to experience greater levels of 
collaboration between the designer and general contractor. Table 5.1 provides the details of the 




Table 5.1 Content Analysis of Relational Phrases in Selected CMR Contracts 
   













"shall advise and consult with", "in 
consultation with", "shall advise", "shall 
make recommendations", "shall 
recommend"
2 7 3 14 9 6 41
"shall provide", "shall furnish", 3 7 3 12 9 7 41
"shall review" 4 0 8 2 15 8 37
"shall prepare", "shall collect" 4 6 4 7 8 0 29
"shall schedule and conduct [meetings] 
with", "meet with", "shall attend 
meetings [and/or conferences]"
5 4 2 6 4 3 24
"prompt", "promptly", "reasonable 
promptness"
6 1 3 6 6 1 23
"shall promptly report", "shall promptly 
notify", "shall notify", "shall identify and 
report", "to identify"
0 3 2 2 11 2 20
"shall submit" 2 0 4 9 0 3 18
"shall assist", "assistance" 3 1 2 0 9 3 18
"to cooperate with", "cooperation" 0 1 3 2 4 4 14
"shall obtain approval", "with approval 
of", "for approval"
0 1 3 7 3 0 14
"shall exercise reasonable care", 
"reasonable opinon", "reasonable 
0 1 2 0 5 4 12
"shall acknowledge", "acknowledges" 1 0 3 2 2 1 9
"shall coordinate", "in coordination with" 3 1 0 1 1 0 6
"mutually", "shall be mutually resovled", 
"jointly"
0 0 0 1 1 3 5
"shall reconcile" 1 1 0 1 0 2 5
"shall work together with", "shall work 1 1 0 1 0 1 4
"shall participate" 1 0 0 1 1 1 4
"shall consider", "consideration" 2 0 0 1 0 0 3
"shal present" 2 0 0 0 1 0 3
"shall be entitled to rely upon" 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
"shall deliver to" 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
"shall provide leadership" 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
A/E & CM SubTotals: 41 36 43 76 89 50 335
Synchonization Phrase Incidence Totals:  
Phrase(s)





5.4 Research Methodology: Shadow Projects Analysis 
 The methodology consisted of three steps. The first was data collection, cleaning, and 
population database assembly. The second step involved pairing CMR projects with similar DBB 
projects so that individual performance between the two delivery methods can be measured. This 
process is a variant of case-based reasoning commonly termed “shadow projects” and found to 
be valuable in previous project delivery method research (Craggs et. al 2008, Dongo et al. 2014, 
FHWA 2018). The final step involved data analysis to statistically compare university project 
scope change using three primary measures: construction cost growth; design cost growth; and 
cost growth from the owner’s initial estimate. The metrics were used to test the following 
hypotheses: 
• Ho1: University CMR projects experience less construction cost growth than DBB 
projects.  
• Ho2: University CMR projects experience less design cost growth than DBB projects. 
• Ho3: University CMR projects experience less cost growth from the owner’s initial 
estimate than DBB projects. 
 
5.4.1 Data Collection and Database Development 
 Project data was collected from public universities in Alabama, California, Colorado, 
Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, North Dakota, and Texas between 2018 and 2019. The projects 
used in this analysis were extracted from a database of capital projects that consists of 256 CMR 
projects and 278 DBB projects. The base project data was collected directly from public 
university capital projects management organizations that responded to email requests then 
augmented by publicly available data found on the internet. Publicly available project data was 
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extracted from design services and construction services contracts, estimates, capital project 
reports for university governing boards, and publicly posted cost data on university websites. 
Universities were selected based on an internet screening search that identified institutions that 
use CMR. Table 5.2 shows the institutions represented in the final database, which was reduced 
to 67 CMR projects and 99 DBB projects (189 CMR & 179 DBB removed for insufficiency).  
Table 5.2 Research Project Participant Universities 
Participant University 
CMR Projects DBB Projects 
# Total Cost # Total Cost 
Auburn University 0 $0 19 $368,829,142 
Cal Poly Pomona 1 $81,912,914 0 $0 
Colorado State 3 $263,876,234 4 $182,700,000 
North Dakota State University 5 $81,853,579 21 $140,124,362 
Texas A&M System Schools         
     TAMU - College Station 13 $292,538,752 6 $47,564,672 
     TAMU - Commerce 1 $28,116,512 0 $0 
     TAMU - Corpus Christi 1 $324,963,941 1 $6,009,626 
     TAMU - Galveston 1 $28,200,000 0 $0 
     TAMU - Health Science Center 
(Houston) 1 $103,800,000 0 $0 
     TAMU - International 3 $38,177,865 1 $12,494,023 
     TAMU - Kingsville 3 $26,024,720 0 $0 
     Prairie View A&M University 1 $14,280,254 0 $0 
     Tarleton State University 4 $125,360,657 3 $42,780,762 
     TAMU - Texarkana 0 $0 1 $20,546,246 
     TAMU - Texas Extension Service 0 $0 1 $16,496,724 
     TAMU - Texas Transportation 
Institute 0 $0 1 $18,727,663 
     West Texas A&M University 2 $37,416,933 0 $0 
University of Colorado System Schools         
     CU Boulder 6 $266,380,900 13 $20,398,386 
     CU Colorado Springs 3 $75,900,000 10 $17,362,007 
University of Houston 0 $0 5 $59,381,026 
University of Oklahoma 14 $157,091,114 10 $18,520,069 
University of Texas System Schools         
     UT Austin 1 $69,400,000 1 $2,600,000 
     UT Dallas 4 $191,239,872 2 $41,857,267 




Data types collected for the database and their definitions are as follows: 
• University Name  
• Project Type – Projects were sorted as either New Construction or Renovation projects.  
• Project Subtype – Projects were sorted into 7 subtype categories:  Academic, 
Administrative, Athletics, Utilities, Health Sciences, Housing, Paving. 
• Project Size (Square Feet) 
• Contract Type (CMR/DBB) 
• Total Project Cost ($) – Includes design, construction, administration, and all other 
project related costs incurred by the owner after the project has been completed and 
accepted. 
• Initial Estimated Cost ($) – This is the earliest available project cost estimate produced by 
either the owner or designer for project planning and funding.  
• Total Construction Cost ($) – This is the construction cost of the project as established by 
the contract for construction services (DBB projects) or the establishment of a GMP 
(CMR projects) necessary for the owner to issue the notice to proceed. 
• Final Construction Cost ($) – This is the sum of the Total Construction Cost plus the cost 
of additional scope added to the contract by change order(s). 
• Initial Contract Design Fees ($) – This is the cost of design fees established in the 
professional services contract issued to the project designer.  
• Final Design Fees ($) – This is the sum of the Initial Contract Design Fees plus the cost 






5.4.2 Data Missingness 
 Data collected directly from university capital projects staff was complete and consisted 
of 77 DBB projects and 29 CMR projects, with the exception of the University of Houston which 
did not provide project data in the requested format on 5 DBB projects (and were eliminated 
from the data set). Data collected from internet searches of publicly available projects, 22 DBB 
projects and 38 CMR projects, lacked some of the collected datapoints found in project data 
obtained directly from the source. This lack of complete project datapoints, also known as 
missingness, necessitated the use of a nonparametric machine learning method to impute the 
missing datapoints. Datapoint missingness for project data collected via the internet is found in 
Table 5.3. Only three data types had a missingness of greater than 50%:  Project Size, Initial 
Contract Design Fees, and Final Contract Design Fees. Data gathered directly from university 
staffs provided sufficient information to impute representative values for the missing internet 
data using machine learning as explained in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Table 5.3 Percentages of Missing Data for Publicly Available Projects over the Internet by 
Contract Type 
Data Type DBB CMR 
Project 0.0% 0.0% 
Project Type 0.0% 0.0% 
Project Subtype 0.0% 0.0% 
Project Size (SF) 63.0% 56.1% 
Contract Type 0.0% 2.4% 
Total Project Cost 37.0% 12.2% 
Initial Estimated Construction Budget 7.4% 14.6% 
Total Construction Contract Cost 3.7% 26.8% 
Final Construction Cost 40.7% 43.9% 
Initial Contract Design Fees 100.0% 75.6% 
Final Design Fees 100.0% 100.0% 




5.4.3 Random Forests Machine Learning Imputation Methodology  
 Data imputation tools are effective ways to fill missing datapoints in a dataset where 
there is sufficient complete data to reasonably impute from. Missing datapoint values were 
imputed using a nonparametric machine learning algorithm known as Random Forests 
programed in Python programming language. This method generates synthetic data from a 
distribution of observed data and is good at handling multiple variable types and measuring 
dissimilarity between variables by weighing the contribution of each variable in the model by its 
dependence to other variables (Shi & Horvath, 2006). The Random Forests algorithm is a tree-
based ensemble method using randomized decision trees which considers nonlinearities and 
interactions between the variables while constructing decision trees (Lin et al. 2017) which 
typically have low bias and high variance. Resultant accuracy is improved by increasing the 
number of decision trees within the algorithm using bootstrap aggregation of multiple regression 
trees to reduce the risk of overfitting (Brownlee 2016, Cutler et al. 2017, Lin et al. 2017). 
Random Forests is an extension of an ensemble method known as Bootstrap Aggregation (also 
termed “Bagging”) that combines multiple algorithm predictions to increase prediction accuracy 
by reducing variance in decision trees produced by classification and regression (CART) 
(Brownlee 2016). Random sub-samples of the dataset are produced and used to train a CART 
model, after which an average prediction is calculated using new data. Random Forests limits the 
CART learning algorithm to a random sample of features to search, typically the square root of 
the number of input variables, when finding the optimal split point in a decision tree, preventing 
decision trees from becoming overly correlated by a small selection of very strong predictors. 
Variable importance is determined by calculating the drop in error at each variable split point 
and averaging the sum across all decision trees where the larger the drop in error, the greater the 
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importance of the input variable (Brownlee 2016). This algorithm was appealing due to its ability 
to impute missing values, reduce computational time, allow for parallel data processing, provide 
integral estimation of generalization error, weighting of classes to resolve unbalanced data, 
measuring variable importance, and the detection of outliers (Cutler et al. 2017). Random Forests 
is also considered more robust in dealing with label noise, an issue affecting classification 
accuracy stemming from the data quality of training instances within inductive learning models 
(Saffari et al. 2009, Zhu & Wu 2004). 
 
5.4.3.1 Random Forests Data Imputation Procedure 
 The first step in the initial database development was to categorize and clean the data by 
matching data types to categories and encoding data into numerical variables to identify missing 
values. Many of the Project Type observations that were either missing or classified as a less 
frequent categorical type were collapsed into an “Other” category, reducing total variable types. 
Later, these missing Project Type values were manually categorized. Other category types, such 
as Project Name, Project Size, etc. were dropped from the dataset prior to analysis. Variables 
were then checked for missing values, sorted by percentage of missing values, and compared. 
Projects with complete data were split into 80% training and 20% test sets, randomly by 
percentage, to generate the Random Forests model. Missing values in the public data were then 
imputed with the Random Forests model and inspected for major outliers. The sample standard 
deviation was calculated for each data type for the complete dataset and the imputed public 
dataset, then compared. The imputed standard deviation was improved for all data types except 




5.4.4 Shadow Project Assignment  
 Each CMR project in the dataset was matched with its most similar DBB shadow project. 
Traditional metrics of measuring project performance typically only compare project 
performance after the design is complete, which does not account for the influence of non-
construction events that occur during planning and design (Konchar and Sanvido 1998; Col 
Debella and Ries 2006). The use of shadow projects is an established technique in construction 
research (Dongo et al. 2014) to control for the inevitable differences between projects resulting 
from regional market variances, labor availability, material cost variability, weather effects, etc. 
that render assumptions of normality within a dataset invalid. Using shadow projects allows the 
researcher to construct a sample with data that are closer to the assumption of normality than 
would otherwise be observed in the population. CMR and DBB projects were matched using the 
criteria proposed by Dongo et al. (2014) in descending priority: 
 
1. Similarity in Initial Estimate Cost 
2. Similarity in Project Type 
3. Similarity in Project Subtype 
 
 This logic permits a comparison in trajectories of similar projects from the earliest point 
in the design available in the given data and compute their relative performance to construction 
completion. In this case, the dataset contained more DBB projects than CMR projects, so 43 
CMR projects were selected and matched with the 43 most similar DBB projects, according to 
the criteria, for a total of 86 projects. The imputed dataset was sorted by Initial Cost Estimate, 
then by Project Type, and finally by Project Subtype. In the case where a CMR project had more 
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than one DBB project that satisfied each criterion, the project with the closest Initial Estimate 
Cost was selected. For CMR projects where only two criteria were satisfied, the project with the 
closest Initial Estimate Cost was selected. The breakdown of Project Type and Project Subtype 
for the 86 sample projects were as follows in Table 5.4: 
 
Table 5.4 Shadow Project Data Sample Statistics 
  
































































CMR 19 24 24 4 10 2 2 1 0 
DBB 20 23 24 3 6 3 1 5 1 
 
5.4.5 Shadow Project Analysis 
 Analysis of the shadow project database measured 1) calculating project performance 
with traditional metrics and 2) calculating design fee efficiency using a comparison of 
construction scope dollars to design fee dollars.  
 
5.4.5.1 Project Performance Analysis 
 The following performance metrics (Equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3) were calculated for each 
project in the sample: 
Equation 5.1 Cost Growth (%) from Initial Estimate 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 =






Equation 5.2 Cost Growth (%) from Construction Contract Award 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑥 100 
Equation 5.3 Cost Growth (%) from Design Contract Award 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠
𝑥 100 
 
 Measures of central tendency were calculated for the CMR projects and DBB projects 
separately and then compared (See Table 5.5). Additionally, the total value for each contract type 
was summed, and the total value of projects in the data sample was summed. 
 
Table 5.5 Project Performance Statistics 
  









MEAN -8.00% 4.90% 11.30%  
MEDIAN 1.30% 3.60% 10.90%  
STANDARD DEV 29.50% 6.50% 13.60%  
DBB VALUE $735,023,057       
CMR 
MEAN 5.00% 9.10% 10.40%  
MEDIAN 5.00% 5.50% 15.00%  
STANDARD DEV 35.40% 16.90% 83.10%  
CMR VALUE $808,726,828       
CMR - DBB 
Difference 
MEAN 13.00% 4.20% -1.00%  
MEDIAN 3.70% 1.90% 4.10%  
STANDARD DEV 5.90% 10.40% 69.50%  
TOTAL VALUE $1,543,749,885   
 
 Results of the analysis seemed to contradict Ho1, Ho2, and Ho3 as well as the general 
findings in the literature that CMR has been shown to improve cost certainty when compared to 
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similar DBB projects (West et al. 2012; Molenaar et al. 1999, Touran 2006).  For the sample 
analyzed in this paper, however, construction cost growth in CMR projects was roughly twice of 
that observed in DBB projects. This is consistent with a study by Carpenter and Bausman (2016) 
that attributed similar outcomes to a combination of conditions in the public higher education 
construction market. The study found that project cost performance is impacted by scope 
changes directed by influential internal stakeholders, quality standards that are higher than 
comparable commercial projects, and resistance toward adopting the institutional culture 
necessary to utilize alternative project delivery methods (Carpenter and Bausman 2016) and 
leads one to infer that university capital project performance should not be compared directly to 
similar project performance in other market sectors.  
 
5.4.5.2 Design Fee Efficiency Analysis 
 These results required that additional analysis be conducted to understand the analysis 
results of the shadow projects sample. These results showed that CMR projects experience 
roughly twice the cost growth as comparable DBB projects, which leads one to question CMR’s 
continued use in this market segment. One possible explanation is that CMR delivery facilitates 
both changes and additions to project scope in a manner that add perceived value. A new metric 
was developed to compare cost growth between construction costs (C$) and design fee costs 
(D$) to provide some insight into the relative value of each delivery method. Inspiration for this 
metric loosely came from the concept of Value for Money. Value for Money is often expressed 
as a ratio of benefits and costs that consider the efficiency and effectiveness of the application of 
resources to end goal attainment (Glendinning 1988). The following ratios (Equations 5.4, 5.5, 




Equation 5.4 Construction ($): Design ($) Initial Estimate 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 $: 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛$𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 =
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠
 
Equation 5.5 Construction ($): Design ($) Contract Award 




Equation 5.6 Construction ($): Design ($) Final Construction Cost 





 The C$:D$ ratio expresses the value of the construction scope developed per unit of 
design expenditure and is intended to measure the efficiency of design fees according to project 
phase. The resulting ratio is a means to quantify much design effort must be expended to produce 
the final constructed design solution. Thus, if the final design for a constructed feature work is 
produced for the originally estimated design fee, it can be said that the design effort was highly 
efficient. On the other hand, if a myriad of revisions, changes, and/or additions are made before 
the documents are released for construction, then the cost of the design should be higher than the 
original fee and reflected in the data as design cost growth. Hence, as the C$:D$ ratio increases, 
the efficiency of the expended design effort increases as well. C$:D$ ratios were calculated for 
the 86-shadow project sets in the sample population and measures of central tendency are shown 














MEAN 14.75 0.08 0.09  
MEDIAN 14.66 0.08 0.08  
STANDARD DEV 3.88 0.04 0.04  
CMR 
MEAN 16.28 0.09 0.11  
MEDIAN 11.51 0.08 0.09  
STANDARD DEV 18.42 0.05 0.14  
CMR - DBB 
Difference 
MEAN 1.53 0.01 0.02  
MEDIAN -3.16 0.01 0.01  
STANDARD DEV 14.54 0.01 -0.03  
 
 The results of this analysis demonstrated that design fees were significantly more 
efficient during the design process for both CMR and DBB projects in the sample, with the 
difference between CMR and DBB projects being negligible. However, as this analysis 
compared design fee efficiency over the entire life of the project did not compare construction 
dollars spent in change orders to the design fees change orders necessitated by owner-driven 
scope change. One final C$:D$ ratio was calculated to compare post-award change order dollars 
to change order dollars using the following equation: 
 
Equation 5.7 Construction ($): Design ($) Post-Award Changes 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 $: 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛$𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 −  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 −  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠
 
 
 To differentiate between owner-directed scope growth and scope creep due to other 
issues, a secondary analysis of a subset that contained only projects that experienced both 
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construction and design growth to focus the measurement of the differences between CMR and 
DBB projects. The analysis was necessary for three reasons:  
1. Projects that did not experience construction cost growth could not be measured with this 
metric,  
2. Projects that did not experience design fee cost growth even though they may have 
experienced construction cost growth may be attributed to contractor errors which would 
not require additional design work to be completed by the designer, or  
3. Cost growth without design fee growth may be attributed to the designer errors and 
omissions, which would also not require additional design fees to be paid.  
 
 Thus, refining the analysis permitted the analyst to identify those projects that 
experienced cost growth where the design fee increase can be attributed to owner-driven scope 
growth. This removed 13 CMR projects and 10 DBB projects from the previous sample. The 
results of this analysis are in the table below (see Table 5.7): 






MEAN 8.48  
MEDIAN 4.42  
STANDARD DEV 9.96  
CMR 
MEAN 14.87  
MEDIAN 8.43  
STANDARD DEV 20.83  
CMR - DBB 
Difference 
MEAN 6.39  
MEDIAN 4.01  






 Construction cost growth in CMR projects was roughly twice of that observed in the 
DBB shadow projects leads one to infer that the universities in the sample are, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, availing themselves of beneficial cost growth due to owner-directed 
additions. Being able to efficiently obligate funding that becomes available from unexpected 
donors or at fiscal year-end maximizes the efficient use of available capital and adds value for 
money to a university’s capital improvement program. Thus, the C$:D$ ratio provides an 
objective measure of this benefit.  
 
5.5.1 Results of Traditional Metrics Analysis  
 CMR project delivery also appears to provide the owner with the ability to efficiently add 
new scope to the project after the GMP has been agreed. The analysis shows that CMR projects 
tended to experience more cost growth (about 4% more on average) throughout the design and 
construction phases than comparable DBB projects did. Design fee growth rates in CMR-
delivered projects were quite similar in DBB projects, about 10% and 11% respectively, 
although median design fee growth for CMR projects was about 4% greater than DBB-delivered 
projects and the standard deviation for CMR was almost eight times as large as in DBB. If CMR 
and DBB delivery methods were judged only by the traditional project performance metric of 
cost growth, the DBB projects outperformed the CMR projects within this sample. When viewed 
through a cost certainty lens, it appears that the DBB projects realized roughly half as much 
overall cost variability as the CMR projects with the standard deviations for construction phase 
cost and design fee growth at 10.4% and 69.5% greater than in DBB. However, classic metrics 
do not differentiate between owner-directed cost growth and cost growth due to other issues like 
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differing site conditions, force majeure, design errors and omissions, etc. Despite this difference 
in cost performance, the widespread of application of CMR project delivery within the public 
higher education market indicates that there are other perceived benefits in utilizing this delivery 
method that cannot be captured by using strictly traditional project performance metrics like cost 
and schedule growth. 
 
5.5.2 Post-Award Change Design Fee Efficiency in CMR 
 Analysis of design fees employed in post-award changes was telling. CMR design dollars 
were able to generate almost twice as much post-award construction scope as the same dollars 
would using DBB. The standard deviation was also roughly twice as large in CMR versus DBB, 
which means that not all post-award CMR changes in the sample were executed as efficiently as 
the mean and median values, but also some were appreciably more efficient as well. 
 
 
5.5.3 Improved Cooperation and Collaboration 
 The analysis showed that for owner-directed changes in CMR projects, design dollars are 
roughly twice as efficient as those spent for change orders in DBB projects. One explanation is 
the collaborative relationship between the owner, designer, and general contractor established in 
the CMR contract that makes the coordination of changes less confrontational than those in DBB 
projects. CMR contracts for the designer and general contractor enable the owner to require both 
parties to cooperate and collaborate as expected which can improve project team integration, 
reducing the level of contention in dealing with scope changes during construction, as 
demonstrated earlier in this paper. Contracts where the collaborative language is well 
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synchronized between the designer and general contractor provide the legal groundwork to 
induce collaboration during design and construction. Sophisticated owners that can expand their 
project administration paradigm beyond traditional methods to embrace the unique capabilities 
and ground rules of CMR stand to gain more from its employment. The analysis of post-award 
change design fee efficiency seems to indicate that the level of synchronization may play a role 
in how efficiently design fees are expended in this phase.  
 
5.5.4 Negotiated Versus Fixed Construction Price 
 A second possible explanation for greater design fee efficiency in construction phase 
scope growth regards making changes to DBB contracts after the construction price has been 
fixed. In CMR, the construction price is negotiated, rather than competitively bid, the scope of 
work is not fixed until the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) is established. Some universities 
negotiate a lump sum GMP to cover the entire project scope and may or may not convert this to a 
lump sum at some point in the project. Other universities negotiate a series of GMPs for each 
work package as the design progresses. This enables expeditious owner directed scope increases 
to accommodate funding that may not have been obligated or available when the general 
contractor’s preconstruction services contract was executed. I In many cases this capacity in 
CMR contracts may obviate the need to request permission from a funding authority to utilize 
the newly available funding to enhance a previously approved capital project.  
 
5.5.5 Incentives and Reduced Transaction Costs 
 The literature shows that two other factors of the GMP negotiation process influence the 
behavior of the contractor during negotiations. First, most CMR contracts contain provisions that 
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allows the owner to terminate the preconstruction services contract and reprocure using DBB if a 
mutually agreed GMP cannot be established, which places the onus on the contractor to settle 
with the owner rather than lose the opportunity to construct the project (Cox et al. 2011; West et 
al. 2012). Secondly, Molenaar et al. (2009) found that contractors interviewed in the study 
emphasized that CMR gave them an opportunity to enhance their competitiveness on future 
CMR projects with the given owner by doing a good job on the current project. One of the 
study’s conclusions was that “future work was the most highly valued incentive for construction 
contractors in CMR.” Thus, the flexibility to minimize the transaction costs associated with 
owner-directed scope increases is a benefit that has not been recognized in previous project 
delivery research.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 Of the 86 projects analyzed from the national sample of 534 projects, 22 projects did not 
experience cost growth (13 CMR/9 DBB). 50 projects experienced cost growth of 10% or more 
(28 CMR/22DBB). The CMR delivered projects, in both mean and median values, experienced 
more cost growth from the initial estimate and from the GMP than comparable DBB delivered 
projects in the sample. In fact, the DBB projects, on average, experienced -8% cost growth from 
the initial estimate and only 4.9% cost growth from the contract to completion. These results, 
when interpreted through the lens of conventional project performance metrics, appear to 
demonstrate greater cost certainty in the sample of DBB delivered projects than the comparable 
sample of CMR delivered projects. This came as somewhat of a surprise to the authors, as much 
of the literature comparing CMR project delivery to DBB project delivery has shown that CMR 
delivered projects tend to outperform DBB projects regarding cost certainty (Pocock et al. 1996; 
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Konchar and Sanvido 1998; Korkmaz et al. 2010) with the exception of public-school projects 
(Rojas and Kell 2008; Carpenter and Bausman 2016).  One should note, however, that the focus 
of the projects analyzed in this paper were restricted to capital projects completed by public 
universities, which is a unique market segment within the construction industry.    
 Two primary causes for project cost growth are 1) errors and omissions in the plans and 
specs caused by the designer or 2) owner-driven scope growth. Owners have Spearin Doctrine 
liability which warrants the completeness of plans and specifications provided to the general 
contractor which have been developed by the designer, hence any errors and omissions within 
the project documents are the owner’s liability if discovered, which can contribute to project cost 
growth through contractor generated change order requests. Conversely, owners may decide to 
add scope to a project after the project documents have been completed, or as design work 
packages are completed, at their discretion, which contributes to project cost growth. 
Conventional project performance metrics fail to differentiate between these two modes of 
construction cost growth, inadvertently combining all owner-driven scope growth with the 
designer’s errors and omissions-driven scope growth. Design fees expended for post-
GMP/construction services contract scope growth are roughly twice as efficient in CMR projects 
when compared to comparable DBB projects. This is most likely attributable to a combination of 
documented benefits derived from the CMR delivery method, specifically 1) the general 
contractor is included as a partner in the design process through a professional services contract 
(preconstruction services) to improve the constructability of the design, 2) CMR has been shown 
to improve the relationships within the project team through increased collaboration which seems 
to reduce transaction costs of post-award change orders, and 3) providing real time pricing of 
project scope while the scope is being developed.  Measuring design fee efficiency using 
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construction dollars-to-design dollars ratios provides project managers with a new tool that 
allows them to quantify previously unmeasured benefits of employing CMR project contracts to 
efficiently add scope to projects, to the benefit of the owner. 
 
5.6.1 Limitations 
 The C$:D$ design fee efficiency metric is a novel concept that provides an analytical tool 
where there was no tool previously. However, it is only one tool in the project managers’ tool kit 
and caution should be taken when the calculated efficiency ratio is significantly higher than 
average to prevent erroneous results. Further investigation into the contract change history of the 
project in question would be warranted to validate the calculated ratio. Possible sources of error 
could result from 1) projects where the design contract value is increased due to reimbursable 
expenses that are not a result of owner-driven scope additions, 2) projects where the designer has 
errors and/or omissions in the documents and the owner decides it is in their best interest to pay 
for the additional cost of redesign resulting in a contract modification for the designer and 
additional scope for the builder, or 3) other circumstances that could provide positive indicators 
that are not validated by the project history.    
 
5.6.2 Next Steps 
 Further research should investigate whether the owner’s ability to add scope to a CMR 
project after the GMP, without the limitations imposed by DBB project delivery, is a perceived 
benefit of utilizing CMR project delivery within the public higher education construction market. 
Textual analysis of a larger collection of CMR contracts may provide useful examples of 
contract language that can be incorporated to improve synchronization between the designer and 
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general contractor’s agreements, specifically its role in post-award scope changes. Additionally, 
further study is required to determine if the C$:D$ ratio can be generalized as a measure of 
design fee efficiency for CMR projects outside the public university sector. Additionally, it 
would be beneficial to either 1) replace the imputed data in the shadow projects dataset with 
actuals and re-run the analysis or 2) assemble a new comparable set of project data to analyze 
and compare with the initial analysis. Further development of this design fee efficiency metric is 
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6.0 Best Practices in Delivering Public University Capital Projects with Construction 
Manager-at-Risk 
Gransberg, N. and Pittenger, D. (2021). “Best Practices for Delivering Public University Capital 
Projects with Construction Manager-at-Risk.”  
 
6.1 Paper Synopsis 
 Validation of the research was conducted through a content analysis of external RFQs 
and RFPs, a survey of public universities capital projects staffs, and an exploration of three 
successful projects from the database that appeared to have been poorly managed according to 
traditional project performance metrics of cost and schedule growth. The validation process 
disproved one of the research hypotheses and strongly supported the remaining ones and 
provides insights into the perceptions of CMR delivery by owner’s representatives and ways that 
project teams have successfully delivered complex projects that met owner and end user goals.  
 
6.2 Research Methodology 
 This study employed qualitative research methods to accomplish 1) construct validation 
and 2) internal and external findings validation. Construct validation was conducted through 
literature review of papers addressing the use of CMR in public projects exploring causes of 
scope growth, owner perspectives on adding new scope to existing CMR projects, and the impact 
of collaboration, project team integration, and early contractor involvement. Internal validation 
was conducted through 1) surveying capital projects staff at participant universities which had 
provided project data for the project database compiled as a part of this research project and 2) a 
case study analysis of three CMR-delivered projects. External validation was conducted 1) by 
including capital projects staff from other non-participant public universities in the same survey 
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and 2) content analysis of RFPs and RFQs for CMR-delivered public education-sector projects 
that had not been included in earlier analyses. The purpose of this multimethod research was to 
achieve “data envelopment” thru triangulating the findings of each method by approaching the 
research questions posed from multiple directions (Williams 2003).  
 
6.3 RFQ/RFP Content Analysis 
 RFQs and RFPs for CMR projects were collected by publicly available internet search, 
resulting in the collection of 44 individual procurement documents. Content analysis produced a 
count, by document, of the number of incidences that an RFQ/RFP addressed a selection of 95 
criteria common to these types of documents. Common criteria were organized into the 
following groups: 
1. Administrative and Cost Data 
2. Type of Procurement Process 
3. Submittal Requirements 
4. Interview Process and Requirements  
5. Method of Award 
6. Preconstruction Services Included 
  
 Consolidated counts for criteria in each category were assembled, sorted, and analyzed. 
Results of this analysis provided an insight into 1) characteristics of general contractors that are 
perceived as indicators of competence and 2) common patterns in the methodologies of public 
university owners in procuring general contractors for CMR delivered projects. A combination 
of visual inspection and OCR tools were employed to reduce the content of each document into a 
summarized scope and numerical count of the presence of common criteria. 
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6.4 RFQ/RFP Content Analysis Results 
 This collection of RFQs and RFPs issued by public universities and educational 
institutions ranged in date from 2002 up to 2019 and had total value of more than $950 million. 
The 86% of documents came from public universities with the remaining 14% coming from 
public educational institutions such as community colleges or public-school districts. 55% of 
institutions utilized an RFP-only procurement process, followed by 30% which used an RFQ-
only process. Only 5 organizations used a two-step RFQ + RFP process. 68% of institutions 
utilize a shortlisting procedure prior to award. These data can be found in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Administrative, Cost, and Procurement Data 
 
 An analysis of proposal submittal requirements can identify the level of importance 
certain selection criteria are to an owner and, where there is a high level of commonality across 
owners, can identify which common criteria that are considered important in general (Table 6.2). 
Owners use the RFP submittal requirements to manage risk associated with procuring the general 
contractor by asking for proof of applicable experience, staff qualifications, management style 
and associated plans, cost of proposed fees, financial state of the proposer, and history of any 
negative events that could disqualify the proposer from the selection. The criteria with the 
highest prevalence were a requirement to provide references from past projects (82%) followed 
Procurement Process % of Tot Count
$1.1 - $131.7 RFQ 30% 13
$24.94 RFP 55% 24
$12.50 RFQ+RFP 11% 5
Organization % of Tot Count LOI 0% 0
University 86% 38 Other  5% 2










by two requirements for providing past project experience in CMR (77%) and related projects 
(73%). When considered in aggregate, the most important factors these owners were interested in 
were being able to select a reputable firm (references) that was competent to deliver a specific 
type of project (related experience) using CMR project delivery (CMR experience). In other 
words, these owners wanted to select a general contractor that has already learned how to deliver 
a project using CMR on somebody else’s dime. The next five most important criteria consist of 
various plans and the general contractor’s organization, ranging from 59% to 61% of all 
documents in the sample. The remaining submittal requirements present in over 50% of the 
sample are a history of claims and litigation (59%), qualifications of the project manager (55%) 
and superintendent (52%), and proof of adequate bonding capacity (52%). Management plans 
provide an insight into the way a general contractor approaches the work and an opportunity to 
assess their level of sophistication and construction expertise, which owners in this represented 
sample consider to be highly important in selecting a best-qualified contractor. This provides 
support to conclusions in Chapter 6 which posits that project change can be incorporated more 
efficiently into CMR projects than with DBB as a function of improved cooperation and 
collaboration between the general contractor and the designer. An effective method of evaluating 
a general contractors potential for cooperative and collaborative behavior is an analysis of their 
management plans which should clearly identify the ways in which they intend to integrate with 
the designer of record and owners’ staffs. 
 It is of particular interest to note that pricing requirements were not present in more than 
half of the RFQs and RFPs analyzed. Pricing submittal requirements included proposed 
preconstruction services fee (48%), proposed construction fee (36%), proposed general 
conditions fee (14%), proposed post-construction services fee (9%), and rates for self-performed 
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work (7%). This shows the most owners do not consider pricing as an important criterion for 
selecting the best qualified general contractor. This provides support to lessons learned from case 
study analysis in Chapter 2 recommending that owners, when using a best value/qualifications-
based selection, the agency should not assign so much weight to the price evaluation criteria that 
is overwhelms the ability to select the best qualified contractor. When taken together with heavy 
emphasis on selecting the best-qualified contractor, these statistics provide support to 
conclusions drawn from the Utah, Kansas, and Oregon project case studies in Chapter 2 which 
found that owners have the potential to mitigate project risk more effectively when they have the 
ability to negotiate the cost of construction with a well-qualified contractor, sharing the risk for 
the work rather than optimizing for low cost and attempting to shed the risk onto the low bidder. 
This also supports conclusions from Chapter 6 that explained the increased efficiency in design 
fee expenditures for post-award growth flowing from the ability to negotiate project costs and 




Table 6.2 Proposal Submittal Requirements and Content Provided 
 
6.5 Survey Research Methodology 
 A 14-question survey (Addendum B) was submitted to capital projects personnel 
employed at 32 public universities in 17 states where legislation currently allowed CMR project 
delivery using cloud-based platform (Survey Monkey). The goal was to receive a minimum of 20 
responses, with a target response rate of at least 10%, necessitated sending surveys to more than 
200 individuals. Most universities maintain a limited professional staff to oversee capital projects 
delivery, typically less than 20 employees, of which roughly half are directly involved in project 
management. The University of Oklahoma and the University of Kansas, for example, both 
maintain a staff of 16 (3 executive administrators, 6 project managers, and 7 support staff), of 
which 9 employees each would be the idea target to respond. Larger universities and statewide 
university systems may have additional staff whereas smaller institutions may only have 2 or 3 
full time employees, relying on design and construction management subcontractors to provide 
Submittal Requirements Category % # Submittal Requirements Category % #
References from Past Projects Experience 82% 36 Quals - Quality Manager Qualifications 39% 17
CMR Project Experience Experience 77% 34 LEED Certification Plan Management 36% 16
Related Project Experience (non-CMR) Experience 73% 32 Proposed Construction Fee Pricing 36% 16
Quality Management Plan Management 61% 27 DBE Plan Management 34% 15
Safety Management Plan Management 61% 27 Other Key Project Plans Management 32% 14
Schedule Control Plan Management 61% 27 Current Workload Capacity 25% 11
Organizational Structure/Chart Management 59% 26 Preliminary Project Schedule Scheduling 23% 10
Subcontracting Plan Management 59% 26 List of Proposed Subcontractors Management 23% 10
Claim History and Litigation Neg. History 59% 26 Quals - Team Qualifications 18% 8
Quals - Project Manager Qualifications 55% 24 Default History Neg. History 16% 7
Quals - General Superintendent Qualifications 52% 23 Proposed Self-Performed Work Management 14% 6
Proof of Adequate Bonding Capacity Capacity 52% 23 Proposed General Conditions Fee Pricing 14% 6
Quals - Estimator/Scheduler Qualifications 48% 21
Claim Reduction/Resolution, 
Dispute Resolution Plan(s) Management 14% 6
Cost Budget Control Plan Management 48% 21 Construction Traffic Control Plan Management 11% 5
Proposed Preconstruction Services 
Fee Pricing 48% 21
Proposed Post-Construction 
Services Fee (Profit) Pricing 9% 4
Quals -Other Key Personnel Qualifications 45% 20 Rates for Self-Performed Work Pricing 7% 3





Quality Management Roles and Responsibilities
Preliminary Plans/Specifications
Design Criteria Checklists
Quals = Qualifications; DBE = Disadvantaged Business Enterprise;                 
LEED = Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design                                 




professional planning and oversight. Construction projects used in the project database were 
gathered from 23 universities, so it seemed reasonable to expect at least 1 response from each 
school to the survey, however, web scraping provided limited results for university staff contacts, 
so additional schools within each region were selected as proxies. Most of these additional 
universities had been contacted during the data collection phase for the project database and 
included in Table 6.3. 27 responses were received out of 228 requests, of which 23 were fully 
responsive, reaching the 10% target response rate.  
Table 6.3 Targeted Public Universities 
Montana State University University of Alabama 
New Mexico State University University of Georgia 
Oklahoma State University University of Kansas 
Oregon State University University of Missouri 
Tarleton State University University of Montana 
Texas Tech University University of Nebraska 
  
 The survey consisted of three sets of questions 1) 6 multiple choice questions focused on 
the project development and design phases, 2) 7 multiple choice questions on experiences on 
recently completed projects, and 3) an open-ended textual response question asking if there was 
anything respondents would like to add. The questions were developed with results of prior 
research conducted comparing DBB and CMR project delivery methods in public university 
capital projects with a view to validate their findings (Addendum B). Demographic information 
was limited to the respondent’s university and their role of which there were 12 executives and 
11 non-executive staff from universities in Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Oklahoma, 
New Mexico, and Texas. This fortuitous split between executive and non-executive staff allowed 
further analysis to compare the delta in perceptions between the two in the subsequent analysis. 
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Response data was organized and consolidated to enable an effective analysis, covered in the 
next section.  
 
6.6 Survey Research Analysis 
 Consolidated results were sorted by question-response, by respondent organizational role, 
and by affiliated university. Respondent organizational roles were consolidated into two 
categories: Executive/Director and Project Staff. Minor inconsistencies carried over from the 
online survey platform were corrected and unnecessary data was deleted, such as date-time 
alphanumeric strings, etc., and finally visually inspected for missing datapoints or obvious 
transcription errors. Responses were converted into numerical values then percentages of total 
responses, by question. These values were consolidated into a new table with a summarization of 
each survey question by questions set with its related research objective hypothesis. Free text 
comments from the final question were preserved in a separate worksheet. A final quality control 
inspection was conducted comparing the tabulated results with the raw output from the survey 
platform. Question responses were then compared with their related hypothesis to determine if it 
was disproved or validated. Tabulated results and free text comments were finally reviewed to 




6.7 Survey Research Results 
  Responses to the survey questionnaire were received over a period of six months (March 
to August 2021) with 23 fully complete responses. Respondent roles/job titles were broken down 
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into two groups: Director/Executive (12 respondents) or Project & Support Staff (11 
respondents). A further breakdown of Project & Support Staff can be found in Table 6.4 and a 
breakdown of organizational role by affiliated university can be found in Table 6.5  
Table 6.4 Breakdown of Respondent Organizational Roles 
Organizational Role Count 
Director/Executive 12 
Capital Projects Staff   
Project Manager/Construction Administrator 6 
Designer (Architect/Engineer/Interior Design/etc.) 4 
Accounting/Finance/Contract Specialist 1 
Total 23 
 
Table 6.5 Respondent University Breakdown by Organizational Role 
Organizational Role Exec Staff 
Colorado State University 0 1 
North Dakota State University 0 1 
Oklahoma State University 2 0 
Oregon State University 1 0 
University of Arkansas 3 0 
University of Colorado 1 4 
University of Georgia 3 0 
University of Kansas 0 1 
University of New Mexico 1 0 
University of Oklahoma 0 4 
University of Texas 1 0 
Totals 12 11 
 
 Responses to questions one through six are shown in Table 6.6. Responses to the second 
question were as expected, indicating that CMR projects regularly experienced owner-driven 
scope growth at respondent universities, as was shown in Section 3.0 where post-award design 
fee cost growth had a median value of 15%. Responses to the third question were a surprise, with 
91% of respondents indicating that a typical owner-driven scope change experienced in a CMR 
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project would not necessitate a second procurement if the delivery method were DBB. This 
disproved Research Hypothesis 3a which posited that CMR-delivered projects allow owners to 
incorporate scope changes that would otherwise require a second procurement if the project was 
delivered under a DBB contract model. Responses to questions four through six overwhelmingly 
favored CMR over DBB delivery for projects with increasing complexity especially if additional 
funds could potential become available during design or construction phases.  
Table 6.6 Responses to Survey Questions 1 to 6 
General Questions: Yes Exec/PM No Exec/PM 
1. CMR authorized at institution? 100% 23/0 0% 0/0 
2. Owner-driven Scope added regularly in 
CMR projects? (Hypothesis 3) 
83% 9/10 17% 3/1 
3. Typical Owner-driven scope growth in 
CMR require re-procurement in DBB? 
(Hypothesis 3a) 
9% 2/0 91% 10/11 
Preferred Delivery Method for: DBB Exec/PM CMR Exec/PM 
4. University 3rd party stakeholders 
involved in determining scope 
(Hypothesis 4) 
17% 1/3 83% 11/8 
5. Complicated site (Hypothesis 4) 13% 0/3 87% 12/8 
6. Additional project funds could become 
available during design/construction 
(Hypothesis 3,4) 
9% 0/2 91% 12/9 
 
 Responses to question seven (Table 6.7) favored CMR delivery with 74% of respondents 
reported working relationships on recent projects as “good” and 0% as “poor” whereas responses 
to DBB projects reported 57% as “good” and 22% as “poor”. These responses are indicative of 
1) the value of qualifications-based selection (QBS) where the criteria other than cost alone are 
employed to procure the best-qualified general contractor and 2) the impact that increased 
project team integration and collaboration may play due to contractual relationships established 
between the project parties during the preconstruction phase. It should be noted that, given a 
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larger survey sample size, there could be executives that report recent CMR working 
relationships as “poor”. Executive responses to this question for CMR unanimously selected 
“good” indicating that leadership is much more likely to view working relationships in CMR-
delivered projects positively compared to project staff who were more evenly split between 
“good” (5 responses) and “neutral” (6 responses) positions. The difference in response 
distribution for DBB working relationships was less pronounced for executives who were more 
likely to rate them as “poor” (4 responses) or “neutral” (3 responses) than “good” (5 responses) 
whereas project staff were more likely to rate them as “good” (8 responses) versus “neutral” (4 
responses) or “poor” (1 response). Further investigation into the cause of this split in perceptions 
would be worthwhile. 
Table 6.7 Responses to Questions 7 to 9 
Recent Project Experiences: Good Exec/PM Neutral  Exec/PM Poor Exec/PM 
7. Working relationships 
with designer and general 
contractor?  
(Hypotheses 1,4, & 5) 
DBB 57% 5/8 22% 3/2 22% 4/1 
CMR 74% 12/5 26% 0/6 0% 0/0 
Typical Scope Change by Phase: DBB Exec/PM CMR Exec/PM Same Exec/PM 
8. More changes during 
design/preconstruction? 
(Hypotheses 2&4) 
17% 2/2 48% 7/4 35% 3/5 
9. More changes during 
construction? (Hypotheses 2 & 4) 
48% 7/4 17% 1/3 35% 4/4 
 
 Responses to questions eight and nine (Table 6.8) asked which delivery method tended to 
see more changes during the design/preconstruction phase or the construction phase. The 
responses were almost mirror opposites of each other with CMR tending to see more scope 
changes during design/preconstruction and DBB during construction. These responses correlate 
with the way that project scope is developed in both delivery methods: CMR allows for 
collaborative scope development versus the scope being developed exclusively by the owner and 
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designer in DBB. Scope growth is an inevitable function of the owner figuring out exactly what 
it needs from a project to meet its goals and expectations for the finished facility. This is strongly 
supported in the literature, reviewed both here in this and previous chapters. Scope change is 
more efficiently incorporated into a project before the actual construction commences, ideally 
before a lump sum price for the work is agreed to as this provides a greater opportunity for the 
general contractor to take advantage of economies of scale in procuring material, equipment, and 
labor. Late scope changes typically come at a higher per unit cost resulting from the additional 
coordination and administrative effort required of the general contractor to secure additional 
construction forces and logistics to accommodate the increased scope. These responses seem to 
indicate that CMR delivery provides a better vehicle to efficiently incorporate owner-driven 
scope changes into the project prior to commencing the work. 
Table 6.8 Responses to Questions 10 and 11 
Owner-Driven Scope Change 
by University 3rd Parties: 
Every 
Project 
Exec/PM Routinely Exec/PM Occasionally Exec/PM 
10. After design contract 
awarded? (Hypothesis 3) 
39% 7/2 43% 2/8 17% 3/1 
11. After construction 
contract awarded? 
(Hypothesis 3) 
9% 2/0 43% 4/6 48% 6/5 
 
 Questions ten and eleven sought to gauge how typical scope changes driven by the 
owner’s 3rd university clients (end users, administration representatives, facilities engineering, 
maintenance, college deans, etc.) occur after the design services contract is awarded and then 
after the construction services contract is awarded (Table 6.9). 43% of respondents indicated that 
university 3rd parties drove scope change routinely in both design and construction phases. The 
overall trend for 3rd party scope was more likely to occur during the design phase than the 
construction phase, but it is important to note that 0% of respondents indicated that these 3rd 
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parties “never” drove scope change in either phase. These results indicate that university 3rd 
parties can be expected to regularly drive scope changes on projects both during design and 
construction. This can be highly disruptive to a project and cause negative impacts to both the 
budget and schedule if they are not well-managed. Responses to question four indicate a 
preference for CMR project delivery when 3rd parties are expected to play a significant role in 
developing the project scope, which also correlates with a primary theme from interviews 
conducted in Chapter 4 where expectations management was expressed as a critical function for 
the parties of the project team to control scope change and additions responsibly to keep projects 
on track. It is the owner’s responsibility to ensure that a sufficient amount of 3rd party 
requirements is incorporated into the scope early enough in the design so that subsequent 
discovery and incorporation of new scope requirements do not negatively impact the project 
team’s ability to successfully complete the project. Similarly, the designer’s responsibility is to 
be forthright and honest with the owner about the potential impact of newly added scope to a 
project so that expectations for what the general contractor will have to build are realistic both in 
cost and time impacts. These responsibilities are directly supported by the general contractor 
who provides priced options for the owner and designer to be able to make well-informed 
decisions from. CMR project delivery provides the lines of communication between these parties 
to enable these processes and open-books accounting to provide detailed, accurate cost estimates 
as quotes that can be reviewed and issued as change orders. Responses to question twelve 
confirmed that CMR is the preferred delivery method to incorporate late changes caused by the 




Table 6.9 Responses to Question 12 
Preferred Delivery Method for: DBB Exec/PM CMR Exec/PM Same Exec/PM 
12. Incorporate late scope changes 
caused by Owner/3rd parties 
(Hypothesis 3&4)  
4% 0/1 74% 11/6 22% 1/4 
 
 Question thirteen was intended to determine whether university capital projects staff 
recognized the ability to add owner-driven scope as a benefit of CMR project delivery. A little 
more than half of the respondents (Table 6.10) indicated in the positive, with twice as many 
executives selecting “yes” as project staff (8 executives/4 staff). The remainder of respondents 
were closely split between “no” and “no opinion”. The largest number of executive responses 
were “yes”, and the largest number of staff responses were “no opinion”. The strong response to 
this question lends credence to the assertation that CMR delivery provides an effective 
contractual vehicle to incorporate late changes efficiently even though this benefit has not been 
previously identified in the literature. 
Table 6.10 Responses to Question 13 
Recognition: Yes Exec/PM No Exec/PM No Opinion Exec/PM 
13. Ability to add owner-
driven scope a benefit if CMR? 
(Hypothesis 3&4) 
52% 8/4 22% 3/2 26% 1/5 
 
 The final question of the survey was posed as a free-text, open-ended invitation to 
provide any additional information that respondents thought would be important to 
communicate. Nine respondents provided additional comments (Addendum C), which could be 
categorized into the following categories: 




- By statue, we are allowed to use CM@R on projects with a total project cost over 
$5M. Between $1M and $5M we are required to use DBB. (Director/Executive) 
- Projects have a funding cap that cannot be exceeded regardless of requests for 
added scope. (Project Manager) 
- Historically we have not pursued DBB on large projects, but that has begun to 
shift as it has been felt that a lot of scope was evaporating in CMR deliveries. 
(Architect/Campus Planner/Design Phase Manager) 
- CMR is typically an option on larger projects as it allows the contractor to have 
more control of the subcontracts. DBB is used for the smaller (typically no larger 
than 5 million, always under 1 million) project and added scope is not usually an 
issue on these. CMR must get approval from the state to be used as a construction 
method, DBB does not need such approval. The university always tries to carry a 5% 
contingency not only for unforeseen conditions but for scope changes as well, no 
matter the delivery method. (Project Manager/Construction Administrator) 
 
2. Benefits and positive outcomes for CMR delivered projects (4 executive comments)  
- CMR is consistently a better approach. The overall experience is better, quality of 
work is superior, and at the end of the day, the overall cost is usually the same or 
similar and the project completion is usually quicker with CMR. (Director/Executive) 
- Costs that appear to be ‘saved’ during DBB usually turn out to equal the CMR 
original cost or exceed it. (Director/Executive) 
- CMR has proven to be a very valuable tool when used on major capital projects 
over the past 17-plus years. (Director/Executive) 
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- Over the last decade we have migrated to Target Value Design Build Lump Sum 
and Design Build with GMP project delivery and acquisition strategies using internal 
staff to develop the RFP and Design Criteria Documents. We have metrics associate 
with our now completed design build projects have outperformed both DBB and CMR 
in terms of schedule, cost/GSF and completed project quality. (University Architect) 
- CMR costs less to build a project. (Director/Executive) 
 
 Executive comments mirrored the functional roles that executives fulfill for their 
organizations being focused on identifying and implementing forward-looking solutions to meet 
current and future needs of their organizations and clients. Their comments provided insight into 
their experiences with and perception of CMR project delivery in public university capital 
projects.  
 Staff comments, similarly, mirrored their functional roles, being focused on the 
implementation of organizational policies and procedures, engaged in the real daily work of 
managing complex projects with hard budgetary and schedule constraints, responsible for being 
good stewards of taxpayer and donor generated funds to construct the quality facilities that will 
satisfy end-user needs and requirements for years to come. Their comments shared insights into 
how their universities selected project delivery methods, the effect of funding caps on scope 






6.8 Project Case Studies 
 The following section discusses a selection of successful projects included in this study 
that appear to have failed, according to traditional project performance metrics. Two of these 
projects were nominated for the Associated General Contractors’ ACE awards in the year of their 
completion (Addenda D & E) and all three achieved LEED certification.  
 
6.8.1 Five Partners Place Office Building, University of Oklahoma 
 The 5 Partners Place building is a $27 million, four-story, 100,000 square foot LEED 
certified commercial office building was programmed and developed in the late 2010’s and built 
between 2012 and 2017 to provide space for several existing south campus tenants to move into 
larger spaces and to accommodate a major federal client with very specific construction criteria 
to be met, which drove the delivery method selection to be CMR. These factors contributed to 
the lengthy construction time and the quantity of change orders as unfinished spaces were leased 
and built out. This project provides a good example of how CMR delivery provides an effective 
way to deliver complex, underfunded projects where the scope is not fully developed by the time 
that construction needs to begin.  
 
6.8.1.1 OU Research Campus Development CMR History 
 The University of Oklahoma began developing a research campus office park south of 
the main campus starting in the early 2000’s that eventually resulted in nine total buildings: five 
tenant-finished office space Partners Place buildings, the National Weather Center building, the 
Radar Innovations Laboratory building, and the two Stephenson Center research buildings of 
which all but one was built using CMR project delivery. The first CMR delivered project on the 
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OU campus was the 1 Partners Place building, completed in 2003 by Lippert Brothers 
Construction, Inc. (LBI) and designed by The McKinney Partnership Architects (TMP). This 
project team was very successful at delivering this first CMR project which resulted in the 
delivery method’s adoption by the university’s Architectural & Engineering Services division 
which utilized CMR deliver for larger, complex projects that would benefit from early contractor 
involvement and integration into the design team. These two firms won contracts for and built 
four of the five Partners Place buildings, culminating with 5 Partners Place. They had developed 
an excellent working relationship over the previous 15 years and had successfully delivered 
multiple commercial building projects for the university. 
 
6.8.1.2 Project Contract History 
 Development for the 5 Partners Place building began in 2010 as the popularity of existing 
office space on the research campus had created a need for another building. TMP was selected 
as the designer of record in November of 2010 on a percentage of construction fee (7.75%) plus 
a $65,000 lump sum to secure LEED certification and reimbursable expenses with a 10% 
markup for a sum of $1,731,250. The initial estimated budget for construction was $21.5 million 
and had not changed in the 18 intervening months when the general contractor was brought in 
under a preconstruction services contract in June of 2012 for a lump sum of $47,000. The project 
scope was refined and developed over the next five months to accommodate five tenants that had 
committed to leasing space in the building, planning for the remaining unfinished space to have 
all the building infrastructure necessary installed in it, and conducting at-cost value engineering 
to bring the project into the budget. LBI submitted a GMP to the university of $24 million, of 
which $2.24 million was owner contingency, $14.9 million was allocated to the building core 
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and shell, $3 million allocated to finishing out spaces with tenant commitments, and $2 million 
allocated to future tenant space infrastructure.  
 LBI was issued eight change orders that increased the construction cost by $1.7 million, 
of which most was devoted to tenant finish outs for newly leased spaces and a combination of 
owner and tenant requested changes. TMP was issued ten contract modifications increasing their 
design fees by $228,000, half were pass through payments to the commissioning agent and the 
other half were dedicated to tenant build out and tenant/owner change requests. Construction on 
the building core and shell began in November of 2012 and substantial completion was granted 
in December of 2014. Six of the eight change orders issued to the general contractor occurred 
after they had been granted substantial completion, with the two largest for finishing out tenant 
spaces on the first and fourth floors.  
 
6.8.1.3 Tenant Abandonment 
 OU Real Estate had lined up a tenant who committed to move into a significant portion of 
the fourth floor of the building, contributing funds to customize the finish out their future 9,100 
square foot space. TMP fully designed the space for them and worked to extensively redesign it 
to reduce the cost to the tenant. This design work was being done at-risk in expectation of 
receiving a contract modification to cover the cost of the design. The university had exercised an 
option in the contract to preposition $72,600 of materials to accelerate the build out, which was 
expected to cost around $546,000. Soon thereafter the tenant decided they would be occupying 
the space and walked away. It is incredibly common in CMR delivered projects for designers and 
general contractors to provide services to an owner before they receive an official contract for 
the work which can place them in a difficult position from time to time when the funding fails to 
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be secured. This kind of behavior communicates the level of trust that these firms place in owner 
and each other to share the risk so that they can all share the reward. TMP requested a contract 
modification to help cover the lost design effort associated with the tenant abandonment of the 
4th floor spaces but reduced their fee by 20% as recognition that the owner had suffered from the 
event as well. A contract modification was issued to TMP in May of 2015 for the redesign for a 
lump sum of $26,208 and the work on the building continued. This kind of event can be 
devastating if the project team is poorly integrated and lacks trust in each other, especially for 
design firms which lack the financial depth and robustness as the owner and general contractor. 
Fortunately, TMP and OU had a longstanding relationship of mutual respect and the project 
survived. This event is a good example of how to maintain trust and collaboration in a CMR 
delivered project by sharing risk across the project team. 
 
6.8.1.4 Bureau of Land Management Delayed Occupancy 
 The largest tenant at 5 Partners if the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Oklahoma 
Field Office, which occupies over 14,000 square feet and more than half of the first floor and 
portions of the second floor with their Wild Horse and Burro Program staff, moving into the 
space in October of 2016, almost two years after the building core and shell were substantially 
complete. One of the university’s primary motivations for building 5 Partners Place was the hope 
that the Bureau of Land Management would occupy the office space as they were looking to 
move the regional office out of their facilities in Tulsa. This remained a closely held secret for 
several years however, steps were taken in the design phase to provide the necessary 
infrastructure to make the building an attractive choice for the agency, adding reinforced floors 
for record stack rooms and additional conduit sleeves for power and data runs to the parking lot. 
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In May of 2014 the university capital projects staff were notified that the space would need a wet 
lab to potentially accommodate US Geological Survey employees that might be officing with the 
BLM. A contract modification was issued to the designer to design the lab who worked with the 
general contractor to adjust the layout and infrastructure in the space so that the lab could be 
built if the BLM decided to move in. The project proceeded with construction and completion of 
the building core and shell. TMP worked with the university real estate office, beginning in June 
of 2015, to put together test-fit feasibility plans based on details of BLM’s expressed 
requirements. In late January of 2016, the lease agreement with BLM was imminent, so the 
university directed the designer to complete the design for the build out of the first and second 
floor areas, which was all done at-risk until a contract modification was issued in June of 2016 to 
pay for the previous 12 months of design effort and subsequent construction administration of 
the work. TMP’s at-risk proactive engagement with the real estate office, the General Services 
Administration, and the BLM provided the continuity necessary to successfully design and 
construct the facilities to meet every stakeholder’s needs over a relatively compressed timeline 
once the decision to move was made. 
 LBI had maintained a reduced staff on site to work through tenant finish outs, warranty 
work, and minor changes associated with the building being incrementally occupied, which over 
time was reduced to a junior assistant superintendent who maintained an office onsite and 
continued to meet regularly meet with the campus capital projects staff and designer to keep 
abreast of future work. Over the summer and fall of 2015, LBI increased their participation with 
TMP in pricing the BLM tenant build-out and began to organize for a late-spring/early-summer 
construction start date. The scope of the change order required selective demolition and 
relocation of existing mechanical and electrical infrastructure, installing partition walls, 
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casework, doors, signage, a secured entrance, and fenced parking area. LBI was able to involve 
key trade subcontractors that had been brought under contract for the building core and shell in 
early 2016 to collaboratively develop their work packages enabling the general contractor to 
efficiently remobilize on site and begin work that summer. The BLM set their move-in date to 
the first of October 2016 to coincide with the expiration of their current lease on facilities in 
Tulsa, which meant that substantial completion had to be accomplished before the end of 
September. LBI began the work in early August under a verbal agreement, receiving a change 
order for the scope of the work on August 31st and receiving substantial completion for the office 
spaces less than one month later, on September 29th, allowing the BLM to move in on time. The 
general contractor took another month after the interior work was completed to finish 
constructing the parking lot gates and fence. Phasing the work to accomplish owner and tenant 
goals for move-in mitigated the financial risk associated with delays, additional leasing cost for 
the BLM and lost revenue for the university real estate, in a compressed timeline. Additionally, 
completing the work in two months reduced the cost of general conditions associated with the 
change order and provided a more efficient delivery of the construction scope. 
 
6.8.1.5 Owner Representative Continuity Disruptions 
 Continuity in the members of a project team is crucial to the success of the project as 
many of the collectively developed decisions made by the owner, designer, and general 
contractor over the lifespan of the project often are not written down or fully captured in meeting 
minutes, email conversations, and official documentation and, even if it were so, is a big ask for 
a new team member to get up to speed on. The university had four different project managers on 
this project, the first one oversaw the planning and programming of the project and the 
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commencement of construction but left the organization halfway through the building core and 
shell build. The second project manager took over during the middle of the build and oversaw its 
completion and tenant changes until he retired in the summer of 2015. The third project manager 
took over in mid-2015 and oversaw the remaining tenant change orders and the initiation of the 
after the BLM design work before handing of the project to a fourth project manager in early 
2016 and stayed on the project until it was finally closed out in 2017. The owner’s role in setting 
project goals, identifying key success factors, making decisions, and providing leadership to the 
project team can be a difficult endeavor yet these functions provide the authority and direction 
needed to successfully complete construction projects. Discontinuity in project leadership can 
cripple a project due to differences in communication and management styles, even if outgoing 
and incoming representatives are competent, experienced, and conduct a good handover of 
project documents. The 5 Partners Place project experienced this disruption three times in the 
project and yet was able to deliver the project successfully and efficiently relying on the strong 
relationships between the designer and general contractor who carried the project over the finish 
line. The relationship between TMP and LBI was the keystone to completing this project 
successfully, their initiative in proactively engaging with third party stakeholders and willingness 
to begin work on a verbal agreement mitigated the disruption from the constant changes in the 
owner’s project leadership. 
 
6.8.1.6 Performance Metrics 
 The 5 Partners Place Building project has mixed performance according to traditional 
metrics. The project construction cost grew 9% from the early estimate but only 8% from the 
GMP to completion, which would be typically considered an acceptable amount of cost growth 
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as many university systems have a 10% cap on change orders before the project requires a 
special authorization to exceed this limit. Design fee cost growth was 18%, according to the 
contract modifications, however TMP coordinated the payment $103,141 for the commissioning 
agent as a pass-through fee without any markup, which is unusual for projects on the OU campus 
given that the capital projects staff typically bring the commissioning agent under a direct 
contract with the owner. Given the discontinuity of project leadership, TMP volunteered to 
coordinate the commissioning and handle their payment at zero cost. Considering these 
irregularities, the actual design fee cost growth was only 7%, adding $125,000 to the initial 
contract. Schedule growth for the project, however, was 44%. The initial project schedule was 
planned for 584 days of construction but tool a total of 783 days due to the extended lease-out of 
the tenant office spaces and delay associated with moving the BLM into the building. This 
project experienced a steady stream of owner-driven scope change over the life of the project 
which was managed well because of project team integration between the designer and general 
contractor. Design fee efficiency for post award changes had a C$:D$ value of $13.32, which is 
well above the mean value of $8.48 for DBB project post award scope changes. Considering the 
deleterious effect of inconsistent owner’s representation, this efficiency ratio for developing 
construction scope illustrates an excellent example of how CMR delivery enables a more 
efficient incorporation of scope changes than found in DBB delivery. Had the owner chosen to 
deliver this building project under DBB contracts would have theoretically reduced the capacity 
to develop the amount of additional scope from $1,663,6190 to between $552,000 to $1,111,500, 
which very well could have impacted the ability to move in the BLM, which cost $893,000. 
Conversely, the theoretical cost for the owner to pay for the necessary scope additions under 
DBB delivery would have had an additional design cost of between $71,000 to $252,000. This 
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additional design cost would have to be either passed onto the tenant or would have pushed the 
design fees over the 10% change order cap, requiring the capital projects staff to go back to the 
board of regents to ask for more money. Finally, the C$:D$ value is a concrete quantification of 
the quality of integration in the project team, specifically between the designer and the general 
contractor. 
 
6.8.1.7 Lessons Learned 
 This project provides several useful lessons learned. A highly integrated design and 
construction team that has a well-established relationship of trust and confidence in each other 
has the potential to deliver a complex project successfully meeting the owner’s key success 
factors despite discontinuity in the owner’s project leadership. The value of the relationship 
established between a designer and general contractor is difficult to quantify in theory but is 
simple to observe in practice. Selecting the best qualified designer and general contractor is more 
important on non-standard projects that have increased levels of complexity and risk associated 
with the impact of 3rd party stakeholders, both internal and external to the university, that are 
highly involved in developing the scope of the work and whose satisfaction is necessary to meet 
the owner’s key success factors for the project. Finally, a highly qualified CMR project team has 
the potential to carry a complex project to successful completion and efficiently incorporate 
scope changes and additions even when the owner’s project management is in flux. This project 
provides strong support to the conclusions from research conducted in Chapters 2, 3, and 6: 
1. CMR project delivery provides greater contractual flexibility to incorporate owner-




CMR delivery provided an effective vehicle to build a tenant finished office building 
capable of being utilized prior to every space being completed and allowed the late 
finish out of a large section of the building (14,000 square feet) for a federal agency 
with a range of specialized requirements to satisfy federal regulations for occupancy. 
2. Contractual language governing the relationship between the designer and the general 
contractor should be well-synchronized (Hypothesis 5). 
Contract documents utilized were well synchronized providing an enforceable 
baseline expectation for collaborative behavior. The well-established professional 
relationship between the designer and the general contractor was given the latitude to 
provide a greater level of service to the owner, 3rd party stakeholders, and tenants 
despite disruptions from changes to the owner’s project team.  
3. CMR project delivery provides the opportunity to incorporate owner-driven scope 
changes more efficiently than DBB providing greater value for money to the owner 
(Hypotheses 1, 3 & 4). 
The relative quality of project team integration can be measured by the C$:D$. 
C$:D$ Change = $13.32 
Post-GMP Construction Scope Change = $1,663,610 
Design Fee for Owner Driven Scope Change = $124,913 
Theoretical Cost of DBB Design Fee Scope Change = $71K to $252K 






6.8.2 Biotechnology Building E-Wing Addition, University of Colorado Boulder 
 The Jennie Smoly Caruthers Biotechnology Building’s E-Wing is an award-winning, 
certified LEED Platinum, 57,500 square foot teaching and research laboratory addition to the 
Jennie Smoly Caruthers Biotechnology Building located on the University of Colorado at 
Boulder’s (CU Boulder) east campus and hosts undergraduate, graduate, and industry 
biotechnology research, housing the university’s BioFrontiers Institute and private industry 
partner companies (CU Boulder 2021). Industry tenants include, at the time of this writing, 
Agilent Technologies, Arpeggio Biosciences, Edgewise Therapeutics, Double Helix, VitriVax, 
and Wavi. Special research campuses are a common feature on many major public universities 
with strong research programs that provide tenant office space and access to advanced research 
facilities to private industry partners that intend to partner with on-campus research staff and 
students. The project received awards from both the Engineering News Record (Best Higher 
Education/Research Project – Merit) and the Associated General Contractors (ACE Award Best 
Building Project – General Contractor $10-$40 million) (AP Construction 2021). This section 
will explore how CMR project delivery provided the vehicle need to complete this complex 
project. 
 
6.8.2.1 Project Contract History 
 Capital projects staff for CU Boulder delivered this project using standard form CM/GC 
contracts developed by the State Architect of Colorado’s office, which contain an excellent 
example of highly synchronized preconstruction and design contract language. The designer was 
awarded their initial contract in January of 2015 and received six cost additive amendments and 
a final deductive amendment that provided a credit back to the owner. The general contractor 
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was awarded the contract for preconstruction services in March of 2015 and received five cost 
additive amendments, nine zero cost amendments, and one deductive amendment returning a 
credit back to the owner. Full details are shown in Table 6.11 
 
Table 6.11 CU Boulder E-Wing Design and Construction Contract History 
 
 
6.8.2.2 Project Financing History 
 The Jennie Smoly Caruthers Biotechnology Building was originally developed in 2005 as 
a three-phase project due to funding limitations with only sufficient state funding to complete the 
first phase. The project was rescoped to take advantage of cash funding internal to the campus, 
descoping the state-funded portion of the project and utilizing $148 million to complete the first 
two project phases which constructed the four-story building shell consisting of an auditorium 
and four wings. The university received a $15 million grant from the National Institutes of 











Original 27-Jan-15 $2,670,290 Original 5-Mar-15 $75,000 $0 $0 $0 $75,000
Mod 1 25-Jan-16 $199,043 Mod 1 25-Feb-16 $41,536 $612,500 $1,210,631 $10,903,082 $22,767,749
Mod 2 27-Apr-16 $5,520 Mod 2 23-May-16 $2,263 $18,243 $85,621 $2,602,832 $2,708,959
Mod 3 14-Jul-16 $5,800 Mod 3 28-Sep-16 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 4 15-Nov-16 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 4 3-Jan-17 $41,886 Mod 5 5-Jan-17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 6 23-Mar-17 $13,140 $105,897 $462,765 $3,418,198 $4,000,000
Mod 7 5-May-17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 8 7-Jul-17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 9 26-Jul-17 $560 $11,716 $0 $138,707 $150,983
Mod 5 24-Jul-17 $79,260 Mod 10 31-Aug-17 $23,788 $191,710 $665,428 $7,159,462 $8,040,388
Mod 6 4-Oct-17 $3,060 Mod 11 19-Dec-17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 12 16-Apr-18 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 13 23-Sep-18 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 14 31-Oct-18 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mod 7 19-Dec-18 -$11,099 Mod 15 8-Feb-19 $0 $0 $0 -$418,550 -$418,550
$2,993,760 $156,287 $940,066 $2,424,445 $33,803,731 $37,324,529
DOR: HDR Architecture, Inc.
TotalsTotal
CMR: Adolfson & Peterson Construction
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Health which completed a portion of the buildout and finish for several laboratories, offices, and 
accessory spaces. The state subsequently authorized $6 million in state funding to complete the 
interior buildout and an additional $4 million in cash to design and begin construction on the E-
Wing. The university received an additional authorization of $15 million in state funds and $13.2 
million in cash to expend during the 2015-2016 fiscal year, bringing the total appropriation of 
funds to $32,266,168. The university requested, in June of 2017, an additional $10.9 million in 
supplemental funding to an “insufficient construction labor force in the region, an unfavorable 
bidding climate for outfitting highly technical teaching and research laboratories, and a ten-year 
delay in the project’s initial construction schedule” (CU Boulder 2017) bringing the total cost to 
$43,169,753. It is important to note that the amount of funds allocated to a project cover design 
and construction costs as well as owner costs associated with developing, administering, 
furnishing, and operating the facility so they do not track straight between costs expended as 
payments to the builder and designer.  
 
6.8.2.3 Phasing an Underfunded Project 
 The university had developed programming requirements for the new addition at an 
estimated value of roughly $38 million moving forward with obtaining approval from their board 
of regents. The designer was selecting in late 2014 with contract award to HDR Architects, Inc. 
in January of 2015, prior to having obtained full funding for the project. A review of the May 
2015 University of Colorado Board of Regents Capital Construction Subcommittee meeting 
minutes (Capital Construction Subcommittee 2015) showed that only $10 million had been 
appropriated, with the State of Colorado committing to allocate a total of $21 million to the 
project with responsibility for the remaining $17 million assigned to the university. This is a 
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common feature in the long work of financing public university capital projects where funds are 
committed from various agencies, by issuing debt instruments, and fundraising among donors. 
The facilities construction staff at CU Boulder recognized the need for specialized construction 
expertise to be able to successfully deliver this project concurrently as additional funding was 
secured. They quickly followed up the design services award by selecting a general contractor 
only a month later, awarding the preconstruction services contract to Adolfson and Peterson 
Construction. They were able to work closely with the designer to phase the project around the 
owner’s financial constraints by breaking down the scope into the base contract work that 
consisted of a four-story building core and shell plus the academic programing spaces for the 
first phase and individual labs within the addition into separate work packages as priced 
alternates to the base contract that were completed in the second and third phase. This allowed 
the project team to begin preliminary investigative work in the spring of 2015 by the owner 
issuing a series of notices to proceed (NTP) with fixed not to exceed (NTE) limits and substantial 
completion and final acceptance dates for each phase. An NTP was issued in December of 2015 
for prework vibrations monitoring, required by building tenant researchers that were conducting 
experiments with rats and needed to determine if the construction work would affect the study, 
which was continued during the length of the project (AP Construction 2021). The third NTP 
was issued in January 2016 to mobilize for construction. The project schedule, provided in the 
first contract modification issued which also established the GMP, showed that preconstruction 
activities began in March of 2015 and planned to be complete in August of 2016, running 
concurrently with construction for a full seven months starting in February of 2016, aligned with 
the university’s academic calendar (Table 6.12). Subsequent work packages for laboratory 
facilities, an elevator, landscaping, and site furnishing and were priced as seven alternates to the 
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base contract and executed by change order if funding became available to cover the work. 
Eventually, the university was able to raise the remaining funds needed to complete the building 
which included a $2 million donation from John and Anna Sie, the founder of Starz 
Entertainment and longtime CU Boulder philanthropists (Knoss 2017). Phase 1 occupancy for 
the building core and shell was substantially complete on April 24th and final completion was 
achieved on May 11th. Phase 2 occupancy for the second-floor laboratories was granted in 
September of 2017 while Phase 3 work continued on the ground and 1st floor offices and 
laboratory spaces for the next year. This strategy of using “planned” change orders should be 
considered a best practice for delivering partially funded, complex projects. 
Table 6.12 E-Wing 95% CDs Schedule Work Packages – Contract Amendment #2 
Work Packages - 95% CD Schedule Start Date Finish Date 
Preconstruction Services Activities 2-Mar-15 11-Aug-16 
Site Mobilization 8-Feb-16 9-Mar-16 
Demolition 15-Feb-16 6-Oct-15 
Early Sitework 16-Mar-16 18-May-06 
Foundations & Substructure 23-Mar-16 31-May-16 
Superstructure 18-May-16 9-Sep-16 
Exterior Envelope 21-Jul-16 23-Dec-16 
Roofing 30-Aug-16 11-Nov-16 
Core and Shell + Academic Space 13-May-16 7-Feb-17 
Elevator 30-Aug-16 5-Dec-16 
Final Site Development 17-Oct-16 21-Apr-17 
Final Inspections 4-Nov-16 20-Feb-17 
Closeout 4-Jan-17 21-Feb-17 
 
6.8.2.4 Strategic Subcontractor Buyout and Design-Assist Roles 
 The general contractor brought on subcontractor trades strategically utilizing a phased 
buyout of the project scope by bringing on key trades in design-assist roles for developing and 
pricing work packages around the available funding. AP sought out competent subcontractors 
that had experience working on the Boulder campus and were familiar with the university’s 
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construction administration processes including several that had worked on the original building 
project. This enabled the general contractor to efficiently accomplish as much work as was 
financially feasible and to have established relationships with subcontractors that allowed for 
portions of the work to be delayed until finding was procured and then collaboratively escalated. 
This process allowed the general contractor to remain mobilized onsite after the core and shell 
plus academic space phase was completed and flow directly into finishing out the various lab 
spaces, avoiding the cost and impact of multiple mobilizations.  
 
6.8.2.5 Mockups and BIM Modeling Accelerate Approvals 
 The E-Wing project contained several nonstandard features of work that required extra 
effort to receive timely approvals. The building envelope’s architectural appearance was a 
critical success factor for the owner who expected the addition to blend seamlessly with the 
existing building and match the architectural context of the campus. Universities with distinctive 
architectural styles rely heavily upon their capital projects staff to maintain the consistency in 
finished to renovations and new buildings. For example, the University of Oklahoma’s 
architectural style is called Cherokee Gothic and consists of brick and architectural cast stone 
exterior finishes accented with gothic flourishes that match the early buildings erected on the 
campus in the late 1890’s and early 1900’s. CU Boulder’s self-named architectural style is 
referred to as University of Colorado Style and is characterized by sandstone walls, tile roofs, 
limestone trim, and black metal accents (CU Boulder 2018). AP constructed six different 
mockups to select the brick blends and grout pigments that best matched the existing building’s 
envelope which had weathered over the years since it was built changing the colors of the 
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original brick blend and grout. This mockup process should be considered a best practice for 
commercial building work in this market segment. 
 The general contractor developed a coordinated BIM model for the addition over the 
course of the preconstruction services phase that enabled the project to deconflict building 
systems, phase work to reduce the impact to ongoing operations in the building, and as tool to 
assist permitting with the campus authority holding jurisdiction. An example provided in their 
AGC award submission (AP Construction 2021) was a dance floor being installed above a 
mechanical chase. Flooring is not typically installed above mechanical chases but campus 
maintenance staff had requested the local for its ease of access The contractor recognizing the 
importance of satisfying facilities management’s concerns and goals for the project, so it was 
incorporated into the BIM model which was used to guide final reviews for each floor with 
facilities management to ensure that concerns about servicing equipment and any final 
modifications could be incorporated.  
 
6.8.2.6 Performance Metrics 
 The project’s initial schedule for a 358-day project duration grew to a total of 928 days 
by completion because of the integrated approach the project team took to phasing the work to 
meet funding availability. According to traditional schedule growth metrics, this project saw 
159% growth in duration, which could be considered a major failure in project management if 
the context of the growth was not well understood. The construction cost grew 31% from the 
initial estimate and 39% from the GMP with design cost growing by 16%. These metrics could 
also be interpreted negatively as a sign of poor scope definition and mismanagement if the 
context of the project were not understood. Design fee efficiency ratios provide an easily 
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understood assessment of the quality of project team integration expressed as the efficiency of 
incorporating owner-driven scope changes into the project. The C$:D$ Change value for this 
project was $34.82, the dollar amount of construction scope that every additional dollar of design 
fee added to the project produced. DBB C$:D$ Change ratios calculated in Chapter 5 varied 
between an average of $4.42 and a median of $8.48. The project team for the E-Wing project 
was able to produce between four and eight times as much construction scope as could be 
expected in a comparable DBB-delivered project. If this project had been delivered effectively 
under a DBB delivery, the amount of construction scope added post-award could have 
theoretically been reduced by $11M to $12.7M due to the delivery method. If the university had 
been adamant about constructing the full scope in the additions, it could have theoretically 
increased the over cost of the project by $1.3 million to $2.9 million in addition design fees to 
obtain it. The $2 million Sie Foundation donation was just enough to carry the project over the 
finish line, to put things in perspective. 
 
6.8.2.7 Lessons Learned  
 This C$:D$ ratio strongly supports Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 and clearly demonstrates the 
value of CMR delivery for complex projects that would benefit from known advantages (shown 
in Table 1.11) 1) QBS selection of the general contractor, 2) continuous budget control, 3) 
construction and design team integration, 4) more ability to handle changes in design and scope 
and would be considered a highly successful project from the owner’s standpoint by being able 
to deliver the full scope of the project in a cost-effective manner providing more value for the 
funding allocated to the project. This project provides strong support to the conclusions from 
research conducted in Chapters 2, 3, and 6: 
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4. Select the general contractor as early as possible in the design phase to maximize the 
potential benefits of CMR delivery (Hypothesis 1 & 4). 
Early contractor involvement enables the owner to make design decisions with more 
complete information with accurate pricing and understanding constructability issues 
5. Contractual language governing the relationship between the designer and the general 
contractor should be well-synchronized (Hypothesis 5). 
Contract documents utilized were highly synchronized providing an enforceable 
baseline expectation for collaborative behavior.  
6. CMR project delivery provides the opportunity to incorporate owner-driven scope 
changes more efficiently than DBB providing greater value for money to the owner 
(Hypotheses 1, 3 & 4). 
C$:D$ Change = $32.82 
Post-GMP Construction Scope Change = $14,556,780 
Design Fee for Owner Driven Scope Change = $418,062 
Theoretical Cost of DBB Design Fee Scope Change = $1.3M to $2.9M 





6.8.3 Multipurpose Stadium, Colorado State University 
 The capital projects staff at Colorado State University were one of the earliest supporters 
of this research project and provided an incredibly useful set of projects that were critical to this 
research. When the campus architect, Mike Rush, handed over the dataset of their projects he 
pointed out that the largest project of the group looked like it was a failure by traditional project 
performance metrics for schedule and cost growth (Table 7.8), but it was considered an 
incredibly successful project. The key to its success was found in the CMR project delivery 
method which set the right conditions for the project team to incorporate new scope funded by 
late donations to the project after construction had commenced. This section will provide a brief 
overview of the project and how it provides a source of validation to previously identified 
research findings.  
6.8.3.1 Contract History 
 Canvas Stadium is a 727,000 square foot, LEED Silver multipurpose facility opened in 
2018 in the heart of the main campus of Colorado State University in Fort Collins, Colorado 
financed entirely by private donations and bond sales (CSU 2020). Fundraising began for the 
new stadium began in 2013 to replace the existing 32,500-seat stadium with a larger 41,000-seat 
stadium to help in recruiting out-of-state athletes and students (Wall Street Journal 2013) with 
construction commencing in May of 2015 and completion of the stadium portion of the building 
occurring in August of 2017 in time to play the first NCAA football game of the season. The 
original planned to cost for the stadium in 2012 was between $150-160 million for construction 
costs and an overall project budget of $243 million for approximately 670,000 square feet of 
space (RFP 2012) with the plan to be built in 20 months, beginning construction in October of 
2014 and completion by May of 2016. The construction cost estimate was reduced to $125 
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million by October 2014 resulting from fund raising difficulties, which appeared to have cause a 
year’s delay in the construction start. This cost was adjusted upwards to $195 million for 
construction, $220 million for the total project, in November of 2014 prior to seeking and 
receiving approval from the university’s board of governors’ approval during the first week of 
that December (CBS Denver 2014). The stadium project was delivered using standard form 
CMR contracts awarded to Populous, a major multinational sports and entertainment facilities 
designer out of Kansas City that partnered with ME Engineers out of Denver, in April of 2012 
(Populous 2012) and then with M.A. Mortenson Company, a major American general 
contracting company headquartered in Minnesota in October of 2013 (American City Business 
Journals 2013). The State of Colorado refers to CMR as CM/GC for both horizontal and vertical 
construction. The university retained an owner’s representative firm, Icon Venue Group, which 
was brought on to develop a preliminary feasibility study (Armbrister 2012). 
 
6.8.3.2 Early Contractor Involvement 
 Mortenson was brought on board early enough in the project’s design phase, in 
September of 2013, that they were able to provide a wide range of preconstruction services to the 
owner. The RFP for preconstruction services listed several specific services expected but left it 
open for the general contractor to be able to propose additional services that the owner may have 
not contemplated at the time of writing this procurement document. Specified preconstruction 
services in the RFP can be found in Table 6.13. The university architect put special emphasis on 
their expectations for project team integration using words like “cooperatively”, 
“collaboratively”, and “collectively” in key sections throughout the RFP. The following 
quotation was taken from the “Preconstruction Phase Services” subsection under the “Scope of 
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Services” section, and it does an excellent job of characterizing the expected tone of 
relationships between the project team parties (emphasis added): 
 
“Furthermore, specific studies to understand cost implications of particular 
design solutions and/or material selections will be required throughout the 
Preconstruction Phase. It is currently anticipated that Contractor will be required 
to establish the GMP based on partially complete Construction Documents. At 
any time that the Contractor’s estimate exceeds the Fixed Limit of Construction 
Cost, the Contractor will be required to participate in value engineering with the 
Project Manager, Architect, and Owner to collaboratively bring the design of the 
Project within such budget.” 
 
 Expectations must be established up front in CMR delivered projects to gain the 
opportunity for reaping the numerous potential benefits of this delivery method (Chapter 4.3.2) 










l Work cooperatively with the PM, Architect, and Owner 
Constructability Reviews 
Preconstruction Planning 





Cost Estimating Expectations: 
  Best Value 
  Cost Certainty 
  Meet Fixed Limit of Construction Cost 
  Show Fees & General Conditions 
Cost Estimates 
  Conceptual Design Documents 
  Schematic Design 50% 
  Schematic Design 100% 
  Design Development 50% 
  Design Development 100% 
  Construction Documents 50% - GMP 
  Fees & General Conditions 
Collaborative Value Engineering to stay in the Budget 
Show Access to Actual Market Pricing (Est & VE)  








  GMP Date 
  Meet Project Schedule 
Specific Studies to Understand: 
  Cost Implications 
  Materials Selection 
 
6.8.3.3 Additional Non-RFP Preconstruction Services 
 Mortenson provided additional preconstruction services to the university that were not 
specified in the RFP. They provided assistance with public outreach to opposition groups that 
had coalesced in the Fort Collins community over concerns from churches and private citizens 
about construction impacts, game day traffic, and many that desired to save or renovate the 
existing stadium which was roughly three miles off campus. The general contractor the 
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university in communicating project goals and expectations while an intergovernmental 
agreement was prepared between Colorado State and the City of Fort Collins which direct the 
formation of a “Stadium Advisory Group” which consisted of nine jointly appointed members 
that included business owners, community leaders, a pastor, two retired CSU faculty, and the 
county director of natural resources. This group served as an interface between the university, the 
city of Fort Collins, and the community while also overseeing the use of a “Good Neighbor 
Fund” established to mitigate impacts established by the university that promised to pay in 
$37,000 a year and fundraise for a $750,000 endowment (Henry 2015). Mortenson’s team 
participation and leadership in this preconstruction activity helped the project team keep the 
design schedule moving forward.  
 Mortenson’s preconstruction team used Populous’ design models to develop a 4D 
Building Information Model (BIM). BIM integrates schedules, material costs, logistical plans 
and simulations, submittal data, with building models produced by the designer of record. The 
general contractor used the 4D BIM model to mitigate schedule risk by synchronizing the model 
with the schedule. Mortenson used the BIM synchronization software called Syncho PRO to tie 
elements of the 3D model with their associated schedule activities in the Primavera P6 schedule 
and vice versa, linking schedule activities with 3D content into a common filetype (AGC 2017). 
This technique allowed the general contractor to evaluate proposed changes and modifications to 
the project with better information to understand potential impacts to the schedule, budget, and 
workflow. Mortenson established a monthly update to the synchronized 4D model as a 
forecasting tool to plan out the upcoming month’s work which was incorporated into the phasing 
plan and communicated to trade partners, the contractor’s internal staff, the designer, and the 
owner providing a visual representation of where the project needed to be in four weeks. This 
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was especially helpful in developing the work plans associated with the radial grid system 
employed in the building’s structure which was more complex due to long cantilevers supporting 
upper bowl seating. Logistical planning simulations were run in the model to develop the site 
logistics plan, sequencing of cranes and critical lifts with the installation of cast-in-place 
concrete, precast stadia seating, and structural steel erection (AGC 2017). 4D BIM provides a 
good visualization tool that can improve project communication and understanding by clarifying 
complex activities into a visual model that is simple to understand, reducing decision-making 
time and improving the quality of decisions made. A good example in this project was how 
concurrent work within the same area of the building was planned. The project schedule planned 
for concurrent work to occur on an upper concourse level (CMU block walls, roofing and 
mechanical equipment) and the elevated hard-lid soffit system being installed above it that 
precluded the use of traditional scaffolding. This drove the decision to use a suspended 
scaffolding system which was work was simulated and planned in the 4D model with the 
structural engineer and the scaffolding subcontractor, allowing an efficient installation that 
avoided making modification to the steel structure, mitigating potential negative impacts on the 
project schedule from the change (AGC 2017). 
 The general contractor is incentivized in CMR to help the designer prioritize efforts to 
produce complete documents for early work packages and to reduce potential delays in getting 
them released for construction. Every week that the design is delayed is one week less that the 
contractor has to complete the project and they are the ones who will be held liable if substantial 
completion dates are missed. Early schedule goals to begin work in 2014 and be finished by the 
summer of 2016 had been pushed due to fundraising and community opposition, so streamlining 
the design process became a critical goal to achieve the current project schedule. Work officially 
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began at the end of the spring semester in May of 2015. Supporting preparatory work had to be 
completed over the summer with the first excavation on the stadium site occurring October of 
2015. Being able to have the stadium open in time for the Fall 2017 NCAA football season was a 
driving concern. This kind of schedule constraint is commonplace in public university 
construction projects, attempting to reduce disruptions on campus during the regular school year 
by maximizing production over the summer and various holiday periods so that facilities can be 
substantially complete to open in time for students to return to campus, attend scheduled events, 
etc. In revenue generating facilities like stadiums, having them open in time for their regular 
competitive seasons is typically critical to the university having the financial capacity to make 
payments on construction financing (loans, municipal bonds, etc.). Missing scheduled payments 
hurts an institution’s credit rating and can negatively impact their ability to issue debt to fund 
future work. 
 
6.8.3.4 Collaborative Scope Definition and Refining 
 Mortenson brought a decision-making tool to the project team that was used to work 
through all the decisions that had to be made throughout the design and construction of the 
project, which was called the “Cost/Scope Alignment Tool” or CSAM (AGC 2017). They used 
this tool to help the owner define and refine the project scope that employed a matrix to visualize 
impacts that various design options had on project cost, schedule, and quality by sorting through 
the university’s “wish list” to move forward on implementing options that provided the most 
value. Part of the function of this decision support matrix was to focus decision-making on 
identifying scope and solutions that would provide the 1) best possible facility, 2) meet project 
cost and schedule goals, and 3) serve the university and end-user needs into the distant future. 
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The project scope had limited the multi-purpose programming aspects of the new stadium to 
athletics team support facilities, retail space, and game day operations with vague references to 
the aspect of community-use. In a February 2015 report reviewing design phase progress, the 
gross square footage of the building (excluding the game field) was a total of 636,527. The main 
focus for programing was located under the western concourse and contained the majority of 
square footage allocated; the eastern concourse plans appeared to be limited to enclosing the 
space under the concourse. 
 
6.8.3.5 Performance Metrics 
 This project initially was planned on a 423-day construction schedule that ultimately took 
809 days to complete, experiencing schedule growth of 91.25%. Construction cost at award was 
$172,083,882 and grew 14.41% to $196,882,358 by project completion. Construction cost 
growth from the initial estimate was less, however, growing 10.38% from $178,361,837 by 
project completion. Design fee cost growth was lower than construction cost growth, growing 
9.86% from $11,879,270 at contract award to $13,050,014 at completion. These cost growth 
performance metrics would not appear to be out of the ordinary, however 91.25% schedule 
growth would raise a red flag.  
 
6.8.3.6 Incorporating Late Scope Additions with Donations 
 Construction operations began on the stadium project in May of 2015 while a series of 
donors began to make commitments to add roughly $28 million to the project: an anonymous 
donation of $20 million to name the field in honor Sonny Lubick, a $3.5 million donation by 
alumnus Michael Smith to fund the construction of a new alumni center in the stadium, and a 
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$4.3 million donation by the New Belgium Brewing Company to fund a named hospitality area 
(a bar) in the north endzone (Phifer 2016) which was announced in April of 2016. The project 
team, in June of 2015, prepared plans and estimates to add an additional 82,000 square feet of 
programing under the east concourse consisting of 20,000 GSF for the alumni center, 11,000 
GSF for a new student advising center, and the remaining 51,000 GSF dedicated to a mix of 
circulation space, classrooms, academic offices, and mechanical space for a total of $18,500 that 
would also enable the project to achieve LEED Silver certification (CSU 2015). Mortenson was 
well-positioned to provide priced options to the owner and designer to assist in making better 
programming and configuration decisions that could be easily converted into executed change 
orders. As subsequent donations came in, including the late donation from New Belgium 
Brewery in the spring of 2016, these established relationships and lines of trust and 
communication forged out of several years of integration from design through construction 
ensured that Colorado State University efficiently incorporated new project scope while reducing 
disruptive impacts to the project trades labor force. This project added $24,798,476 of 
construction scope after the GMP as agreed to but only paid an additional $1,170,744 in design 
fees for these changes which shows that the university was able to get $21.18 of construction 
scope for every design fee dollar spent on owner-driven scope changes. The mean and median 
C$:D$ values for DBB post award changes are $4.42 and $8.48 (Chapter 6). If this project had 
been delivered using DBB, using the DBB C$:D$ Change, the Colorado State University would 
theoretically have had to reduce the amount of construction scope added to the project between 
$14.9 million to $19 million. To put this into perspective, the new alumni center donation was 
$3.5 million and the endzone bar donation was $4.3 million and would have likely required both 
a significant descoping in other programming that was added to the east concourse post award 
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and a reduction in the finishes and programming for those two additions. On the other hand, if 
the university had been adamant about adding the additional programming, the design fees to 
accomplish these owner-driven scope additions could have theoretically cost an additional $1.8 
million to $4.4 million. 
 
6.8.3.7 Lessons Learned 
 There are three primary lessons that can be drawn from the stadium project at Colorado 
State University, a highly successful CMR-delivery public university project, that support 
Research Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5. This project was procured using standard form CM/GC 
contracts provided by the Colorado State Architect’s Office which were shown to have a high 
level of synchronization between the general contractor’s preconstruction services agreement and 
the designer’s design services agreement (Chapter 4) which provided the contractual 
environment within the project team to enable a effective integration and collaboration. 
Hypothesis 3 claims that CMR delivery provides greater contractual flexibility for incorporating 
owner-directed and late scope changes, scope changes on this project were both late and owner-
driven yet were effectively incorporated into the project. Hypothesis 4, on a similar train of logic, 
states that CMR project delivery provides greater efficiency incorporating changes than DBB 
due to project team integration (owner, designer, general contractor). The general contractor’s 
contribution to the project in CMR can be oversized, providing constructability reviews, 
developing 4D models to support both designers and trade subcontractors, and producing priced 
options with actual quotes that can be readily converted into change orders accelerates the 
decision-making process for the owner. Hypothesis 5 posits that the “quality of contractual 
language synchronization between the designer and general contractor directly impacts… project 
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team integration,” which is clearly demonstrated here. The high level of trust and integration 
provided the requisite lines of communication and intentional collaboration to efficiently 
incorporate roughly $25 million of owner-driven scope with a C$:D$ Change value of $21.18, with 
roughly four times more efficiency than under DBB project delivery. Efficient change scope 
generation allows the general contractor to provide a greater value of betterments as project 
funds which would have gone to the designer in additional fees are invested into the project 
itself, which generates more value to the owner, their end-users, clients, and 3rd parties than 
would have been realized under a DBB delivery model. This provides strong support for 
Hypothesis 1 that CMR project delivery provides greater value for money to the public 
university owner than would be realized under DBB delivery. The project example demonstrates 
clear support for many of the findings and conclusions found in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6: 
1. Select the general contractor as early as possible in the design phase to maximize the 
potential benefits of CMR delivery (Hypothesis 1 & 4). 
Early contractor involvement enables the owner to make design decisions with more 
complete information with accurate pricing and understanding constructability issues 
2. Contractual language governing the relationship between the designer and the general 
contractor should be well-synchronized (Hypothesis 5). 
Contract documents utilized were highly synchronized providing an enforceable 
baseline expectation for collaborative behavior.  
3. CMR project delivery provides the opportunity to incorporate owner-driven scope 
changes more efficiently than DBB providing greater value for money to the owner 
(Hypotheses 1, 3 & 4). 
C$:D$ Change = $21.18 
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Post-GMP Construction Scope Change = $24.8M 
Design Fee for Owner Driven Scope Change = $1.17M  
Theoretical Cost of DBB Design Fee Scope Change = $2.9M to $5.6M 
Theoretical DBB Scope Change Capacity Reduction = $14.9M to $19.6M 
 
6.9 Quantifying Value for Money in CMR Project Delivery 
 Quantifying value is a complex undertaking that attempts to associate some sort of 
measurement to a concept that is a combination of objective fact and subjective perception. 
Recognizing these limitations, it seems worthwhile to propose a simple metric for assessing the 
theoretical value for money realized on CMR delivered public university capital projects that 
measures the difference in the design capacity to incorporate owner-driven scope changes as 
compared to a DBB delivery model, expressed as a range of dollar values as illustrated in the 
following equations. Please note that the upper and lower limit equations are based on the 
skewness from the calculation of C$:D$ values derived from the shadow projects analysis in 
Chapter 6 and are directly applicable to these projects as part of this study. Should this 
calculation be applied to other project data, these values should be recalculated and adjusted 
based upon their skewness. 
 
Equation 6.1 Value for Money – CMR ($) 







Equation 6.2 Value for Money – CMR ($) Lower Limit 
𝑉𝑓𝑀𝐶𝑀𝑅 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡($)
= Δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 ($) − 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 ($) 
 And, 
Equation 6.3 Value for Money – CMR ($) Upper Limit 
𝑉𝑓𝑀𝐶𝑀𝑅 𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡($)
= Δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 ($) − 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 ($) 
 Where, 
Equation 6.4 Mean Change Capacity of DBB ($) 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛($) = Δ𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒($)𝑥 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐶$: 𝐷$𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 (𝐷𝐵𝐵) 
 And, 
Equation 6.5 Median Change Capacity of DBB ($) 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛($) = Δ𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒($) 𝑥 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐶$: 𝐷$𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 (𝐷𝐵𝐵) 
 And, 
Equation 6.6 Post Award Construction Cost Change ($) 
Δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 ($)
= 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  ($) − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑃($) 
 And, 
Equation 6.7 Post Award Design Fee Cost Change ($) 




For example, the calculation for the multipurpose stadium at Colorado State University would be 
as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  ($) = $196,882,358 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑀𝑃($) = $172,083,882 
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙($) = $13,050,014 
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 ($) = $11,879,270 
The mean and median C$:D$ values for DBB delivery were calculated in Chapter 6: 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐶$: 𝐷$𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 (𝐷𝐵𝐵) = $8.48 
𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐶$: 𝐷$𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 (𝐷𝐵𝐵) = $4.42 
Calculate the values of design fee change and post-award construction change: 
Δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 ($) = $196,882,358 − $172,083,882 = $24,798,476 
Δ𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒($) = $13,050,014 − $11,879,270 = $1,170,744 
Calculate median and mean DBB change capacity based off the value for design fee change: 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛($) = $1,170,744 𝑥 $8,48 = $9,927,909 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛($) = $1,170,744 x $4.42 = $5,174,689 
Calculate upper and lower limits: 
𝑉𝑓𝑀𝐶𝑀𝑅 𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡($) = $24,798,476 − $5,174,689 = $19,623,787 
𝑉𝑓𝑀𝐶𝑀𝑅 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡($) = $24,798,476 − $9,927,909 = $14,870,567  
Therefore, for the multipurpose stadium,  






6.10 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 CMR provides public university owners with the contractual vehicle to successfully 
deliver complex projects, realistically align project scope with project financing and other 
owner/3rd party constraints, add scope to an on-going project more efficiently that in DBB 
providing greater value for money to the owner as the final scope of the project is fully defined. 
This has been quantified by measuring design fee efficiency comparing the dollar value of 
construction scope developed for the change order to design change dollars expended, providing 
a novel tool to understand the beneficial impact of 1) the contractually-established relationships 
between the designer and general contractor, 2) integration and collaboration among the project 
team, and 3) contractual flexibility to proceed with necessary work on verbal agreements for 
projects that appear to perform poorly according to traditional performance metrics of schedule 
and cost growth from award but are successful projects according to the owners and end-users. 
Owners have an opportunity to maximize the potential benefits available in CMR delivery on 
good candidate projects by employing the following best practices. 
 
6.10.1 Best Practice 1: Synchronize Design and Preconstruction Contracts 
 Contract language in the designer’s agreement for design services must be well-
synchronized with the general contractor’s preconstruction services agreement. This means that 
where the general contractor has a duty to the designer in their agreement, the designer’s 






6.10.1 Best Practice 2: Select the General Contractor ASAP 
 Select the general contractor as early as possible in the design to maximize the potential 
benefits of integrating them into the project team. Early integration provides time to develop 
healthy professional relationships between each party of the project team and allows the general 
contractor to better understand the context of major project decisions. Early integration also 
allows the owner and designer to make major scope decisions with more complete pricing, 
materials selection, preferred means and methods, labor and equipment availability, logistical 
considerations, and constructability information. 
 
6.10.3 Best Practice 3: Use CMR to Phase Construction on Partially Funded Projects 
 Partially funded, complex projects that need to begin construction prior to securing full 
funding that could benefit from a phased construction strategy should consider utilizing CMR 
delivery where the general contractor and designer collaboratively develop the scope into stand-
alone work packages aligned with owner financial constraints, treated as “planned change 
orders” to the base contractor for the project. 
 
6.10.4 Best Practice 4: Supplement Traditional Performance Metrics on CMR Projects 
 Traditional project performance metrics for cost and schedule growth may not provide an 
accurate assessment of the delivery of CMR projects constructed by public university owners in 
the United States. Measuring the efficiency of design fees expended for owner driven scope 
changes provides a tool evaluate 1) the relative quality of integration and collaborative behavior 
in the project team and 2) quantify the relative value for money received by the owner from 





 This research project was specifically focused on comparing CMR and DBB project 
delivery on public university project in the United States of America, which is a unique, albeit 
significant, sector of the American construction industry which demonstrated several unique 
characteristics that drive decision making that may not be applicable in other related segments of 
the construction industry.  
 The first major limitation of this study is that projects included in the database did not 
include any from New England states nor any CMR projects from Deep South states, Auburn 
University provided 22 DBB projects, so regional variations in the way CMR is employed may 
not have been addressed for those states. 
 The second major limitation of this study is that development of the project database 
required missing data value imputation. The quality of the imputed data was considered 
sufficiently robust for the analysis but could be improved by being updated with actual values, 
which was not attainable over the period the research. Random Forests imputation provides a 
better method of imputing missing project data values than early techniques and has proven its 
utility in this study, among others, and should be considered by other construction engineering 
research scholars to assist in developing statistically significant data sets, with a fully 
appreciation of its limitations. 
 The third limitation is in the computation of value for money, proposed in the previous 
section. This calculation should be used an indicator to assess the relative value received by an 
owner from CMR delivery on a project that benefited from the ability to fully develop the final 
scope concurrent with construction activities. It is a relative value that is useful for understanding 
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the impact of project team integration, trust, and collaborative behavior on a complex project, 
however it should not be considered definitive. 
 
6.6 Contributions 
 This research study provides several direct contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge within the discipline of construction engineering, construction research, construction 
project management, and alternative project delivery.  
 The first contribution is that, for capital projects on public universities, the value of CMR 
delivery is not in its ability to reduce cost growth but the capacity to efficiently incorporate new 
owner-driven scope requirements identified after the design has commenced and as the project 
shifts into construction. CMR project delivery does not appear to reduce project cost growth in 
public university capital projects. This is supported by research focused on education sector 
construction yet contradicts a significant portion of the literature on CMR delivery in general.  
 The second contribution is to provide a novel metric (C$:D$) to evaluate the relative 
efficiency that CMR delivered projects incorporate scope change by comparing the dollar value 
of new construction scope to the dollar value of additional post-award design fees, which are 
typically only given to designers for owner-driven scope change. The C$:D$ metric can be used 
to evaluate CMR projects that appear to be performing poorly according to traditional cost and 
schedule growth metrics but may be providing a more efficient vehicle to deliver complex, 
partially funded, and/or phased construction projects in an easily understand manner. This metric 
provides a tool for capital projects staff to accurately communicate project status and success 
with university leadership, governing boards, and stakeholders with a vested interest in the 
efficient use of funds.  
216 
 
 The third contribution is providing a technique to evaluate the synchronization of contract 
clauses between design services and preconstruction services contracts for CMR delivered 
projects where a greater level of synchronization provides the contractual basis for maximizing 
the potential benefits of cooperation and collaborative behavior between the designer and general 
contractor. 
 The fourth contribution is a demonstration how machine learning can be leveraged in 
construction research. This project provides several modern machine learning tools that can be 
employed by construction researchers to improve the rigor of statistical analysis of historical 
project data, specifically the use of Multiple Regression models and the Random Forests 
algorithm as a technique to impute missing data more accurately. Research in construction 
engineering requires the application of both qualitative and quantitative research methods as 
every construction project is essentially unique. This makes it difficult to assume normality of 
any database of projects, even two projects with the same plans, specifications, owner, designer, 
and general contractor will be unique due to variations in the weather, market forces, availability 
of labor, etc. Additionally, assembling statistically significant databases of projects is 
challenging as private owners and general contractors tend to view historical data as being 
proprietary and access to project data from public owners may require the onerous and expensive 
approach of utilizing the Freedom of Information Act. Therefore, being able to develop complete 
databases with incomplete data that is assembled by a combination of voluntary provision, 
internet searches, and other open-source techniques is a critical tool in the toolkit of any 
construction researcher.  
 The fifth contribution is a method of quantifying the value for money in dollars of 
construction change scope that owners have received on projects that have benefited from 
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efficient incorporation of owner-driven scope change with CMR as compared to the potential of 
a theoretical delivery of the same project under DBB. 
 
6.7 Recommendation for Future Research  
 CMR delivery of public university capital projects would benefit from additional research 
primarily in three areas:  
1. An extended analysis of contractual clause synchronization between design services and 
preconstruction services contracts that includes additional standard form contracts (AGC 
Consensus Docs, CMAA Standard Contracts, etc.) as well as proprietary contracts used 
by public universities outside of the scope of this project may provide new insights and 
examples of effective contractual language that can be synthesized into best practices 
may contribute to improving the quality of existing CMR contract documents.  
2. The public university capital project database would benefit from several improvements. 
First, imputed data points should be replaced with actual data and compared to evaluate 
the effectiveness of Random Forests data imputation. Second, additional projects should 
be added for other public universities in different geographical areas than covered under 
the scope of this project to validate conclusions and identify regional idiosyncrasies 
inherent to this market segment. Third, the multiple regression model simulation should 
be rerun using final data and additional project data to refine levels of correlation 
between cost and schedule variables and to explore the effects of preconstruction services 
fees on final cost and final schedule. 
3. A research study to fully develop the proposed value for money in CMR calculation 
would provide rigor to this proposed technique and improve its usefulness.  
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Addendum A – Informal Interview Protocol 
 
Interview Protocol – Preconstruction Services Research Question 
 
Interviewer: ________________________ Date: _________________________________ 
Interviewee: _______________________ Organization: ___________________________ 
 
Introduction & Consent 
Thank you for making time to allow for this interview!  You were selected based upon your experience in the 
construction industry and position within your organization.  The focus of this research project is to better 
comprehend how contracting parties in construction projects define their roles and responsibilities during 
preconstruction, within the Construction Manager-at-Risk delivered project.  In order to allow me to take 
accurate notes, I would like to audio record our conversation today and transcribe portions of it, after which, the 
audio recording will be deleted.  Is that ok with you?  Once my research is complete, I would be happy to share 
my findings with you, if you wish.   
 
Eligibility 
1. Would you define your employer as an Owner, Architect, or Construction Manager? 
2. What is your position at your company/firm/organization? 
3. How many years have you worked in the commercial construction industry in Oklahoma and North 
Texas?   
4. How many years have you worked in the construction industry? 
5. How many Construction Manager-at-Risk delivered projects have you participated in? (5 minimum) 
a. PROBE:  (If answer is 3 or 4 CMR) How many negotiated bid/qualifications based selection 
project have you participated in?  
6. Briefly describe your role and responsibilities at your company/firm/organization.   
 
Participation 
1. How often would you say that your company/firm seeks projects procured under Construction Manager-
at-Risk (CMR) contracts? 
a. PROBE: How many CMR delivered projects does your company/firm engage in a typical year? 
b. PROBE:  Do you have a preference for project delivery method? 
 
2. Have you participated in preconstruction activities as part of a CMR contracted project within the last 
two years? 
a. PROBE:  What was the rough scope of the project(s)? 
b. PROBE:  Would you say these are typical projects for your company/firm? 
c. PROBE:  What was your role? 
 
Definition 
3. How would you describe the (Choose One to match interviewee) Owner’s/Architect’s/CM’s role during 
preconstruction activities? 
a. PROBE:  What sort of specific responsibilities do you have? 
 
4. What would you say the most important preconstruction activity is for a project? 
a. PROBE:  What would you say makes it important? 
b. PROBE:  Can you think of any other ones that important as well?   
 




a. PROBE:  How often have you seen these outcomes realized? 
b. PROBE:  What do you think contributed to that? 
 
6. Thinking about the (Choose one – not interviewee) Owner/Architect/CM, what would you say are their 
role is during preconstruction activities? 
a. PROBE:  What would you consider to be their primary responsibilities? 
b. PROBE:  In your opinion, how well do they seem to understand these responsibilities? 
c. PROBE:  Has this ever impacted your company’s/firm’s contribution to the scope of work, either 
positively or negatively? 
 
7. Thinking about the (Choose remaining one) Owner/Architect/CM, what would you say are their role is 
during preconstruction activities? 
a. PROBE:  What would you consider to be their primary responsibilities? 
b. PROBE:  In your opinion, how well do they seem to understand these responsibilities? 
c. PROBE:  Has this ever impacted your company’s/firm’s contribution to the scope of work, either 
positively or negatively? 
 
Communication & Collaboration 
8. In your experience, how well do the (Choose two – opposite of interviewee) Owner/Architect/CM 
coordinate with and support your company’s/firm’s/organization’s responsibilities during 
preconstruction activities?   
a. PROBE:  In your experience, does one of them typically perform better than the other? 
b. PROBE:  Can you give an example of project where preconstruction went particularly well? 
c. PROBE:  Can you give an example of project where preconstruction went particularly poorly? 
 
9. Do your contracts typically stipulate collaboration between your company/firm and the Architect and 
CM? 
a. PROBE:  What are some of the more common stipulations that you see? 
b. PROBE:  How do these stipulations affect your interaction with the Architect and CM? 
 
Lessons Learned  
10. We’re almost done here, I’d like you to pause for a second and consider this.  If you were able to change 
anything about the relationship between your company/firm/organization and the (Choose opposite two) 
Owner/Architect/CM in regards to preconstruction activities, what would it be? 
 
11. Is there anything else you consider important, or salient, to the topic that we haven’t already discussed? 
 
12. Thank you so much for your time! 
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Addendum B – Informal Interview Transcripts 
1. Construction Manager Interview 
 The first interview was conducted with a senior project manager for a major regional 
construction management company. He had 16 years of construction management experience in 
the commercial construction, six of which had been at his current company and holds a Bachelor 
of Science in Construction Management. His role as a senior project manager places him in 
responsibility over multiple projects where he was responsible for overseeing preconstruction 
services, managing project finances, liaising with the Owner’s representatives and the Architect, 
and the delegation of authority to field office personnel for the day-to-day management of 
subcontractors. His recent projects include multimillion dollar higher education mixed-use, 
housing, and commercial hotels. His company operates primarily as a Construction Manager-
General Contractor (CMGC), preferring to secure projects with negotiated bids, although they do 
seek out a small number of hard bid projects from time to time. 
 
Architect’s Responsibilities  
 The interviewee was asked to describe the responsibilities of the Architect as it related 
to preconstruction activities within a CMR contract with the following question:  
 INTERVIEWER: [T]hinking about the Architect, what would you say are their 
responsibilities for preconstruction? 
 CM:  My big thing from them is that they’re communicating with the Owner and 
being realistic of what they’re going to deliver. Of course there’s always the back and forth 
between the general contractor and the Architect. The last project I did, being a design build, 
my relationship with the Architect was incredible. It was not only beneficial to each other but 
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to the project and to the Owner, because of that relationship. You know, that’s not every project 
but I believe that the Architect has responsibility going back to managing expectations and 
understanding. I’m doing a hotel, my next project is a hotel, I’ve got a 688-page design criteria 
for the specific brand of hotel. In that you have minimum design standards, for example like 
[the university] has, basic design standards for buildings, whatever. So, when we’re going 
through [preconstruction] I’m expecting that Architect is designing to the minimum standard 
and that’s what the expectation is. So, if we’re on the same page, say we’re looking at finishes, 
and I’m having this discussion with the Architect in my pricing and I’m pricing $6 per square 
foot tile and he says, “Well no, no, no, this is what we’ve normally done and this is $10-12 per 
square foot.”  So now, what happens? You go in front of the Owner and say, “My estimate is 
based on $6 per square foot and this guy’s wanting to give you $12 per square foot and you 
have the money for $8 per square foot.”  So where is that open communication at? The last 
thing you want to do is this – here’s what happens a majority of the time – the Architect draws 
something, we get it, we price it, most of the time it is way over budget, and then everybody 
points fingers at us and goes, “Well, you need to get this in line.” When I go back to the 
Architect and I say, “Ok Mr. Architect, we need a less expensive product.” The Owner has to 
go, “Ok, I understand that.” I keep saying that [we have] finite resources and if you have that 
communication you can give that look you want for the price, it’s just going to take some 
communication between the parties, that’s all.  
 INTERVIEWER:   So why do you think that happens? 
 CM:  I think what we’re saying really is, you’ve got champagne tastes on a beer 
budget. What I think needs happen very first, up front is [to ask] what is my budget? That’s 
what needs to be established. Now, if there are standards that a client has, we need to address 
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those. That’s key. I don’t believe in getting a set of plans, working up an estimate, presenting it 
to an Owner and had [having them say], “Well, this is way too much.” If you could have told us 
how much you had, that could have gotten back to the Architect to draw something within the 
budget, because that’s what it comes down to. You want to satisfy your client but you also what 
to make sure it’s on budget. Those conversations are never fun to have. 
 INTERVIEWER: [chuckle] They are necessary though. 
 CM:  They are very necessary to have. We all want to satisfy our client, that is correct, I 
agree 100%. That’s why you’re hiring me, but I also need to be honest with you about what 
you’re looking at you can’t afford. So, what can we do to get you the look that you want for, 
the program you want, within your budget? So, there’s going to have to be some give and take. 
Owner Responsibilities  
 The interviewee was asked to describe the responsibilities of the Owner, as it related to 
preconstruction activities within a CMR contract with the following question:   
 INTERVIEWER:  Absolutely. So, what would you say are the Owner’s responsibilities 
during preconstruction? 
 CM:  The best thing that an Owner can do is to talk about what their vision of the 
project is with the Construction Manager and the Architect in the room and establishing – a 
lot of times it’s “siloed” – there’s a lot of conversation with the Architect that we’re not privy 
to. It’s like we get ganged up on when you come back with a budget because Architects do 
not traditionally have a good idea about budgets. They design things and have no idea what it 
costs in the real world. So, I think the conversation comes with all parties involved. Now 
relating that, saying here’s what I’m looking for, there’s a lot of smart people that can go and 
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solve these problems. When it’s siloed and you don’t have all the information or you’re not 
part of the discussion it makes it very difficult to try and satisfy a client.   
 INTERVIEWER: Yeah, you know, absolutely. So, has that ever impacted your 
company’s contribution to the scope of work, either positively or negatively? 
 CM:  Yeah, it has. It’s more of, you know it’s difficult when a client wants to come in, 
you know, four months from opening and says, “I want to put a hot tub on the second floor.” 
And you go, “OK, there’s a lot of work that’s going to go into this.” They say, “Whoa, whoa, 
whoa, that’s way too much.” And you say, “Well this is what it’s going to cost.” And they’re 
like, “Well, you know, the Architect told me it would be like half of that.”  And the smart ass 
in me wants to say, “Well have the Architect build it for you for half the cost.” [laughter] So 
you have to set that expectation and working in the successful projects I’ve had, the Owner is 
coming up with these changes, I’m discussing it with the Architect like, “Hey man, this costs X 
amount a square foot, how much do they have?” It goes back to the relationship.  A successful 
project is where you are not adversaries but allies. So, I can call and have that honest talking 
with my Architect and he can have the same thing and call me and ask and bounce ideas off 





2. Owner’s Representative Interview 
 The second interview was conducted with an Owner’s representative project manager 
from the capital projects unit for a major higher education institution. He had 25 years of 
experience, primarily in commercial construction, as an Architect, of which the last three years 
has been as an Owner’s representative and holds a Master of Science in Architecture. His recent 
experience included a 75,000 square foot commercial higher education building procured using 
CMR as well as various remodel projects. His organization procures and manages capital 
construction projects that range from $75,000 to $100+ million which are typically procured 
using CMR contracts with negotiated preconstruction services. Recently, his organization 
decided to hard bid a handful of projects as test cases due to negative outcomes associated with 
some high profile CMR projects. He was responsible for predesign project development with the 
Owner-end user, selection of the Architect and CM, project finances including payment of the 
Architect and CM, coordination of meetings and collaboration between contracting parties, 
review of project documents including plans, specifications and submittals, approval of changes, 
and the general oversight of the project from concept to completion. 
 
Architect’s Responsibilities  
 The interviewee was asked to describe the responsibilities of the Architect as it related 
to preconstruction activities within a CMR contract with the following question:  
 INTERVIEWER: So, thinking about the Architect’s role in the preconstruction period, 
what are their primary responsibilities? [pause] What do you expect for them to provide to you 
and to the CM? 
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 OWNER:  Almost the same thing for all the phases:  clear documentation, clear 
documents. One of the things that’s happened with CM is that there’s been a lack of quality 
control once you get to construction documents, just to answer your precon[struction] 
question. It is a problem, since the Architect is working with a CM, working through details 
and ways to do things. I don’t think they button up their CD’s [construction documents] as 
tightly as they used to, but that’s not the only reason, it’s not taught as well as it once was 
taught. I think software has caused a problem in construction documents, but I think that’s just 
a big problem in the industry is poor construction documents. 
 INTERVIEWER: So, what you’re saying, you’d expect to see in a hard bid scenario a 
more complete, or better finished, set of documents as opposed to what you typically see in 
your CM projects? 
 OWNER: Certainly, now they still go and get bid out, to the subcontractors, so they still 
have to be solid documents, but it’s a little bit looser.  
 INTERVIEWER:  In your opinion, how well do they seem to understand these 
responsibilities? 
 OWNER: Hmmm… the ones we’ve been dealing with recently have understood it 
well.  
 INTERVIEWER:  Has this had an impact, either positively or negatively on your 
projects? 
 OWNER:  Mostly positive, [Architecture Firm] has done a good job. My background 
was almost all hard bid projects as an Architect so my knowledge is limited to only a few 
projects that were CM-at-Risk. So I’ve learned a lot over these last couple of years 
Owner Responsibilities  
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 The interviewee was asked to describe the responsibilities of the Owner, as it related to 
preconstruction activities within a CMR contract with the following question: 
 INTERVIEWER:  So how would you describe the Owner’s role during preconstruction 
activities? 
 OWNER: Hmmm… [pausing to thinking] A lot of it is weighing the options when 
you’re looking at “We can only afford this much.” Then, you’re talking to the end users, 
which in this case is the [university department]… and helping them determine “Hey we 
need this, we need that, we gotta have this, we can live without that.”  Making sure that those 
needs end up reflected in the documents that are being estimated. Does that sort of make 
sense? 
 INTERVIEWER:   Yeah, yeah, you really … kind of serving as a middleman in that 
way. So, dealing with the expectations of the end users. 
 OWNER:  Oh yeah! Managing them and making sure that they don’t think they’re 
going to get more than they are, so that they’re not disappointed later. But then also, seeing 
what the needs are for the university and what’s really critical to have a successful program. 
 INTERVIEWER: Kind of adding that extra layer of realism to the design, to the, to the 
project… 
 OWNER: I don’t know if realism is the word, but… 
 INTERVIEWER: I guess “realistic” is a better term…  





3. Architect Interview 
 The third interview was conducted with the director/senior project manager for a local 
Architectural design firm. He had over 40 years of experience in the construction industry and 
holds a Bachelor of Science in Architecture. His recent experience included both private and 
public commercial construction projects primarily procured under negotiated bids using CMR 
and Design-Build project delivery methods.  His role includes responsibility for securing new 
work, execution of the design, coordination of technical consultants, the Owner, design team and 
Construction Manager, typically for the duration of his projects up to the one-year warranty.  
Projects discussed ranged in scope from $300,000 renovation to a $30 million commercial office 
building. 
Architect’s Responsibilities 
 The interviewee was asked to describe the responsibilities of the Architect as it related 
to preconstruction activities within a CMR contract with the following question: 
 INTERVIEWER:  How would you describe the Architect’s role during Pre-
Construction Activities? 
 ARCHITECT: Man, that is a great question. As my experience has been, it’s varied. I 
think it has a lot to do with who is really leading the project, whether you’re in a CMAR or any 
other relationship, contractual relationship, short of Design-Build where the contractor is going 
to hire us directly. It gets a little grey ….and a little nebulous in terms of the responsibilities, 
based upon the experience and the capabilities of the contractor, in my opinion. We have 
worked on a project that was about $30 million with a national sized CM, at risk, and they 
drove the process from the very beginning. I think it was highly technical project, they had lots 
of experience there, and my contributions during preconstruction [chuckling] were fairly 
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minimal. We kind of doped out what the building needed to be in terms of square footage, size, 
arrangement, and they contributed from day 1 on the, “Are you sure about this structurally? Are 
you sure about this mechanically? Are you sure about this from where we’re worried about 
procurement and equipment?” On the flip side of that, we’ve had CMAR’s on projects that 
were smaller, in scale. One project that comes to mind that’s about $11 million, office building 
type project and in that we were definitely more in the lead, “This is what we want in terms of 
materials, can you price it?” and they were more reactionary. We’ve had varying input and 
varying results in terms of the preconstruction services. I think the biggest thing they can 
contribute, or that they did contribute, is constructability and cost. Along with constructability 
comes scheduling. The $30 million project I was talking about was definitely about some 
elements with very long lead times and those procurement was clearly identified up front as 
what were, kind of going to be our choke points. Do you want us to procure it for now or do 
you want us to bring it later? You know, those kinds of discussions I definitely feel that the 
Architects are normally not that privy to and can’t really contribute to. To kind of answer your 
question though, I’ve had varying kinds of successes and varying kinds of roles. I think the 
biggest thing is, I’ve always felt about a CMAR, but sit around and collaborate together and 
depending on what all of our team needs are this is what we need to do to contribute to that. So, 
if I need to contribute more on the initial front end, in terms of site plan, layout, sizes in terms 
of structural, civil, I can do that. Or if it’s more along the lines of just initially, just kind of, how 
big, how wide, how tall, I can do that as well. To me, it’s much more of a CMAR-type, and 
Design-Build is a little similar, where we can kind of define our roles from the git-go and so 
long as it’s clearly defined, one can kind of go about their business and work together towards 
it and not necessarily in a hard-bid, traditional design bid build. 
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Owner Responsibilities  
 The interviewee was asked to describe the responsibilities of the Owner, as it related to 
preconstruction activities within a CMR contract with the following question: 
 INTERVIEWER: Thinking about the Owner, how would you describe their 
responsibilities for Pre-Construction Activities? 
 ARCHITECT: Wow, that is a great question. I think a lot has to do with the Owner’s 
mindset.  It’s my opinion that the Owner should be very engaged during the preconstruction 
process. The Owner sets the tone, in my opinion. If they are actively involved form the git-go 
and can contribute and kind of build that collaborative atmosphere, I think that any project, no 
matter if it’s compressed in time or challenged in money or whatever issue may be challenging 
that project, that project will be a success. I think that if the Owner is engaged, especially as it 
comes to the preconstruction side, can understand cost issues, can understand scheduling 
issues, the ramifications of decisions, the project will succeed. End of story. I do think that 
most Owners have in their mind that, “I’ve hired you all to do this, I’ve already got a full 
time job and that’s what I need to do, I need to respond to you.” So, depending on how big 
the riffs are, how big the challenges are, I think that approach is not very successful. If we’re 
going to go build, if we sat down and said I’m going to go build a 10,000 square foot, metal 
shop for handful of trucks or cars, the Owner doesn’t really need to be involved too much. The 
cost is going to be identified immediately, there’s not going to be any risks, you know that’s 
pretty straight forward stuff. The more challenging the project may be, for any reason, the cost, 
the schedule, the use, that’s when I feel that the Owner needs to be part of the process and be 
engaged every step of the way, because nothing an affect the project worse than having a 
backup. When you’ve gone down the road in a certain direction but now we’re going to shift to 
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a different direction, that’s when it causes confusion. I think the Owner has a key, critical role 
and when you boil it all down, the Owner sets the tone for how this is going to go. If you’re 
engaged in it, we’re going to make it, and if you’re standoffish, there’s some risk! Then I think 
that onus switches over to the Architect more, and it’s the CMAR, it’s kind of more on the 
Architect and the contractor to work together to solve it so that they can propose to the Owner, 
here’s our unified, semi-unified answer. We hope you like it. [laughing] 
 INTERVIEWER: In your experience, how well do most Owners seem to understand 
their responsibilities? 
 ARCHITECT:  Outside the university, nobody.  [laugher] I think it has a lot to do with 
the staff. If you have people that can kind of help you navigate the process, then the Owner is 
represented and represented well. We have a couple of projects in the recent past, they’re 
relative small, I think they’re like $2 million, and the Owner would… appear… at meetings and 
then wouldn’t really contribute very much more than approvals and it, uh, went ok. But I don’t 
think it, uh, there wasn’t very much in terms of decision making, other than yes and no, so, 
because they have other things to do. And I fully understand that and there’s times when I want 
to engage you on this deal, but on the flip side of that… um, you’ve got other things to do. 
[chuckles] 
 INTERVIEWER: I guess sometimes that just the situation that you’re in, if they don’t 
have a fully developed staff or they’re not super savvy… 
 ARCHITECT: Yep, that’s exactly right. I personally, have never been accused of 
keeping my Owner or my client informed, but I certainly have been accused of over informing 
them! [laughter] 
 INTERVIEWER: I think I’d prefer the latter to the former! [laughter] 
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 ARCHITECT: [laughter] You know, on our private projects, we solicit some input from 
the Owners, how’d we do on the project? You know, do want us for your next project? Do you 
want this project manager assigned to you? And I’ve received some comments like, 




ADDENDUM C – Validation Survey Questions and Summary of Results 
 
1. Does your university permit the use of Construction Manager-at-Risk or Construction 
Manager-General Contractor project delivery for capital projects? 
a. Yes     22/96%  12 Exec/ 10 PM 
b. No    0/0% 
c. Yes, but it is rarely used  1/4%  1 Exec/ 0 PM 
 
2. In your experience, does your university tend to add owner-driven scope to CMR or 
CM/GC delivered projects on a regular basis? 
a. Yes    19/83%  9 Exec/ 10 PM 
b. No    4/17%  3 Exec/ 1 PM 
 
3. In your experience, would owner-driven scope growth that is added to typical CMR or 
CM/GC deliver projects by change order require a re-procurement if the project were 
delivered under a DBB contract? 
a. Yes    2/9%  2 Exec/ 0 PM 
b. No    21/91%  10 Exec/ 11 PM 
 
4. If you knew that 3rd party stakeholders within the University would be heavily involved 
in the decision-making regarding a project’s final scope, which delivery method would 
generally be considered a better fit? 
a. DBB    4/17%  1 Exec/ 3 PM  
b. CMR    19/83%  11 Exec/ 8 PM 
 
5. If you knew that a project had a complicated site (multiple subsurface utilities 
coordination, constricted site, significant student/traffic disruption, historical renovation, 
etc.), which delivery method would generally be a better fit? 
a. DBB    3/13%  0 Exec/ 3 PM 
b. CMR    20/87%  12 Exec/ 8 PM 
 
6. If you knew that additional funding could potentially become available during either the 
design or construction phase of a project that would permit an increase the overall scope 
of a project, which delivery method would generally be a better fit? 
 
a. DBB    2/9%  0 Exec/ 2 PM  





Thinking of RECENTLY completed projects at your university, please answer the following 
questions: 
 
7. Rate the university project teams’ working relationships with the contractor and designer 
working on the project. 
i. DBB:  Poor   5/22%   4 Exec/ 1 PM 
Neutral  5/22%  3 Exec/ 2 PM 
Good   13/57%  5 Exec/ 8 PM 
ii. CMR: Poor   0/0%  0 Exec/ 0 PM 
Neutral  6/26%  0 Exec/ 6 PM 
Good   17/74%  12 Exec/ 5 PM 
8. Which project delivery method tended to experience more changes during the 
design/preconstruction phase? 
i. DBB:   4/17%  2 Exec/ 2 PM 
ii. CMR:  11/48%  7 Exec/ 4 PM 
iii. No difference 8/35%  3 Exec/ 5 PM 
 
9. Which project delivery method tended to experience more change orders during 
construction? 
i. DBB:   11/48%  7 Exec/ 4 PM   
ii. CMR:  4/17%  1 Exec/ 3 PM 
iii. No difference 8/35%  4 Exec/ 4 Exec 
 
10. How often do 3rd party stakeholders (building occupants, college deans, campus groups, 
administrative departments, etc.) drive changes to project scope after the design contract 
has been awarded? 
i. Never   0/0% 0 Exec/ 0 PM 
ii. Occasionally  4/17% 3 Exec/ 1 PM 
iii. Routinely  10/43% 2 Exec/ 8 PM 
iv. On every project 9/39% 7 Exec/ 2 PM 
 
11. How often do 3rd party stakeholders (building occupants, college deans, campus groups, 
administrative departments, etc.) drive changes to project scope after the construction 
contract has been awarded? 
i. Never   0/0% 0 Exec/ 0 PM 
ii. Occasionally  11/48% 6 Exec/ 5 PM 
iii. Routinely  10/43% 4 Exec/ 6 PM 
iv. On every project 2/9% 2 Exec/ 0 PM 
 
12. In which project delivery method is it easier to incorporate late changes to the scope that 
were caused by the owner or 3rd party stakeholders? 
a. DBB    1/4%  0 Exec/ 1 PM 
b. CMR   17/74%  11 Exec/ 6 PM 





13. Do you consider the ability to add owner-driven scope to a benefit of CMR? 
a. Yes  12/52%  8 Exec/ 4 PM 
b. No  5/22%  3 Exec/ 2 PM 
c. No opinion 6/26%  1 Exec/ 5 PM 
 
14. Is there any additional information that you would like us to know about? (Open-ended 
responses listed below with respondent role/job title) 
  
 Directors/Executives 
- By statue, we are allowed to use CM@R on projects with a total project cost over $5M. 
Between $1M and $5M we are required to use DBB. (Director/Executive) 
 
- CMR is consistently a better approach. The overall experience is better, quality of work is 
superior, and at the end of the day, the overall cost is usually the same or similar and the 
project completion is usually quicker with CMR. (Director/Executive) 
 
- Over the last decade we have migrated to Target Value Design Build Lump Sum and 
Design Build with GMP project delivery and acquisition strategies using internal staff to 
develop the RFP and Design Criteria Documents. We have metrics associate with our 
now completed design build projects have outperformed both DBB and CMR in terms of 
schedule, cost/GSF and completed project quality. (University Architect) 
 
- Costs that appear to be ‘saved’ during DBB usually turn out to equal the CMR original 
cost or exceed it. (Director/Executive) 
 
- CMR has proven to be a very valuable tool when used on major capital projects over the 
past 17-plus years. (Director/Executive) 
 
- CMR costs less to build a project. (Director/Executive) 
 
Project Management and Support Staff 
- Historically we have not pursued DBB on large projects, but that has begun to shift as it 
has been felt that a lot of scope was evaporating in CMR deliveries. (Architect/Campus 
Planner/Design Phase Manager) 
 
- CMR is typically an option on larger projects as it allows the contractor to have more 
control of the subcontracts. DBB is used for the smaller (typically no larger than 5 
million, always under 1 million) project and added scope is not usually an issue on these. 
CMR must get approval from the state to be used as a construction method, DBB does 
not need such approval. The university always tries to carry a 5% contingency not only 
for unforeseen conditions but for scope changes as well, no matter the delivery method. 
(Project Manager/Construction Administrator) 
 
- Projects have a funding cap that cannot be exceeded regardless of requests for added 










University of Colorado Boulder Jennie Smoly Caruthers Biotechnology Building E-Wing 
Addition and Renovation 
Adolfson & Peterson Construction 
Keri Burson: kburson@a-p.com; 303-363-7101 
9. Best Building Project – General Contractor ($10-$40 Million) 
 
Why this project should win an ACE Award and why this project is unique 
Building on a busy, occupied campus presents challenges for any construction project. However, 
at the University of Colorado Boulder – a 600-acre campus with 33,246 students – the Jennie 
Smoly Caruthers Biotechnology Building E-Wing Addition and Renovation project was unlike 
any other, requiring strict construction protocols and unique innovations to build and renovate 
without making noise or vibration.  
The jobsite was sandwiched between the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, 
Prentup Field and Potts Field, requiring construction activities to be coordinated around the 
schedules of CU’s soccer, track and field and skiing teams in addition to the academic and 
research facilities. This limited scheduling construction work for weekends and off-hour work. 
The addition had to be built with the building fully operational, connecting to a 330,000-sf 
facility containing numerous biochemical labs and vivariums which could not be moved or 
disturbed. These highly-sensitive labs – which included live animals, million-dollar investment 
research, dangerous chemicals and work by Nobel Prize-winning scientists – were required to 
remain fully functional and running 24-7. Being an addition, these labs and learning 
environments were extremely close to where construction had to occur. Exterior windows of the 
existing structure became interior windows, resulting in no buffer zone for work.  
The project required removing an entire side of the existing 3-story structure and rebuilding a 
57,500-sf new addition. Connecting and tying into the current structure required precise 
engineering expertise to match up each floor elevation, restructure room layouts, which bridged 
old and new rooms, and connect to the existing main stairway and hallway which were 
permanent parts of the old building. 73 vertical feet of brick was removed from the exterior 
Addendum D - AGC Award Submission E-Wing Addition CUB
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E-Wing. Adolfson and Peterson Construction (Website). (n.d.). Retrieved October 29, 2021, from
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façade, leaving only 5 inches of studs and 1 layer of drywall between construction and labs 
conducting million-dollar research.   
 
Excellence in Project Execution and Management/Team Approach:  
Coordinating with the University, the team organized town hall meetings on campus with lab 
users, campus facility management and neighboring campus entities. Current project 
information, upcoming activities, logistics and questions were all addressed. The meetings also 
gave facility users a personal connection with the construction management team and an 
opportunity to address their concerns. During construction, weekly prepared dashboard 
communications were customized to the project and handed out to the project stakeholders.  
The team also included both the physics and athletic departments in their meeting and 
communications. They prepared public communications and 4-week look ahead schedules for 
the CU website. For example, when the team needed to build their crane in the parking lot, a 
phased logistical plan was sent out to the user groups months in advanced and coordinated 
around their activities for least impact to parking. Even with the best planning, unexpected issues 
came up, such as the team providing a portable restroom for the band during a Grateful Dead 
concert. The band paid their gratitude in T-shirts to the construction team.  
Because testing and research functionality was needed 24 hours a day inside the facility, utility 
shutdowns were not possible. Pre-planning was essential in preconstruction and included 
numerous MEP investigations. To tie electrical and mechanical into the existing utilities, the 
team created a detailed communication and M.O.P. or needed major outages. The work was 
conducted during the least disruptive time periods between 1 and 5 am, requiring special 
scheduling challenges for construction. Most importantly was the communication with the 
University and lab managers to properly prep for the outages – preparations which took 3 months 
to implement and had to run flawlessly. 
The team had nine seismic vibration monitors (one on every floor and two in sensitive labs) to 
monitor any disturbances during construction. These were linked to the phones of both the 
construction team and the client’s facilities management team, alerting them of any potential 
problems. A baseline was set before construction began to create a known vibration threshold. 
The construction team built thermal and acoustical walls between spaces to lessen disruptions 
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caused by construction. Besides when initially tested, the monitors never went off, which reflects 
the diligence of the construction crews to not impact the client’s valuable research.   
 
Solutions of Special Projects:  
The project was underfunded from the beginning with the University only having $25.6M 
approved and a design of a $37M addition. With the lacking funds, the team had to find a way to 
make the project still go. Even though the awarded contract was CM/GC, the preconstruction 
team acted in a design-build fashion with the architect to phase and estimate with CU’s budget 
constraints. The team broke the labs out into a separate work package which maintained state 
compliance by providing academic spaces in phase I. Phase I construction was able to then start.  
AP provided 18 full estimates and countless smaller pricing exercises and had full team 
involvement during preconstruction for a seamless transition to construction. AP also had a team 
member who worked as an Estimator in preconstruction and shifted to Assistant Project Manager 
during construction, providing the client and team a continuous thread of budget management. 
Subcontractors were brought on through a strategically phased buyout process in design-assist 
roles and alternates were crafted around what funds were available, repricing pieces to 
accommodate escalation after a year delay. AP targeted subcontractors that had campus 
experience and understood CU’s standards, including subcontractors who originally built the 
Jennie Smoly Caruthers Biotechnology Building. 
The team worked diligently with CU on funding for the entire building and was able to avoid 
demobilizing after the core and shell was done and continue the lab TI work in two additional 
phases. At the end of the project, unused contingency was leftover on the project and AP was 
able to return those funds to CU. 
 
Construction Innovations/State-of-the-Art Advancement:  
Construction practices put into place were proven scientifically evident, reflecting the uniqueness 
of this project. Research in the labs used live rats—animals whose natural cycles of defecation, 
feeding and sleeping were closely monitored by researchers. The labs measured cortisol levels 
continually before and during construction, measuring stress or any abnormalities caused by 
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construction activity. No indication of stress was found and thus the labs had scientific data that 
construction did not impede their live animal experiments.  
CU has its own authorities of jurisdiction so the team didn’t need to go to the state or city for 
permitting and inspections. The team understood the importance of ensuring these individuals 
were satisfied with the work performed, each having their own requirements – often which were 
not standard requests. For instance, a dance floor was put into the mechanical chase, where 
usually flooring isn’t installed, at the request of the building’s maintenance management for ease 
of accessibility. These personnel were deeply involved in the project since they were responsible 
for maintaining the equipment and structure once construction was over. Once BIM coordination 
was complete, the AP team invited the CU Facility Management Team to participate in the final 
BIM fly-throughs of each floor in order to make any final modifications for access concerns by 
the individuals that would be servicing the equipment. 
Even though the team had information for materials ordered on the original structure, the look 
and colors of the materials had since changed. Six different brick mockups were created to obtain 
a grout that matched the existing structure due to the fading from sun and wind (image 1).  




The project finished without any lost-time incidents on an occupied campus and facility. 
Above safety training and standards common to the industry and AP, this project took an 
increased approach to harassment prevention because of the large amount of people on campus. 
All personnel onsite were trained and instructed on what was considered appropriate interaction 
with students, staff and community members.  
AP implemented a badging system to easily identify all workers and put security measurements 
in place to enter the site. Field management communicated with subcontractor crews about how 
the project is a high-profile project to the University and the safety concerns on the busy campus. 
Background checks were required for all workers involved in the project. Because of the 
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significant pedestrian traffic on campus, it was imperative for the team to coordinate signage and 
wayfinding with the University to properly redirect students and staff. 
On-time delivery coordination was imperative for the limited laydown site, so the team rented a 
parking lot a quarter mile down the road and trucked materials and personnel back and forth. 
This area allowed for parking and storage when just-in-time deliveries weren’t feasible. To 
maximize efficiency, daily huddles were conducted with the Foreman before work began each 
day to coordinate the offsite staging and deliveries.  
 
Excellence in Client Service and/or Contribution to Community:  
The project was committed to sustainable design principles and is pending LEED Gold 
Certification. The addition is fitted out with sustainable heating, cooling, water treatment, and 
material selections to reduce the structure’s carbon footprint. The addition was designed to have 
an efficient footprint that is intelligently sited and features windows and shading devices that 
maximize the interior natural light while minimizing solar glare. 
The addition was painstakingly designed to not look like an addition, while meticulously being 
reinvented to improve on everything that the 360,000-sf original structure left to be desired.  To 
anyone walking by, the precise location where the finished addition attaches to the existing 
structure at the new side entrance is inconspicuous. Success of the project is reflected by the 
seamless transition from old to new.    
“I have been involved with a fair number of construction projects on campus over the years, and 
it is one thing to build a stand-alone building, and quite another to build a building with people 
connected directly to the construction site. Our many researchers perform sensitive and 
sophisticated experiments and were very concerned that noise, vibration, power/utilities issues, 
and the like, would pose significant problems. We wanted the space, but at what sacrifice? Well, 
the AP team was amazing. They were great at communicating the construction schedule, they 
accommodated all our requests (ok, some demands!), were hugely flexible, and did all that in a 
professional and courteous way. They all went that extra mile to make sure we got what we 
needed, and, remarkably, were always so pleasant about it! Truly impressive!” – Lee Silbert, 











“We probably built the best stadium in America.”
Joe Parker, Athletic Director, Colorado State University 
2017 AGC ACE Awards
Colorado State University On-Campus Stadium 
Fort Collins, Colorado
Entry Category: Best Building Project Over $70 Million - GC
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Colorado State University On-Campus Stadium
COMING HOME
After nearly 50 years playing off campus, Colorado 
State University has brought athletic competition back 
to the University’s core with its new, multi-purpose, 
41,000-capacity, On-Campus Stadium.  The stadium 
enhances existing game day traditions while creating new 
excitement for athletes, students, fans, the Fort Collins-
area community and the state of Colorado. 
The project is part of an overall commitment in excellence 
across the institution, including investments in ensuring 
student success and an outstanding student experience, 
in faculty and staff, and athletics. CSU’s campus has 
witnessed a transformation in the past several years, with 
a $1.5 billion investment in facilities and infrastructure. 
The On-Campus Stadium will be used year-round. It is 
not only the home of CSU football administration offices, 
training and team locker rooms, but also home to 80,000 
square feet of space for alumni, academics and student 
advising. Open for business less than two years after 
groundbreaking, this Mortenson-built facility includes: 
• 36,000 seats
• 11,600 square foot stadium club  
• 112 concession sale points
• 22 luxury suites and 40+ loge boxes
• a new alumni association center
• a center for advising and student achievement
• a hall of champions
• six additional retail locations 
The open north end zone consists of two large grand 
staircases on either side of the New Belgium Porch.  
The open concept integrates amenities and offers an 
intimate view of the game, accomplishing CSU’s goal 
Best Building Project Over $70M - GC
Transforming design to reality.
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of fan game involvement. This design allows fans to arrive to a single 300-level concourse with 
continuous connection to the game and back to campus.
ENSURING DELIVERY OF THE BEST PRODUCT MEETING COST AND SCHEDULE
Throughout the process of 
bringing a stadium on campus, 
the owner and project team faced 
many challenges.  Opposition 
to the project came from those 
who wanted to save the existing 
Hughes Stadium, campus 
neighbors who worried about 
the impact of construction and 
traffic on game days, and others 
concerned about the impact 
of such a large project being built right in the middle of a 586-acre campus. Community outreach 
and stakeholder input became helped streamline the process. An open communication approach by 
everyone on the team was crucial to developing trust and overcoming the challenges of delivering 
the stadium in less than two years.  
Well-coordinated preconstruction efforts became particularly crucial to achieving this goal.  One 
of the many tools employed by the project team was the development of Mortenson’s CSAM: the 
Cost/Scope Alignment Matrix. This tool was frequently used and referred to as the team worked 
through myriad decisions that 
were required of the owner.  
This matrix helped the team 
clearly see the cost, schedule 
and quality impacts of the 
various options that the owner 
had to sort through.  The 
ultimate goal of the project 
team in utilizing this matrix 
was to deliver the best possible 
facility that would meet owner 
Project site and campus context February ‘16, five months after groundbreaking.
An eye on progress as of June 2016.
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goals within the project’s budget and schedule constraints while serving the University’s and 
the community’s needs well into the future.  The team started with a “wish list”that the design 
and construction team reviewed with the owner, allowing them to sort through the options and 
implement the ones that provided the most value, along with the including owner’s “must haves”. 
LEVERAGING BIM TO ACHIEVE QUALITY AND SCHEDULE DEMANDS
With a deliverable date looming less than two years out, the construction team mitigated 
the schedule challenges through the use of 4D modeling and the use of mock-ups to ensure 
constructibility of all of the details.  The team used Populous’ design models as the basis for the 
4D development. By exporting critical 3D elements such as structural and enclosure objects to 
a common file type and then tying those elements to activities from the P6 schedule using the 
software Synchro PRO, the team successfully linked 3D content and activities from the schedule 
to properly evaluate any modifications or proposed changes.
The team developed a workflow and each month the 4D model was used to forecast what the 
stadium was going to look like at the end of the month. This model state was then incorporated 
into phase plans which were posted in all the jobsite trailers and conference rooms. This process 
helped ensure that the entire project team had an idea of what the progress would look like at the 
end of each month.
The 4D modeling was done from start to finish and helped identify issues before they became 
problems, especially during the structure phase. The stadium’s radial grid system required a 
more technical approach than a typical building and the steel framing that supports the upper 
bowl seating includes long cantilevers.   The model showed everything from how cranes were 
sequenced to site logistics that may affect the structure, including steel, precast stadia seating and 
cast-in-place concrete. 
Screen shots of the animated 4D that was a powerful planning and logistics tool. 
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An image from the model in context with a photo of the completed stadium. 
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One of the areas that was particularly challenging was the coordination of concurrent work on 
and above the concourse level (Level 300).  Intensive pre-planning was required to manage 
the work that had to occur to complete the concession areas while other trades had to build 
the soffit beneath Level 500 of the tower.  Freestanding CMU walls, a roofing system, and 
large mechanical equipment had to be installed on the concourse on Level 300 concurrent with 
the installation of a 25,000-square-foot framed Direct Applied Finishing System (DAFS), a 
hard lid soffit system with stucco finish. This meant that traditional scaffolding could not be 
erected to execute this work without negatively impacting trade partner access and the overall 
schedule.  The team implemented a hanging scaffolding system beneath the Level 500 tower 
that allowed various trade partners to finish their work on the soffit from the leading edge of the 
platform. This “Quikdeck” system, traditionally used for performing work beneath bridges, was 
assembled and disassembled from north to south in eight-foot sections as the work progressed 
and was completed. This eliminated the need for shoring, allowing the freestanding concourse 
concessions to be completed without interruption.
Pre-planning for this scenario occurred early in the project and involved Mortenson’s Integrated 
Construction Coordination team to get the system incorporated into the overall 3D model. This 
model coordination was key because the Quikdeck system was suspended by hangers that need 
to be either anchored in the concrete deck above or attached to the bottom flange of the beams 
Screen shots from the model showing the Quikdeck System and the system in action.
276
Colorado State University On-Campus Stadium
Best Building Project Over $70M - GC
More than a dozen Mortenson CSU alumni worked on CSU’s 
On-Campus Stadium. 
above. After developing an initial Quikdeck layout that minimized attachment points to the 
structure, it was determined that the resulting lateral loads on the typical floor beams would be 
unacceptable. To address this issue, the structural engineer, Martin/Martin, provided guidelines 
for hanging the system directly from the slab, with allowable loads for various slab areas and 
anchor spacings. Using this information, the scaffold trade partner, Safeway Scaffolding, was 
able to reconfigure the Quickdeck layout to avoid any modifications to the steel floor structure 
by attaching the slab on deck. Thus, the project team was able to efficiently coordinate a hanging 
and coring effort while accommodating the installation of MEP systems on the floor above (i.e. 
installation of bathroom fixtures and food service equipment), allowing crews to progress with 
work in a safe and minimally congested manner.  
A LABOR OF LOVE FOR THE 
PROJECT TEAM
Although the stadium is one of many 
important new buildings the CSU 
campus has seen over the years, it was 
particularly important to the Mortenson 
team and its trade partners. With nearly 
100 CSU graduates that are Team 
Members at Mortenson, the pride felt for 
the Green and Gold within the organization is strong.  More than a dozen Mortenson CSU alumni 
directly worked on the project, including one Team Member who had a truly unique perspective: 
Former CSU Ram football team member and Mortenson Project Engineer Cameron Moss.   Cam 
made his desire to be part of this project known. “For the most part, I just let them tell me where 
I’m going, but I definitely let them know this was somewhere I’d like to be,” he said. 
His involvement as a project engineer is special to the school and its renowned construction 
management program.   “I think it’s exactly that. It’s a unique combination of having a former 
student-athlete now working for Mortenson, getting a chance to do something historical in his 
career and early in his career,” said CSU athletic director Joe Parker in an interview with the 
Loveland Reporter-Herald.  In addition to Cam and the many other Mortenson CSU alumni Team 
Members who worked directly on the job, there were many others who supported efforts.  There 
were also dozens of CSU grads from our trade and design partners who worked on this project.  All 
told more than 1.75 million craft hours went into the delivery of this state-of-the art facility.  
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THE END RESULT
The excitement on campus is palpable 
as the Rams football team is off to 
a winning start in the new stadium.  
Fans visiting the stadium during a 
recent open house were left with “jaws 
dropping” and gushed about the quality 
of the construction. At a media tour 
held just before the official opening, 
Joe Parker stated, “we probably built 
the best stadium in America.”   
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